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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to identify and analyze the observable cognitive processes of
experts in mathematics while they work on proof-construction activities using the Principle
of Mathematical Induction (PMI). Graduate student participants in the study worked on
“nonstandard” mathematical induction problems that did not involve algebraic identities
or finite sums. This study identified some of the problem solving-strategies used by the
participants during a Cognitive Task Analysis (Feldon, 2007) as well as epistemological
obstacles they encountered while working with PMI. After the Cognitive Task Analysis, the
graduate students participated in two semi-structured interviews. These interviews explored
graduate students’ beliefs about proofs and proof techniques and situates their use of PMI
within the contexts of these beliefs.
Two primary theoretical frameworks were used to analyze participant cognition and the
qualitative data collected. First, the study used Action, Process, Object, Schema (APOS)
Theory (Asiala et al., 1996) to to study and analyze the participants’ conceptual understanding of the technique of mathematical induction and to test a preliminary genetic decomposition adapted from previous studies on PMI (Dubinsky & Lewin 1996, 1999; Garcia-Martinez
& Parraguez, 2017). Second, an Expert Knowledge Framework (Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 1999; Shepherd & Sande, 2014) was used to classify the participants’ responses to the
semi-structured interview questions according to several characteristics of expertise. The
study identified several results which (1) give insight to the mental constructions used by
mathematical experts when solving problem involving PMI; (2) offer some implications for
improving the instruction of PMI in introductory proofs classrooms; and (3) provide results
that allow for future comparison between expert and novice mathematical learners.
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1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the observable cognitive processes of
experts in mathematics while they work on proof-construction activities, specifically problems using the Principle of Mathematical Induction (PMI). Graduate student participants in
the study work on “nonstandard” mathematical induction problems in which the base case
has not been explicitly identified for them. This study seeks to identify the problem solvingstrategies used by the participants as well as epistemological obstacles they encounter while
working with PMI. In addition, this research explores graduate students’ beliefs about proofs
and proof techniques and situates their use of PMI within the contexts of these beliefs. Action, Process, Object, Schema (APOS) Theory, including the theory of schema development,
is the primary theoretical framework through which participant cognition is evaluated, analyzed, and discussed. In addition, learning theories involving expert learning and knowledge
organization also serve as foundational to the data analysis.

1.1.1

Significance of the Study

Proof lies at the center of advanced mathematical study and research. It follows that
mathematicians should be able to effectively read, write, and evaluate proofs. Krantz (2007)
argues “It is the proof concept that makes the subject cohere, that gives it its timelessness, and that enables it to travel well” (p.1). He explores the historical development of
mathematical proof and contextualizes its importance to the field of mathematics. Many
mathematicians argue that efforts to strengthen, expand, and adapt notions of mathematical proof have positive effects on the mathematical community as a whole (Thurston, 1994).
Proof is closely linked to the communication of mathematical ideas and the identification of
weaknesses within logical arguments, so a solid grasp of various proof techniques becomes
increasingly important for students as they advance in their studies. The 2015 CUPM Cur-
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riculum Guide’s second Content Recommendation claims that undergraduate math majors
should “learn to read, understand, analyze, and produce proofs at increasing depth as they
progress through a major.” This guide repetitively emphasizes the value of good proof education, especially for students pursuing a graduate degree in mathematics.
The literature is rich with research analyzing student difficulties with proof in general,
focusing on issues with the construction, comprehension, or evaluation of mathematical
proofs (Baker & Campbell, 2004; Hanna & Barbeau, 2008; Harel & Sowder, 1998, 2007; Inglis
& Alcock, 2012; Mejia-Ramos, et al., 2012;Piatek-Jimenez, 2010). Over the past few decades,
many math education researchers have tightened their focus to particular proof techniques
(Antonini, 2003; Chamberlain & Vidakovic, 2021; Demiray & Bostan, 2017; Harel, 2001). In
particular, the use of the Principle of Mathematical Induction as both a concept and a proof
technique has been the central focus of many research studies (Ashkenazi & Itzkovitch, 2014;
Atwood 2001; Dubinsky, 1986, 1989; Dubinsky & Lewin, 1986; Ernest 1984; Garcia-Martinez
& Parraguez, 2017). Avital and Libeskind (1978) argue that a deeper understanding of PMI
and the natural numbers is positively related to the “mathematical maturity of the learner”
(p. 429). Many curriculum-focused entities for grades K-12 encourage the introduction of
PMI at earlier stages of mathematics education as the principle can help students understand
iterative and recursive processes as well as introducing them to the natural numbers and their
properties (NCTM, 2000). Mathematical Induction is used across numerous disciplines of
mathematics, and the common epistemological difficulties associated with the topic make it
of particular interest for those who study the pedagogy of mathematics.
Many studies have characterized some students’ difficulties with mathematical induction.
Lowenthal and Eisenberg (1992) state that students view PMI as “a mechanical procedure
triggered by the statement, ‘Prove that for all n...’” (p. 238). Other research supports this
claim, finding that students perceive mathematical induction as indistinguishable from trialand-error and as a “technique of drawing a general conclusion from a number of individual
cases” (Harel, 2001, p. 11). Most of these studies concerning PMI and its associated epis-
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temological obstacles have focused on subjects in high school, undergraduate subjects, and
preservice teachers, but very few have focused on PMI with advanced mathematical students
or mathematicians. Further, much of the relevant research focuses on the standard types
of mathematical induction problems encountered in introductory courses to proof such as
the verification of algebraic equalities or verifications involving sums (Avital & Libeskind,
1976; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993). In advanced mathematics courses, however, proofs and
problems involving PMI do not often fit into one of these two limited categories of mathematical induction. A few studies have analyzed participants or suggested research using PMI
in nonstandard mathematical induction problems (geometry, graph theory, etc.), but they
are significantly less common (Ashkenazi & Itzkovitch, 2014; Garcia-Martinez & Parraguez,
2017). Relatively little is known about how the concept of PMI develops long-term as learners progress through their mathematical education. More research is needed to understand
how advanced mathematical learners think about and use mathematical induction so that
this progress can be closely examined in order to develop pedagogical practices that foster
the development of a deep understanding of PMI.

1.1.2

Purpose of the Study

In a seminal paper discussing the purpose and value of undergraduate math education
research, Selden & Selden (1994) say, “Making major changes in curriculum or teaching
methods with inadequate knowledge of how students learn is like designing flying machines
with little knowledge of aerodynamics” (p. 432) Their work focuses on importance of collegiate mathematics education research, and they emphasize the role of the learner within such
work. We cannot, or at the very least should not, advocate for pedagogical and curriculum
designs which do not take into account the individual learner. For every mathematical proof,
there is a writer and a reader. Effective proof curriculum necessarily requires research in
which the learner plays a central role. One common practice to develop effective pedagogical tools is to study learners who have successfully learned a topic and integrate relevant
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parts of their learning process into the development of curricular materials (Inglis & Alcock,
2012; Styliandes, Sandefur, & Watson, 2016; Weber, 2008). With this practice in mind,
this study seeks to add to the existing literature concerning learning as it specifically relates
to the Principle of Mathematical Induction by studying graduate students as they work on
problems using PMI and by investigating, through semi-structured interviews and Cognitive Task Analysis (See Section 2.1.1), both the solutions and thought processes associated
with their work on these problems. By studying students who have been, by certain measures, successful in pursuing mathematical study at a high level, we might gain insight into
how those with advanced mathematical skills think about and use mathematical induction.
This research provides some results which can be compared to and contrasted with previous
novice-participant studies to understand any similarities or differences between how experts
and novices think about and work on mathematical induction problems. Furthermore, the
findings provide insight into possible pedagogical adjustments to undergraduate curriculum
involving PMI.
This study expands on previous work on PMI in three main ways. First, the participants
in this study are mathematically advanced with years of proof-writing experience. These
participants can be considered experts in their field. For a discussion of experts and novices
in the context of knowledge construction and retrieval, see Section 2.1. The choice of expert
participants is intended to help isolate mathematical induction as the focus of the research.
Several studies (discussed in Section 2.4.2) identify issues with mathematical induction that
stem from technical or mathematical issues which have nothing to do with the inductive process itself, but rather gaps in mathematical knowledge (Avital & Libeskind, 1978; Ernest,
1984). Choosing mathematically advanced participants will allow the research to target the
proof technique of mathematical induction as the main object of study, with less need to
worry that participants will struggle with aspects of content or proof-writing like elementary
computations or general proof mechanics. Secondly, this research will explore “nonstandard”
examples of PMI. Namely, participants will work on questions which do not primarily involve
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the verification of algebraic identities or statements involving sums. These are the types of
mathematical induction problems most often used in introductory proofs instruction, and
research by Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson (2016) suggests that these types of mathematical induction problems can encourage students to use rote memorization or algorithmic
applications of PMI, which are not easily transferable to more difficult problems. By using
“nonstandard” mathematical induction problems, this research provides examples of more
nuanced applications of mathematical induction and more closely interrogates the participants’ understanding of each part of mathematical induction as well as their perceptions of
the relationships between these parts. Lastly, in contrast to mathematical induction problems given in introductory proofs courses, participants in this study work on problems in
which the base case is not explicitly given to them. This setup provides the opportunity
to study the base step of mathematical induction and creates an organic problem-solving
situation which more closely mimics the mathematical research process in which the base
case may need to be identified.

1.2

Research Questions

This research attempts to illustrate a holistic picture of how graduate students think
about PMI and situate it within their overall conceptual understanding of proof and proof
technique. The research design focuses on nonstandard problems involving the Principle of
Mathematical Induction. The research will be situated in the contexts of problem solving,
proof construction, and mathematical discussion. This research is guided and motivated by
the following questions:
1. How do experts describe the development of their conceptual understanding of PMI
over time?
2. How do experts situate their conceptual understanding of PMI in relation to the notions
of proof and proof technique?
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3. When viewing a novel problem, how do experts determine whether or not mathematical
induction is an appropriate method for proving a statement?
4. What obstacles, if any, do experts face when solving mathematical induction problems
in which mathematical induction is not explicitly specified as the technique to use?
5. How do experts explain and define the two primary parts of PMI (the base step and
the inductive step) and the perceived relationship, if any, between these two primary
parts?

1.3

Epistemological Perspectives

This research is primarily rooted in two fundamental epistemological perspectives which
are linked to the theoretical frameworks discussed in Section 1.4. First, many factors motivating this research, as well as the researcher’s long-term goals as a collegiate mathematics
education researcher are rooted in a postructuralist foundation. Second, several of the primary theoretical perspectives used in this research are inextricably linked to constructivism
and constructivist frameworks. Post-structuralism and constructivism both provide unique,
though tangent, treatments of the individual and the notion of individual experience. Because these two perspectives strongly inform and influence this research, a brief summary of
each of them is included here.

1.3.1

Post-Structuralism

Post-Structuralism can be difficult to formally define. This difficulty arises both because
poststructuralism, by nature, resists definition, and because it is both rooted in and in
opposition to structuralism, from which it gets its name. In his influential text in qualitative
research, Crotty (1998) posits that the introduction of the prefix “post” to an epistemological
perspective can be interpreted in several distinct ways. In some cases, such as with positivism
and post-positivism, the addition of “post” can simply be indicative of a chronological or
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logical continuation of the initial epistemology with little to no modifications to the core
tenants of the perspective. He states that post-positivism “remains in the broad tradition
of positivism and retains many of its features” (Crotty, 1998, p. 197). In contrast, Crotty
(1998) also highlights post-modernism and modernism, asserting that “post-modernism is a
thoroughgoing rejection of modernism and an overturning of the foundation upon which it
rests”(p.198). In the case of structrualism and post-structuralism, the latter of these two
interpretations of “post” is most appropriate.
Crotty (1998) defines structuralism as “an approach to the study of human culture, centered on the search for constraining patterns or structures which claims that individual
phenomena have meaning only by virtue of their relation to other phenomena as elements
within a systematic structure” (p. 212). However, these structures were often binary representations of power, and this epistemology privileges established hegemonic structures above
the experiences and thoughts of the individual. This is a crucial distinction between structuralism and post-structuralism. While early structuralism viewed social power structures
as dichotomous, and an individual as being valuable or relevant only in their role as a piece
of the whole, post-structuralism assumes a more spectral approach to power structures and
views the individual as important on their own and as being capable of operating independently of the group.
Many of these post-structuralist notions underpin educational research, even if the connection is not always explicitly mentioned. Mathematics education researchers have noted
that one difference in qualitative and quantitative research lies in the role and importance
of “generalizability.” Selden and Selden (1998) note that in math education research “Even
very careful observations only suggest, but do not prove, general principles” (p. 432). In
this way, Collegiate Mathematics Education (CME) research does not usually seek to situate an individual’s cognitive processes or problem solving as being only valuable for how it
can generalize to a group of learners or how it can inform pedagogical practice. Instead, it
uses more in-depth methods like interviews, longitudinal studies, case studies, etc. to form
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more comprehensive illustrations of individual learners as valid entities in their own right.
Williams (2014) says in the post-structuralist view, “truth becomes a matter of perspective
rather than absolute order.” This description intimates a link between post-structuralist
thought and cognitive models, like APOS Theory, which view learning and cognition as
individualized and non-linear.

1.3.2

Constructivism

While post-structuralism is primarily concerned with notions of general and individual
truths and what knowledge is valued, constructivism is an epistemological perspective which
considers the ways in which knowledge is constructed. Crotty (1998) defines constructivism
as “the view that all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent
upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings
and their world.” In other words, Constructivism maintains that an individual constructs
knowledge in relation to their previous experiences and knowledge. This epistemological
viewpoint provides structure for theories, like APOS Theory and Expert/Novice theories,
concerned with how new and pre-existing knowledges relate to one another. While constructivism does not argue that there is a single, all-encompassing pattern of learning, it does
provide some potential structures within which multiple possible patterns can be observed
and cataloged. Some examples of these structures are discussed in the following section.

1.4

Theoretical Frameworks

This research is informed, guided, and influenced by two primary theoretical frameworks,
APOS Theory and an Expert Knowledge Framework. APOS Theory, a theoretical framework
developed by mathematician Ed Dubinksy, is based on Jean Piaget’s theory of reflective
abstraction. APOS Theory will be used as the first primary framework in the data analysis
of this study. The theory of schema development further expands the APOS framework and
will also be used as part of the APOS-based data analysis. In addition to APOS Theory, two
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existing theoretical frameworks classifying characteristics of expertise will be incorporated
into a single categorization framework, which will also be used as part of the data analysis.
This framework will be referred to as the ‘Expert Knowledge Framework,’ since it captures
and classifies various characteristics of expert knowledge. An overview of both of these
frameworks can be found in the following sections. The existing literature relating to these
two frameworks is detailed in Chapter 2, and more information on how these frameworks
were used within the data analysis can be found in Chapter 3.

1.4.1

Piaget’s Reflective Abstraction

Jean Piaget was a Switzerland-born cognitive psychologist whose prodigious research was
primarily guided by the question “How does knowledge grow?” (Jean Piaget Society, 2021).
While studying the ways in which individuals gain and develop knowledge, Piaget formed
his theory of reflective abstraction which can be broken down into two parts- reflection and
abstraction. Arnon et. al. (2014) describe reflection as a process of contemplation about
content, operations, and concepts, while abstraction is described as reconstruction and reorganization of content and operations. This reconstruction and reorganization results in the
operations being modified into content to which new operations can then be applied. There
are two characteristics of reflective abstraction which are worth noting in greater detail. First,
the restructuring of operations into content is indicative of Piaget’s belief that higher level
structures can be constructed from low level structures. This notion is crucial for learning
theories and pedagogical practices rooted in the idea that new knowledge can be built onto
and connected to previous knowledge. Second, Piaget argues that this restructuring is cyclic
and repetitive, therefore enabling this process to repeat itself as new knowledge continues
to be constructed. These two characteristics of reflective abstraction have been important
to those who have used Piaget’s work to develop theories used in mathematics education
research, like Ed Dubinksy’s APOS Theory (Dubinsky, 2000; Dubinsky & McDonald, 2001).
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1.4.2

APOS Theory

APOS Theory is a theoretical framework based on a refined model of Piaget’s reflective
abstraction discussed in the previous section. It is a constructivist framework developed
by mathematician Ed Dubinsky to study students learning mathematics. This framework
is based on the idea that students traverse through four distinct, but related, stages while
learning (Arnon et al., 2014). APOS Theory maintains that if a student is able to successfully
navigate, sometimes cyclically and non-linearly, through the four stages: Action-ProcessObject-Schema, then the student will, to some extent, have a sufficient grasp on a topic. A
brief example of each of the four stages follows.
In APOS Theory, an individual is at the action stage when they are able to respond
to external stimuli by transforming objects, performing the necessary steps for the transformation. For example, a student at the action stage, when working on mathematical
induction problems, might exhibit the ability to use mathematical induction as a formulaic
algorithm to verify algebraic identities. The action-stage student may be able to “plug in”
the appropriate value for the base case, then show how P (n) leads them algebraically to
P (n + 1) for the specific algebraic equality given. As the student continues to reflect on
the action of verifying a base case or shifting from P (n) to P (n + 1) in algebraic uses of
mathematical induction and begins to be able to imagine or perform these actions in their
head without the use of any external stimuli, we say that the action has been interiorized
into a process. A student who is at the process stage of mathematical induction might now
be able to imagine verifying a base case for a given statement P (n) in their mind without
the need to write their work down. Further, a student at a process stage will be able to
think about the inductive implication P (n) ⇒ P (n + 1) along with the base case P0 without
the visual stimuli of the written algebraic equality grounding and concretizing them. When
the individual can think of these Processes of the inductive step and base step as a whole
entities to which they could apply actions or other transformations we say that the student exhibits an Object stage of understanding of mathematical induction. Continuing with
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the mathematical induction example, a student at the object stage might be able to think
about and use backwards mathematical induction or double mathematical induction. Here,
a reversal (backward mathematical induction) or multiplicative (double mathematical induction) action is applied to the mathematical induction Object. Lastly, when the collection
of Actions, Processes, Objects, and other Schemas connected to some initial concept begin
to form into a coherent understanding for the individual, this is called a Schema (Dubinsky,
2002). Schemas are uniquely formed based on individual experiences. For instance, once a
student has formed an mathematical induction schema, they may be able to think about
how this schema connects to other schemas like the Logic Schema, the Function Schema,
or the Method-Of-Proof Schema. Schemas may develop alongside or in-tandem with other
schemas. For more information on this phenomenon, see Section 1.4.3. Importantly, although APOS Theory is presented in a hierarchical manner, the theory also emphasizes that
this cognitive construction is non-linear and often cycles back and forth through the four
structures. APOS Theory identifies several mechanisms through which students cycle and
progress through the four stages.
The primary mechanisms through which students move through (often non-linearly) the
stages in APOS Theory are detailed in the following discussion. The aforementioned transition from action to process is called interiorization. Simply, interiorization occurs when
a student is able to transition from performing an action to imagining the action without
external stimuli. The mechanism through which students can form associations and connections between processes in a particular schema is called coordination. Additionally, a
process can undergo reversal within the student’s mind as they continue to reflect on it.
Then, a process becomes an object through a mechanism called encapsulation. Importantly,
students can de-encapsulate an object into the process or processes it originated from in
order to assimilate new knowledge or to enmesh or combine different objects based on newly
acquired information and coordination (Arnon et. al. 2014). An illustration of these stages
and processes adapted from the work of Arnon et. al. (2014) is included below.
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Figure 1.1: APOS Theory illustration adapted from Arnon et. al. (2014)

APOS theory has been used by a host of mathematics education researchers in various
branches of mathematics. The most relevant of these works will be covered in Chapter 2.
In particular, one important aspect of the APOS research process is the construction of a
genetic decomposition.
Genetic decompositions operate as rubric-like models for explaining cognitive progression
through the APOS cycle. In APOS Theory, they are used as research tools to identify and
summarize some perceived necessary conditions students should meet in order to develop sufficient understanding of mathematical concepts (Arnon et al. 2014). It is important to note
that genetic decompositions offer a potential model of how a concept may be constructed in
students’ minds. The researcher initially creates a preliminary genetic decomposition. This
preliminary model is based on the historical development of the concept, known epistemological difficulties, relevant research, the researcher’s or researchers’ own experiences with the
topic, and, occasionally, another author’s initial decomposition from a previous study. This
initial genetic decomposition is crucial to the APOS research cycle. It informs the creation
and implementation of research instruments like surveys, interviews, activities, etc. and
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further influences the strategies for the analysis of the collected data. The initial genetic decomposition also guides the instructors as they develop curriculum for teaching the concept
in question. Often, the research cycle starts with an initial genetic decomposition, followed
by the development of teaching material or research instruments and finally, instruction or
research using these materials. Afterward, data is collected and analyzed, the genetic decomposition is revised, and the teaching material or research instrument is modified for a
repetition of the cycle to start anew.
During data analysis, the preliminary genetic decomposition is evaluated. Researchers
check to see if the study’s instruments, created based on the initial decomposition, helped
students progress through mental constructions suggested by the genetic decomposition.
Often, the data indicates that something about student understanding is not completely
captured by the preliminary genetic decomposition. Based on the evaluation, the initial
genetic decomposition may be revised, refined or enlarged to account for the findings of the
study. The final goal of this cyclic evaluation and revision process is a genetic decomposition
that closely and accurately describes the cognitive development of the concept in question.
The hope is that, while learning and cognition is individual, the genetic decomposition
will capture a patterned progression of cognition which is applicable to a large group of
individuals. This “final” genetic decomposition can be used to design teaching materials that
effectively facilitate student learning in mathematics courses (Arnon et al. 2014). In Sections
2.5.1 and 2.5.2, an initial genetic decomposition of PMI and its revision are presented,
respectively.
Because cognitive processes are, by nature, not directly observable, tools like genetic decompositions become necessary to help us create models that link the observable to the
unobservable. Research using genetic decompositions accomplishes this by testing for patterns in participants’ verbal explanations and physical actions and yielding an appropriate
list of cognitive progressions based on these patterns. The fours stages of APOS provide
structures and mechanisms into which these genetic decompositions can be grounded. This
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serves as one way for a researcher to describe and interpret some pieces of learning and mental construction. In particular, throughout the APOS process, a student forms, develops,
and refines schemas. One theoretical framework for analyzing and discussing this so-called
schema development is discussed in the following section.

1.4.3

Schema Development and the Triad

As mentioned in the previous section, knowledge construction is a deeply individualized
process. The progression through the stages of APOS theory, detailed in Section 1.4.2, will
most likely occur or progress differently for distinct individuals. Schema development is an
aspect of APOS Theory that helps describe and explain how students develop and expand
their understanding of mathematical concepts. Schemas are complex mental structures,
which may consist of a single concept/definition that is applied in various situations or may
instead be composed of several interconnected concepts (Arnon et. al, 2014). As an individual’s schema develops in their mind, connections are often created between the different
components of the schema. Different Actions, Processes, and Objects can be introduced
into this existing schema through a process which is often called assimilation. Additionally,
multiple schemas can be assimilated into a new schema which uses components from several
schemas. For example, the the Implication Schema is involved in the development of the
Induction Schema, because the idea of implication is inherently involved in the construction
of the inductive step in PMI.
Studying the development of an individual’s schema has the potential to aid in pedagogical
research in several key ways. First, studying the relationships between concepts within
a well-developed schema or connections between different schemas can provide insight for
useful ways to structure or organize how we teach these concepts. The study of schema
development can also increase our understanding of how individuals use schemas to reason
in novel problem-solving situations. Studying how an individual accesses and deploys a
schema during problem-solving can illuminate the underlying structure of this schema. In
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order to provide a framework for naming and categorizing the evolution and progression
of an individual’s schema, Piaget and Garcı́a (1989) proposed three stages of this schema
development: Intra-, Inter-, and Trans-. These three stages have been adapted from Piaget’s
work to APOS theory and collectively referred as the triad of schema development, and
many authors have conducted studies using this framework (Baker, Clark, et al., 1997;
Cooley, & Trigueros, 2000; Cotrill, 1999; McDonald et al., 2000). The triad has been found
to be effective as an additional tool of analysis when trying to understand how various
schemas interact with one another. In particular, this theoretical orientation is useful in
situations where schemas have had the time to become cohesive. As the participants of
this study are experts with years of practice reading, writing, and constructing proofs, they
theoretically have well-developed schemas which interact with each other in multiple ways.
This breakdown of schema development is therefore used in the analysis of the interview
data to help classify participants’ observable schema organization. Each of the three stages
in the triad is briefly outlined below, and applications of this triad in the proposed research
will be discussed in Chapter 3.
The initial stage, Intra-, is identifiable when Actions, Processes, or Objects within the
Schema are viewed as isolated from one another. This stage of development of the Schema
can be exemplified by individuals who focus on single, isolated components of a schema. In
particular, a student may be able to identify a set of local properties between objects within
a specific schema. For example, an individual who can identify similarities in the base
cases and inductive implications of a certain class of mathematical induction problems (like
routine algebraic verifications for natural numbers) shows evidence of schema development
characteristic of the Intra-stage of the mathematical induction schema. An individual at this
stage of schema development may also view the various parts of mathematical induction as
being isolated. We will refer to this stage as Intra-induction or Intra-PMI for the remainder
of the paper.
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The next stage, Inter-, is characterized when some relationships begin to form between
Actions, Processes, or Objects within some Schema. As knowledge continues to develop
within the mind of an individual and their schema is refined and expanded, connections
between different components of the schema begin to form. These connections indicate that
an individual is beginning to operate in the Inter-stage of the triad. For example, when an
individual is aware of the connection between the base step and inductive step, they are
exhibiting evidence that they are operating in the Inter-stage of the mathematical induction
schema. Students at this stage of schema development should also be able to translate the
general structure of mathematical induction within a particular problem (i.e. identify what
P (n) ⇒ P (n + 1) means in the context of a given problem. We will refer to this stage of
development as Inter-induction or Inter-PMI.
The last stage, Trans-, can be characterized by an implicit or explicit coherence and
understanding of relationships developed in the Inter- stage. An individual exhibits indicators they are operating in the Trans-stage of development when they can conceptualize
the schema as a whole, cohesive unit. Further, the individual is able to determine whether
the schema is appropriate for a given scenario. For example, an individual operating in the
Trans-induction, or Trans-PMI, stage of development understands the underlying structure
of a general argument using PMI, and can determine when the approach is appropriate when
given a novel proof-construction problem. An individual at this stage can easily situate the
relationships from the Inter-PMI stage within the particular context of the problem.

1.4.4

Expert Knowledge Classification

Because this research takes experts as its participants, the data analysis will also take
into consideration how expertise may affect and shape the data. This study will categorize
participant responses during semi-structured interviews and Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA)
using a classification of expert knowledge organization and retrieval. The items in this
theoretical framework have been developed by researchers studying expertise. These nine
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items highlight some of the characteristics classifying aspects of expert knowledge.
1. Pattern Recognition: Experts notice features and meaningful patterns of information
that are not noticed by novices.
2. Knowledge Organization: Experts have aquired a great deal of content knowledge that
is organized in ways that reflect a deep understanding of their subject matter.
3. Contextual Conditioning: Experts’ knowledge cannot be reduced to sets of isolated
facts or propositions but, instead, reflects contexts of applicability: that is, the knowledge is “conditionalized” on a set of circumstances.
4. Flexible Retrieval: Experts are able to flexibly retrieve important aspects of their
knowledge with little attentional effort.
5. Variable Communication: Experts may or may not be able to teach others effectively,
and expertise is not necessarily a good indicator of an individual’s ability to communicate their own knowledge.
6. Novel Application: Experts have varying levels of flexibility in their approach to new
situations.
7. Mathematical Fluency: Mathematical experts can decode mathematical language and
symbols and skim over known mathematical concepts.
8. Comprehension Monitoring: Experts self-check performance, and persist through difficulty when working on tasks.
9. External Exploration: Experts search the relevant text along with outside resources to
gain a better understanding of the concept in question.
This classification is adapted from two primary sources which are explored in detail in Section
2.1. A detailed description of this framework’s role in the data analysis can be found in
Chapter 3.
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1.5

Chapter Summary and Outline of the Study

The beginning of this chapter provided a brief explanation of the significance of mathematical proof within the mathematics community at large as well as its importance for students
studying mathematics. Secondly, the chapter contained a precursory explanation of some literature regarding the teaching, learning, and comprehension of proofs involving the Principle
of Mathematical Induction. Afterward, the chapter situated the current research within the
existing body of work, highlighting both the connections to previous research and the ways
in which this work seeks to expand the literature. Lastly, this introductory chapter identified
both the epistemological perspectives and theoretical frameworks which inform and guide
the research, giving a brief description of the primary theories used of interpretation and
analysis in the remaining pages.
The remainder of this research report will address the research questions outlined in Section
1.2. Chapter 2 contains a review of literature relevant to mathematical proof, PMI, and
the theoretical frameworks outlined in Section 1.4. This chapter is intended to inform the
reader of both past and current research adjacent to the main topic of this work as well
as relevant background information. Chapter 3 includes a detailed account of methodology,
data collection and analysis methods, and study design. Chapter 4 presents the results of
the research, and Chapter 5 offers a summary and conclusion of the work along with study
limitations and thoughts for future work. Finally, the Appendix includes relevant materials
associated with the research project including interview guides and problem solutions.
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2

LITERATURE REVIEW
The introductory chapter situated this research proposal within the broader literature

around proof and proof using PMI. This chapter will provide more detailed descriptions of
the most relevant results in literature on topics associated with the focus of the proposed
research. Section 2.1 will outline work done on how experts learn and communicate within
their field of expertise, with special attention to studies focusing on mathematical experts.
Section 2.2 will provide a description of relevant studies dealing with the broad category
of mathematical proof, focusing on work done with proof construction and evaluation, in
particular. Section 2.3 will give a comprehensive description of research involving proof
using PMI. Lastly, Section 2.4 will cover two works in detail relating APOS Theory and
PMI.

2.1

Experts and Novices

As this proposed research focuses on graduate students as its subjects, it is important
to examine the literature pertaining to the differences in experts and novices. This study
intentionally focuses on graduate students due to the length and breadth of their proofwriting experience as well as their experience with a wide array of mathematical content.
This section will discuss general classifications of expert knowledge as well as work done
specifically with mathematical experts.

2.1.1

Expert Knowlege Framework and Cognitive Task Analysis

What does it mean to be an expert? Numerous studies have explored this topic (Chi,
1978; DeGroot, 1965; Feldon, 2007; Flavell, 1994; Hatano & Inagaki, 2000; Hinsley, et al.,
1977; Glaser & Chi, 1988; Robinson & Hayes, 1978; Schneider 1993). Other researchers
analyze effective methods for studying expert participants and extracting their knowledge
for instructional design purposes (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006; Feldon 2007; Feldon
& Tofel-Grehl, 2013; McAdams, 2001; McAllister, 1996; Wegner, 2002). Most commonly,
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studies involving experts find that it is not only what an individual knows that makes them
an expert, but also how their knowledge is organized and accessed. Discussion about expert
knowledge construction can be situated within the framework proposed in the second chapter
of How People Learn: Brain, Mind, Experience, and School, an extensive exploration on the
science of learning. This framework identifies six key features that are characteristic of expert
knowledge, synthesized from several well-known studies on expertise. The six characteristics
in the framework are described below.
1. Experts notice features and meaningful patterns of information that are not noticed
by novices.
2. Experts have acquired a great deal of content knowledge that is organized in ways that
reflect a deep understanding of their subject matter.
3. Experts’ knowledge cannot be reduced to sets of isolated facts or propositions but,
instead, reflects contexts of applicability: that is, the knowledge is “conditionalized”
on a set of circumstances.
4. Experts are able to flexibly retrieve important aspects of their knowledge with little
attentional effort.
5. Though experts know their disciplines thoroughly, this does not guarantee that they
are able to teach others.
6. Experts have varying levels of flexibility in their approach to new situations (p.19).
These six items were adapted and named to form the initial part of the theoretical framework
discussed in Section 1.4.4. These characteristics of expert knowledge are useful to help us
identify and classify expert behaviors, which can be useful for the development of pedagogical
tools. The work underscores the importance of studying expert knowledge, claiming that
“understanding expertise is important because it provides insights to the nature of thinking
and problem solving.” However, while this framework gives us a way to classify expertise and
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its characteristics, the methods we use to study expertise and use it to affect pedagogical
change must also be carefully considered.
Feldon (2007) navigates the nuances of working with expert participants in a study. In
particular, highlights important issues identified by studies on expertise. Research indicates
that some individuals, with experts being particularly susceptible, attribute routine or procedural actions to intentional decision making (Wegner, 2002). This attribution can cause
them to craft intentionally-reasoned descriptions of behaviors, even if these descriptions are
not an accurate explanation for the choices they made. Studies indicate that this phenomena
may even cause participants to give such a false explanation regardless of whether or not
it is compatible with the reality of the actual events that transpired. This has particularly
important implications for experts in an academic setting. Experts, especially academics
who operate in an instructional capacity, often explain processes involved in their disciplines
to students or colleagues. In these roles, they become accustomed to identifying and describing linkages between successful problem-solving and intentional actions and decisions. This
can, and has been shown to, elicit fabrications or exaggerations when self-describing certain
choices as calculated or deliberate. Studies show that experts may be even more susceptible
to these types of misattributions or hyperboles (McAdams, 2001; McAllister, 1996). After
noting these issues, and the research studies which have identified them, Feldon (2007) also
identifies strategies to avoid these pitfalls when conducting research with experts.
Feldon (2007) notes that a specific cognitive engineering tool called guided knowledge
elicitation shows promise to be an effective instrument for gaining the pedagogical benefits
of studying experts while minimizing the impacts of the previously-mentioned issues, and
this tool is explored in more detail by Feldon & Tofel-Grehl (2013). Cognitive Task Analysis
(CTA), a specific type of guided knowledge elicitation, has been shown to effectively elicit and
capture expert knowledge in ways that successfully translate to instructional development.
Crandall, Klein, and Hoffman (2006) argue that CTA techniques identify the knowledge and
processes experts use while performing complex tasks in their discipline. Feldon & Tofel-
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Grehl (2013) perform a meta-analysis on studies using CTA to study expertise. The authors
argue this meta-analysis grants “the ability to combine the findings of multiple, independent studies to assess aggregate effects of an independent variable (CTA-based elicitation
of instructional content, in this case)” (Feldon & Tofel-Grehl, 2013, p. 294). In this case,
the meta-analysis indicates that when CTA is used to elicit expert knowledge, the resulting
CTA-based instructional materials are statistically more effective than instructional materials derived from other experimental or study designs (i.e. unguided expert self-report). The
authors conclude that the significant statistical effects noted indicate that CTA “offers great
value to organizations with human performance needs,” giving it the potential to be a useful
tool in pedagogical research (Feldon & Tofel-Grehl, 2013, p. 302).
The first part of this section highlights part of a classification framework that will be
used during the data analysis of the current study. In addition, this section highlights
some common issues arising from studies with expert participants, and identifies CTA as
a method which has shown promise for successfully translating research on expertise to
instructional materials. The use of this expert framework and CTA in the current study will
be detailed in Chapter 3. In particular, this work seeks to study mathematical expert and
to use these experts to develop and test new pedagogical tools for mathematics classrooms.
Research which specifically involves mathematical experts will therefore also be pertinent
to the current work. Several math education research studies have used experts as their
subjects. A few of these studies are explored in more detail in the following sections.

2.1.2

Studies Involving Mathematical Experts

In addition to the research conducted on expertise in general, there have been several
studies conducted that specifically focus on mathematical experts and expertise (Inglis &
Alcock 2012; Sella & Cohen-Kadosh, 2018; Shanahan, Shanahan, & Misischia 2011; Shepherd & Sande 2014; Sweller, Mawer, & Ward, 1983; Weber 2008). These studies explore
characteristics of expertise that are unique to mathematics and contextualize general results
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on expertise in mathematically-focused situations. This sectioni will restrict attention to
several of these studies that offer results pertinent to the current research. These studies are
explored in more detail below.
Shepherd & Sande (2014) studied three undergraduate students, three graduate students
and three faculty members to understand how mathematically advanced subjects read for
comprehension in mathematical texts and compared their findings to the reading habits of
novice readers. The authors conducted two-hour sessions consisting of the participant reading aloud followed by an interview period. The authors identified three main components
of reading and proof comprehension in which differences were noted between the undergraduate students and the more advanced participants: Mathematical Fluency, Comprehension
Monitoring, and Engagement. First, mathematical fluency consisted of decoding mathematical language and symbols, skimming or not skimming over familiar concepts, and reading
verbatim or summarizing. The study found that the more mathematically advanced the
reader, the more likely they were to skim and summarize. Second, Comprehension Monitoring consisted of performance checking, time spent on understanding, and willingness to
persevere. Experts in the study were more likely to spend more time, perform comprehension checks more frequently, and be more likely to persevere through difficult concepts.
Lastly, Engagement consisted of exploring and searching the text and outside resources to
gain better understanding of the concept in question. Experts in the study were much more
likely to explore and search than their novice counterparts. Although Shepherd & Sande
used these three components of analysis to study mathematical reading and proof comprehension, these components can also be applied in the context of proof construction, and
they will be used as part of the data analysis framework outlined in Chapter 3. These three
items make up the last three parts of the framework discussed in 1.4.4. Together with the
six items from the previous section, they form an adapted classification framework which
will inform both the study design and the data analysis of the current study. Shepherd and
Sande’s findings are consistent with other work which has studied the differences in experts
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and novices in general (Glaser, 2013; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Stehr & Grundmann, 2011).
These works most often indicate that identifying differences in novices and experts can be
helpful in developing curriculum which effectively teaches novice students to be more successful in problem-solving. Other studies focusing on mathematical experts have identified
and analyzed ways in which these experts interact with mathematical proof, specifically.
Inglis & Alcock (2012) conducted a study comparing the proof validation strategies of
undergraduate students (novices) and active mathematicians (experts). For a definition of
proof validation, refer to Section 2.2.2. The study used eye tracking software to understand
proof validation behavior without relying on verbal descriptions of the validation process.
While the experts were more consistent than the novices in their ability to accurately validate
some of the proofs, the study found some disagreement between experts on the validity of
several other proofs presented. However, the key difference discovered by the authors was in
the “dwell times” (Inglis & Alcock, 2012, p.371) on different aspects of the proofs. Novices
in the study spent significantly more time, proportionally, dwelling on formulas within the
proofs. While the actual time spent on formulas was roughly the same for both groups,
experts spent proportionally more time dwelling on the non-formulaic portions of the proof
(Inglis & Alcock, 2012).
Inglis & Alcock’s (2012) study also sought to analyze Weber and Meija-Ramos’s (2011)
proposed two validation strategies of zooming in and zooming out. Zooming in is a line-byline approach which targets the “problematic parts of the proof” (Weber & Meija-Ramos,
2011, p. 340) and zooming out consists of a more holistic approach to proof validation which
focuses on the overarching ideas and methods used in the proof rather than individual details.
Inglis & Alcock (2012) tried to see if participant eye-movements during their study validated
these two proof-validation strategies. The authors tracked the number of saccades, rapid eye
movements between two or more fixation points, in relation to line numbers of the proof to
determine if the participants seemed to use a zooming-in (linear progression through proof)
or a zooming-out (nonlinear progression through proof). The study found that the average
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number of between-line saccades was significantly larger for experts (78.8 per proof) than
for novices (53.3 per proof), suggesting that the mathematicians may employ more zooming
out techniques than their undergraduate counterparts (Inglis & Alcock, 2012, p.375).
These findings indicate that most of these between-line saccades, for both experts and
novices, were primarily limited to adjacent lines, suggesting that participants were checking
the places where logical or mathematical justification was happening between consecutive
lines. Further, experts had significantly more saccades than did the novices in the study
overall. This evidence supports the idea that experts practice the zooming in technique more
often than novices during proof validation (Inglis & Alcock 2012). The works discussed in
this section establish that some known differences exist between the ways in which expert
and novice mathematicians study and read mathematical works. This suggests the potential
for other differences in mathematical thinking, including in proof-based activities. While the
current research is not focused on tracking eye-movements, it is concerned with identifying
and understanding which aspects of proof experts might focus on. Therefore, some of the
findings of this proof validation study proved useful during the data analysis portion of
the research. In another proof validation study, Kieth Weber (2008) also studied the proof
validation strategies of expert mathematicians.
Weber’s 2008 study involved 8 mathematicians, all faculty with Ph.D’s at a regional institution. These participants were given 8 purported proofs for number theory statements. Half
of these purported proofs were for basic number theory statements, called the ”elementary
arguments,” and half were more sophisticated arguments, called the ”advanced arguments”
(Weber 2008, p. 436-437). These mathematicians were asked to determine if each of these
8 proofs constituted valid proofs, then asked follow-up questions associated with proof validation. For a definition and discussion of proof validation, see Section 2.1.2. The study
identified “225 instances in which a participant read an assertion whose validity could reasonably be judged” (Weber, 2008, p. 438). From these 255, 77 instances were identified in
which the participant determined that the assertion with some explicit analyzable comment
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after being unsure about it’s validity at first. 71 of these 77 instances occurred when participants were analyzing the advanced arguments, and these instances served as the primary
basis for Weber’s findings discussed below.
Weber (2008) identified two primary types of arguments used in these cases to accept a
claim as valid. Property-based arguments were instances when a participant validated an
assertion using known properties or concepts pertinent to the proof. Example-based arguments were when the participant accepted the validity of a claim solely by examining the
statement in the context of carefully chosen examples. Property-based arguments included
the construction of subproofs or the construction of informal justifications. Example-based
arguments primarily consisted of identification of systemic patterns or utilization of a specific example to construct a generic proof. In a few cases, participants also based their
argument on their failure to find a counterexample or on a single carefully chosen example
that convinced them of an assertion’s validity. Weber notes that several of these forms of
arguments that participants used to convince themselves of an assertion’s validity would not
be acceptable as a formal proof. Weber (2008) says, “mathematicians would not judge an
open theorem to be true simply because they were unable to find a counterexample to this
theorem, yet the participants in this study would sometimes accept particular assertions
within a proof to be true for this reason” (p. 450). He offers two hypotheses for this phenomena. First, it is possible that the mathematicians understood how their example-based
inductive reasoning could be generalized, but did not express this in a way that was observable. Secondly, it is possible that the participants were only requiring a high level of
confidence in a statement’s validity, rather than absolute certainty. In either case, this study
offers insight to some important processes involved in the validation of proofs with expert
participants and may be indicative of patterns in the way expert mathematicians think about
the validity of assertions and mathematical proofs. In particular, Weber’s hypotheses for the
expert behavior identified by his study also offer potential explanations for the findings of the
current study and will be used to help in interpreting some of the results in Chapter 4. We-
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ber’s procedure in this study asks participants to read, comprehend, and validate purported
proofs. These three tasks represent only a few of the activities which can be associated with
mathematical proofs. The following section explores a detailed description of several kinds
of activities associated with proof.

2.2

Mathematical Proof

Because proof plays an integral role in mathematics education and research, there are numerous studies primarily focused on mathematical proof (Hanna, 2002; Jones, 2010; Krantz,
2007; Meija-Ramos & Inglis, 2009; Selden & Selden, 2017; Weber, 2005; Weber & MejiaRamos, 2014), proof techniques (Antonini, 2003; Baker, 1996; Chamberlain & Vidakovic,
2021; Demiray & Bostan, 2017; Harel, 2001), and student difficulties associated with proof
(Dreyfus, 1999; Ernest, 1982; Moore, 1990; Samkoff & Weber, 2015; Selden & Selden, 2011).
It is a common pedagogical practice in most traditional advanced mathematics classrooms
for mathematics students to learn the concept of proof by reading and studying proofs presented by their instructors during lecture. However, much of the research regarding proofs
in mathematics education indicates that most students do not effectively learn proof in this
manner (Dreyfus, 1999; Selden & Selden, 2011; Weber & Mejia-Ramos, 2014). This section
will begin by furnishing an operational definition for proof and distinguishing between four
different aspects of understanding a mathematical proof as outlined by Selden & Selden
(2017). Two of these aspects, construction and validation, are relevant to the current work
and will be explored in greater detail. Next, a few studies involving known student difficulties associated with mathematical proof will also be detailed. Lastly, since this study focuses
on a particular proof technique, some studies analyzing particular proof techniques will also
be summarized.
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2.2.1

Definition of Proof and Four Aspects of Proof

There have been many studies focused on mathematical proof, but the approaches of
these works vary greatly. Likewise, there is not necessarily one universal definition of what
constitutes a mathematical proof. This research primarily relies on the definition of proof
outlined by Stylianides (2007), although the researcher also acknowledges that this definition
is certainly not all-encompassing. Here, proof is defined as “a mathematical argument, a
connected sequence of assertions for or against a mathematical claim” (Stylianides, 2007, p.
291) which uses statements, methods of argumentation, and communication representations
which are generally accepted by the mathematical community. This definition captures two
important aspects of proof. First, it recognizes that mathematical proof requires the use of
specific tools and methods. These include, but are not limited to, objects like definitions,
logical statements, and axioms. Second, the definition acknowledges that a valid proof
should adhere to some set of standards widely accepted by most, or all, of the mathematical
community. These two requirements provide a solid foundation for a general description
of mathematical proof. In addition to understanding what is considered to constitute a
valid proof, another common question involves determining when a student exhibits a solid
conceptual grasp on mathematical proof. There are many ways in which researchers choose to
evaluate whether a student (1) has a sufficient grasp on this definition of proof and (2) is able
to create and evaluate proofs adhering to the two characteristics of proof given by Styliandes
(2007). In order to provide a framework to help with this type of evaluation, Selden &
Selden (2017) classified aspects of proof into four categories: construction, comprehension,
evaluation, and validation. This research focuses primarily on proof construction, but also
includes elements of proof validation. These two aspects of proof are defined in the following
sections, and a summary of some relevant literature is included.
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2.2.2

Proof Construction

Selden and Selden (2017) define proof construction as an attempt to “construct correct
proofs at the level expected of university mathematics students” (p. 1). Construction is perhaps the most well-studied of the four aspects of proof, with the bibliographic study discussed
in Section 2.2 estimating that around 77% of studies involving mathematical proof focus on
proof construction (Meija-Ramos & Inglis, 2009). Common difficulties with proof construction have been documented frequently within proofs-focused research (Andrew, 2007; D.
Baker & Campbell, 2004; J. D. Baker, 1996; Dubinsky, 1986, 1989; Dubinsky & Lewin,
1986; Harel & Sowder, 1998, 2007; Selden & Selden, 2009; Weber, 2005). Some noted difficulties associated with proof construction are explored in Section 2.2.5. In addition to
the classification of common obstacles with proof construction, some research also seeks to
classify different kinds of successful proof construction.
Weber (2005) describes three distinct approaches to proof construction that “undergraduates successfully use to construct proofs” (p. 353). Namely, he discusses procedural proof
production, syntactic proof production, and semantic proof production. Each of these is
described below:
• In procedural proof production, a student locates a proof of some statement similar to
the statement they are proving, and they use this existing proof as a template for their
own proof production. In procedural production, the student uses some external source
to construct a procedure or algorithm, a “linear set of steps not directly attached to
conceptual knowledge,” (Weber 2005 p. 353) that can be used to write a new proof
for a similar statement.
• In syntactic proof production, a student uses some previously known definitions and
assumptions and draws inferences or conclusions regarding these statements by using
some set of established theorems and logical rules. Specifically, Weber (2005) refers
to this type of proof construction as “logically manipulating mathematical statements
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without referring to intuitive representations of mathematical concepts” (p. 355).
• In semantic proof production, a student uses some informal or intuitive examples of
a relevant concept to understand the given statement. The student can then use the
informal, intuitive representations of this concept to guide their formal line of inquiry.
Examples of each of these in the contexts of mathematical induction are provided below
to give the reader a deeper understanding of the differences between the types of proof
productions.
A procedural proof production might happen when students are first exposed to routine
algebraic verifications for the natural numbers. Students may become accustomed to the
algorithmic versions of the base step “plugging in n = 1” and inductive step of “an equation
involving n and add something to both sides so as to produce a similar equation with n + 1”
(Woodall, 1981, p. 100). Weber (2005) outlines the benefits and restrictions of this type of
proof production. Procedural proof productions can often allow students to become proficient
at a particular proof technique or at specific types of proofs, for example, the specific type
of mathematical induction arguments described above. However, Weber (2005) also states
that procedural productions do not necessarily aid in helping convince the student that a
proof is true, nor does this type of production lend itself to helping the student understand
the underlying logic of a proof.
An example of syntactic proof construction might be when a student knows the definition
of PMI and is able to construct a series of logical steps and sequences of deductions without
using intuition about the underlying mathematical concepts and structures relevant to the
proof. Weber (2005) again outlines the uses and limitations of this kind of proof production. Using this method of production, a student can improve their ability to make correct
inferences and deductions based on logical rules and the appropriate application of theorems
and definitions. The student is also able to see how the theorem or statement they are
proving is connected logically to previous theorems or concepts they have learned. However,
syntactic productions are not reliant on intuition or informal understandings of a concept,
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and therefore, they do not allow students to develop their intuition or their ability to craft a
meaningful mathematical explanation of a statement’s validity, which is the primary learning
opportunity provided by the last of the three types of proof productions.
Consider a statement for all graphs of size n. A student using a semantic proof production
method for an inductive proof to prove such a statement may begin by thinking of how the
statement works for a specific classification of graphs (e.g. complete graphs or bipartite
graphs), and then use this informal exploration to inform their formal proof. Semantic proof
productions offer several learning opportunities that the previous two productions do not.
Semantic production allows students to develop individual representations of more formal
mathematical concepts and ideas (or in Tall’s language to further develop their concept image). Further, semantic production allows a student to develop a, albeit intuitive, convincing
explanation for why the statement is true, allowing for the proof construction to serve the
role of convincing them of the truth of the given statement. While each of these proof productions offer students the opportunity to learn different sets of skills while constructing
proofs and each has value in classrooms, Weber (2005) argues that “semantic proof productions provide more important learning opportunities than procedural or syntactic proof
productions” (p.358). In particular, he argues that the scaffolding typically present in activities lending themselves to the two former proof productions can often limit students’ proof
construction competence. Many of these limitations can be seen specifically in the context
of PMI, as activities given in transition-to-proof courses involving mathematical induction
typically privilege procedural and syntactic proof productions. In this research, expert participants work on mathematical induction proofs which are more semantic in nature. This
setup highlights some nuanced differences between how experts and novices may view mathematical induction, and Weber’s (2005) classification will be used to interpret some of the
results of the study in Chapter 4. In addition to constructing proofs, students and research
participants may also be asked to present or explain them in a process Selden & Selden
(2017) refer to as proof validation.
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2.2.3

Proof Validation

Proof validation and evaluation are closely linked aspects of proof and can often be difficult
to distinguish (Selden & Selden, 2017). Proof validation is generally said to describe the
reading of or reflection on proofs. The Inglis & Alcock (2012) study described in Section
2.1.2 gives one example of research focused on proof validation. Several other studies have
also concentrated on proof validation (Selden & Selden, 2003; Weber, 2008). Selden &
Selden (2003) provide some examples of activities involved in proof validation. They are
listed below.
1. Asking and answering questions and assenting to claims.
2. Constructing subproofs.
3. Remembering or finding and interpreting related theorems and definitions.
4. Feelings of rightness or wrongness.
5. Production of a new text- modification, expansion, or contraction of the original argument (p.5).
While mathematicians are often concerned with evaluating or reflecting on the work of
others, self-reflection and self-editing are also important parts of the mathematical process.
Most of the studies analyzing proof validation and proof validation strategies have involved
participants validating proofs found in textbooks or written by other mathematicians. In
contrast, the current research will require participants to validate their own proofs during
a post-proof-construction, semi-structured interview. These 5 activities will be used to aid
in the interpretations of this study’s results in Chapter 4. In addition to the 5 activities
involved in proof validation above, a study conducted by Kieth Weber in 2008 also discovered
another pattern emerging within a proof validation study he conducted on mathematicians.
This study was explored in Section 2.1.2. While Selden & Selden’s (2017) work gives us an
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important and useful framework through which to analyze various aspects of proof, other
researchers have also focused more closely on studying particular proof techniques.
The preceding sections have highlighted some relevant research regarding proof in general
as well as particular aspects of proving. However, despite the copious research addressing
proof and proof comprehension, Selden and Selden (2017) argue that “more is known in the
research literature about difficulties that often prevent students from proving a theorem than
about interventions that would help students’ proving” (p. 1). In particular, the authors
identify several obstacles to proof construction noted by the various research studies focused
on this aspect of proof. These obstacles are listed below:
1. Difficulties interpreting and using mathematical definitions and theorems.
2. Difficulties interpreting the logical structure of a theorem statement one wishes to
prove.
3. Difficulties using existential and universal quantifiers.
4. Difficulties handling symbolic notation.
5. Knowing, but not bringing, appropriate information to mind.
6. Knowing which (previous) theorems are important. (Selden & Selden, 2017, p. 3)
Many of these difficulties are related to the tasks of organizing and accessing previous knowledge. This pattern is noteworthy in the contexts of this proposal due to the discussion of
expertise in Section 2.2. It is hypothesized that these issues will not be as common with
expert participants, due to the general superiority of experts’ knowledge arrangement. Since
strategies for improving students’ abilities to prove and comprehend proof are less prevalent than those studying issues with proof, it is important to consider frameworks about
mathematical proof which prioritize the purpose and goals of proof, rather than associated
difficulties. Karen Giaquinto’s (2005) work offers one such framework and is explored in the
following section.
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2.3

Mathematical Activity in Research

While many consider the research of mathematicians to be the only type of mathematical
activity, Giaquinto (2005) explores an alternate definition of mathematical activity and classifies it into four initial categories, each with an associated goal. The associated category
and goal pairings are as follows: discovery and knowledge, explanation and understanding,
justification and relative certainty, and application and practical benefits (Giaquinto, 2005,
p. 75). She further argues that mathematical proof can be used as part of any one of these
four categories. Proof is used for discovering, explaining, justifying, and applying mathematical knowledge. Therefore, instead of being a category of activity, it intersects with each
category depending on the situation. Within each of the four categories, Giaquinto (2005)
describes three activites: making, presenting, and taking in. For instance, when participating in the justification activity one can either create justification (constructing a proof),
present justification (giving a lecture or a conference talk), or take in justification (listening
to justification from a talk, lecture, or colleague). Similar examples of these three activities
can be given for the remaining three categories. This structured definition of mathematical
activity allows us to analyze how activity might be useful in both the classroom and in math
education research.
Meija-Ramos & Inglis (2009) use Giaquinto’s mathematical activity framework in the
context of proof activity. They specify the general activities of making, presenting, and
taking in for proof as “constructing a novel argument, presenting an available argument,
and reading a given argument” (p. 88), respectively. But these authors further Giaquinto’s
(2005) work by arguing that one must also consider the goal of the activity. For example,
a mathematician who is reading (taking in) a proof by mathematical induction might do so
differently if they are (1) analyzing the proof to apply a similar approach to research she is
working on (2) grading a student’s proof homework (3) preparing to present the proof in a
lecture or (4) trying to understand a new proof for the first time. Based on the notion that
goals and contexts can produce different behaviors within the same proving activity, the
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authors adapt the framework of proving activities to include the sub-activities illustrated in
Figure 4.
The authors were primarily interested in how each of these designated subactivities appeared in math education research. They performed a bibiographic study on one database
(ERIC) to analyze the frequency of each subactivity. They found that 82 of 131 articles
dealt primarily with Construction, with 44, 16, and 22 of those relating to Exploration, Estimation, and Justification, respectively. 24 of the 131 articles dealt with Reading, with three
focused on Comprehension and 21 focused on Evaluation. None of the articles in this study
dealt with the Presenting Activities associated with proof. The authors conclude by saying
“researchers in the field have tended to concentrate on understanding a relatively small subset of the activities associated with mathematical argumentation and proof” (Meija-Ramos
& Inglis, 2009, p. 93). The current proposed research will explore the construction, exploration, and justification categories discussed by the author through the use of semi-structured
interviews in which participants construct, justify, and explicate novel proofs with mathematical induction. For a more detailed description of the interview setup, see Section 3.2.2.
The next section will give a better understanding of the research with mathematical proof
that does currently exist in the literature to help quantify and explicate some of the gaps
identified by this bibliographic study.
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Figure 2.1: Sub-Activities of Proof Adapted from Meija-Ramos and Inglis (2009)

2.4

Principle of Mathematical Induction

While this study is also concerned with some facets of general proof, it is primarily centered
on understanding how experts work on proofs specifically using the Principle of Mathematical
Induction. In order to situate the current discussion of mathematical induction within the
broader context of inductive reasoning, this section begins by providing an outline of existing
literature specifically pertaining to PMI. First, the section gives a historical overview of the
development of the technique. Next, common epsitemological obstacles associated with
mathematical induction are explored in detail. Lastly, some relevant studies analyzing the
use of PMI in Proof Construction Activities are summarized.

2.4.1

Historical Overview

While the origins of proof itself have been widely studied (Thurston, 1994; Krantz, 2007;
Bramlett & Drake, 2013), the historical development of various proof techniques: direct
proof, proof by contrapositive, proof by mathematical induction etc. have been somewhat
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less researched. Many researchers who study the historical development of mathematical
concepts and tools highlight the tendency of mathematical knowledge and technique to
develop in non-linear and geographically disparate progressions. Since the conception and
historical development of mathematical proof has also adhered to this scattered development
pattern, it can be difficult to cleanly chronologize the formation of the rigorous form of
mathematical proof which exists today. Since the development of particular proof techniques
are inextricably linked to the development of proof in general, it is even more difficult to
formulate a neat, straightforward description of the historical evolution of these techniques.
Instead, it is often the case that the genesis and history of such concepts is described by
fluid patterns in mathematical research and practice rather than rigid timelines of specific
historical events. One example of this phenomenon can be found in research regarding the
development of mathematical induction. There is no easily identifiable point of origin for
the concept of mathematical induction. Instead, we can find many examples of both implicit
and explicit uses of this strategy in the work of many early mathematicians, then trace the
more rigorous and formal development of the concept as the discipline of mathematics was
constructed, developed, and rigorized.
There are several authors who document the genesis and historical development of mathematical induction (Bather, 1994; Bussey, 1917; Burton, 1991; Coughlin and Kerwin, 1985;
Ernest, 1982; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993; Rabinovitch, 1970; Weil, 1983). The earliest examples we have of mathematical induction, from mathematicians including Maurolycus, Pascal,
and Fermat, did not use the familiar axiomatic structure of mathematical induction (developed by Peano), but rather looser versions of inductive reasoning. These early examples
would later serve as foundational for the axiomization that resulted in the formal definition
of mathematical induction we use today. Many scholars, including Bussey (1917), claim that
PMI was first used in 1575 by Maurolycus in his book Arithmeticorum Libri Duo, where
Maurolycus uses PMI as a method to prove that the sum of the first n odd integers is equal
to n2 .
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Almost 100 years later, Pascal wrote proofs with PMI using what we now call Pascal’s
Triangle. One of the first record of Pascal using an inductively-structured argument came as
the result of a gambling problem presented to him. This problem, known as “The Problem
of Points,” is the focus of a 1985 paper published by Coughlin and Kerwin. According to
the authors, the problem was presented to Pascal by a prolific gambler named Chevelier de
Méré. It can be simplified as follows: Assume there are two players of equal skill gambling
in a game in which the winner is the first player to win four games. Now, if the game is
interrupted before someone has won, how should the money be split? In summary, Pascal
sought to determine how the money might be fairly allocated in an interrupted game based
on the known number of wins for each player at the time of interruption. Some work had
been done on this problem by other mathematicians, but Pascal wanted to eliminate some of
the recursion in the solution, which he did by using mathematical induction and his triangle.
He wrote letters to Fermat regarding this problem, and these letters are considered by many
to be “fundamental to the development of modern concepts of probability” as well as one of
the “earliest examples of the use of mathematical induction” (Coughlin & Kerwin, 1985, p.
376).
Fermat is well-know for his prodigious work as a mathematician, and he has contributed
crucial results in various branches of mathematics, but he is perhaps best known for his work
in Number Theory. In addition to his correspondence with Pascal, Fermat contributed many
other examples of early mathematical induction. In his text Number Theory: An Approach
through History, André Weil details some of Fermat’s work with mathematical induction.
In particular, he explores Fermat’s frustration with an inductive-type argument used by
John Wallis, the mathematician credited with the development of infinetesimal calculus
(Weil, 1983, p. 49). In his seminal work, Arithmetica Infinitorum, published in 1656, Wallis
repeatedly uses an incomplete form of mathematical induction to prove statements. Namely,
he claims that a general statement P (n) is true for all natural numbers by proving the
statement for some finite list of values. Fermat’s (translated) critique of this work follows.
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One might use this method if the proof of some proposition were deeply concealed
and if, before looking for it, one wished first to convince oneself more or less of its truth;
but one should place only limited confidence in it and apply proper caution. Indeed,
one could propose such a statement, and seek to verify it in such a way, that it would
be valid in several special cases but nonetheless false and not universally true, so that
one has to be most circumspect in using it; no doubt it can still be o f value if applied
prudently, but it cannot serve to lay the foundations for some branch of science, as
Mr. Wallis seeks to do, since for such a purpose nothing short of a demonstration is
admissible. (Weil, 1983, p. 50)

Fermat’s own use of mathematical induction, although not yet axiomated, was much more
rigorous than Wallis’. Perhaps the most famous example is in a small case of his famous
“Last Theorem.” It is well-known that around 1637, Fermat wrote a claim in the margins
of a copy of Diophantus’ Arithmetica that there are no positive integers x, y, and z such
that xn + y n = z n for n > 2. Fermat produced a proof for this statement in the case where
n = 4 with used a sophisticated and geometric inductive argument (Weil, 1983, p. 88).
Mathematical Induction showed up to some extent in the work of other mathematicians
around this time, but it began to truly cohere in the 19th century.
The term “ Mathematical Induction” first appeared in work by DeMorgan, a mathematician well-known for his work in logic (Burton, 1991, p. 422). Then, in 1888, Dedekind
proposed a complete system of axioms for arithmetic, finally formalizing PMI in a more
solid manner. Peano was simultaneously working on a similar set of axioms, and we now
refer to them as the Peano postulates. Axiom V of these postulates is most closely associated
with the formal definition of mathematical induction used today. After the introduction of
these postulates, mathematical induction was axiomized and formalized into a technique
closely resembling the one we use today. PMI is the fifth of Peano’s postulates involving
the foundation of natural numbers, and PMI is equivalent to the fact that any (non-empty)
subset of N has a minimum element (Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993). Mathematical Induction
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became a core proof technique, and is now integral to any study of mathematical proving.
As such, there are various difficulties associated with the teaching and learning of this topic.
A collection of studies concerned with these difficulties are outlined in the following section.

2.4.2

Epistemological Obstacles with PMI

In a 1984 article, Paul Ernest identified “unresolved problems concerning the teaching
of mathematical induction which should benefit from a careful analysis.” Since then, many
researchers have studied the obstacles associated with mathematical induction (Avital &
Libeskind, 1978; Baker, 1996; Doyle & Núñez, 2021; Dubinsky, 1986; Harel, 2002; Lane,
2007; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993; Nardi & Iannone, 2003; Ron & Dreyfus, 2004; Stylianides,
Stylianides, & Philippou, 2007). While some of these articles address pedagogical practices
pertaining strictly to the natural numbers, many of them seek to address particular epistemological obstacles associated with PMI. Before exploring these obstacles, Ernest (1984)
first formulates a list of the skills necessary for a student to be able to write a proof by mathematical induction. It should be noted that he specifically focuses on the skills necessary
to use the method of PMI in routine algebraic problems. His three “necessary behavioral
skills” are listed below
1. The ability to prove the basis of the mathematical induction. This consists of the
ability to verify that fixed numerical properties hold for particular numbers. Under
the restrictive conditions considered, this depends on the ability to perform substitution
into algebraic expressions in a single variable.
2. The ability to prove the mathematical induction step. This depends on the ability to
prove an implication statement by deducing a conclusion from a hypothesis. Under
the restrictive conditions considered, this consists of the ability to make deductions
from algebraic identities, which in turn depends on the ability to manipulate algebraic
expressions and identities.
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3. The ability to present a proof by mathematical induction in the correct form. This
is manifested in the ability to communicate the knowledge of the correct form of a
proof by mathematical induction in some way - be it verbal, written or diagrammatic
(Ernest, 1984, p. 176-177).
Ernest’s discussion of these necessary skills presents one way of identifying underlying cognitive processes necessary for understanding a complex concept like mathematical induction.
Using this discussion, Ernest identifies six key misconceptions associated with mathematical
induction. These are listed and described below.
1. Ambiguity in the term “induction”: While inductive reasoning is a “heuristic method
for arriving at a conjectured generality describing a finite sequence of examples,” the
Principle of Mathematical Induction is rigorous and deductive in nature. This distinction can cause confusion for students when the difference between these two uses of
the term “induction” are not clarified.
2. Misconceptions about the legitimacy of the inductive step: Many students have difficulties with the assumption of the inductive hypothesis P (n), which is used as part
of a complex proving process to show P (n) for all n ∈ N. In other deductive proofs,
this would certainly be illegitimate, so students are reasonably confused. However, this
confusion is indicative that a student has a limited understanding of the implication
and of the underlying structure of PMI.
3. The use of quantifiers: Students struggle with the use of quantifiers, and PMI’s reliance
on universally quantified variables can cause even greater confusion for many students.
The use of such quantifiers is “subtle and abstract” and must be practiced.
4. Components of PMI as being inessential: This most often applies to the base case.
Students may often underestimate the importance and logical necessity of the base
case of mathematical induction.
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5. Linkages to routine versions of PMI: Students are often unable to generalize the method
of PMI to examples that differ from the routine algebraic verifications they see associated with PMI in introductory proofs courses.
6. The purpose and use of mathematical induction: Students struggle to understand the
usefulness and necessity of PMI. PMI is, in many ways, unlike other principles they
may have been previously exposed to. In particular, “mathematical induction is neither
self evident nor a generalisation of previous more elementary experience.” Therefore,
students may struggle with the basis and justification for PMI (Ernest, 1984, p. 181183).
A few of these difficulties were explored prior to Ernest’s (1984) work in greater detail and
are discussed below.
Authors Avital and Libeskind (1978) highlight several obstacles students face when learning mathematical induction. The authors categorize these epistemological obstacles into
three categories: conceptual, mathematical, and technical (Avital & Libeskind 1978). The
authors identify two conceptual difficulties, (1) The Implication P (k) ⇒ P (k + 1) and (2)
The Transition from k to k + 1 (Avital & Libeskind 1978). They found that advanced students were asking questions like “How can you establish the truth of P (k + 1) if you don’t
even know that P (k) is true?” The authors argue that this difficulty arises from a gap in
knowledge regarding the logic of implications. Namely, proving p ⇒ q does not inherently
show anything about the truth value of p itself. The second conceptual obstacles relates to
student’s struggles with the cognitive jump from starting with a base case then transitioning from P (k) to P (k + 1). As a solution, the authors recommend asking students to first
perform some inductive “naive” calculations with actual numbers, then slowly transitioning
to more general inductive proofs (Avital & Libeskind 1978).
The second class of difficulties is comprised of what the authors call mathematical difficulties. Again, the authors classify two particular difficulties in this category (1) Underestimating the Importance of the Base Case and (2) Difficulty with Step Size Greater than 1.
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For (1), the authors highlight the following (incorrect) statement P (n):
n
X
i=1

n=

n(n + 1)
+ 1.
2

For this statement, P (k) ⇒ P (k + 1) for all k ≥ 1. However, it is easily seen that this
statement does not hold even in the base case when n = 1. Many students misunderstand
the crucial requirement that P (1) (or P (m)) must be true in order for the Principle of
Mathematical Induction to work. The second mathematical obstacle occurs when students
are asked to inductively prove some statement in cases when the “step” size between cases
is larger that one. For example, if a statement applies to the even integers, a student would
need to show that P (k) ⇒ P (k + 2) (or equivalently that P (2k) ⇒ P (2(k + 1)). The authors
suggest that using appropriate substitution can reduce these cases to the original formulation
of mathematical induction, eliminating this particular epistemological difficulty.
Finally, the authors classify two final obstacles as technical problems. These two “technical
issues” are (1) Determining what P (k) ⇒ P (k+1) is for a given P (n) and (2) Student Ability
to Perform the necessary algebra for the P (k) ⇒ P (k + 1) implication. In particular, the
statements P (k) and P (k + 1) can sometimes be difficult for students to find. They give the
following as an example of this phenomenon:
A class of 22 high school students with above average in ability were asked to
P
. A vast
prove by the Principle of Mathematical Induction that nk=1 k = n(n+1)
2
majority of these students wrote out their proofs of the stage P (k) ⇒ P (k + 1)
in the following way:
n(n + 1)
(n + 1)(n + 2)
+n+1=
2
2
n2 + n + 2n + 2 = n2 + n + 2n + 2
2 = 2 (p. 435)
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This demonstrates the student’s lack of understanding of the underlying logical statement,
as they give no indication of assumption or conclusion. Dubinsky refers to this as “difficulty
formulating the hypothesis in the induction step” (1989). The second technical difficulty the
authors explore is common issues with necessary algebra in the inductive step. Here, they
offer several examples, one of which is given below:
Prove that (a − b)|(an − bn ) for all n.
“To prove statements like the last two many textbooks and teachers apply an
approach which involves adding and subtracting an appropriate expression” (p.
436). For instance, part of the step P (k) to P (k + 1) in a possible proof of the
problem above is as follows:

ak+1 − bk+1 = a · ak − b · bk
= a · ak − b · ak + b · ak − b · b k
= (a − b)ak + b(ak − bk )

The authors argue that many algebraic steps can be seen by many students as tricks which
“they find difficult to apply in similar problems” (Avital & Libeskind 1978, p. 436). This
work introduces the tendency of students to overlook or misunderstand the importance of
various parts of the mathematical induction process.
Nitsa Movshovitz-Hadar (1993) gives concrete pedagogical strategies for addressing some
of the pedagogical issues discussed in the two previous studies. She categorizes these strategies according to the two steps of mathematical induction which she refers to as the “checking
step” (base case) and the “transition step” (inductive step). The author advocates for convincing students of the importance of both steps of the mathematical induction process. In
particular, she advises instructors to give examples where one holds, but the overall statement is not true for all n. One such task where the base case is not true is shown below:
Task No. 7: Is checking for n = 1 always simple?
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1. Is it true for all n that:
n
X
i=2

3 1
1
= −
(i − 1)(i)
2 n

2. Check for n = 6.
3. Comment on your results.
The author notes that for this problem, students must first recognize that the base case is
n = 2 (not n = 1). Further, if the students fail to check the base case, they will be able to
“prove” the statement even though it is not true for n = 2. Similarly another of the authors
“tasks” demonstrates the importance that the transition step must be true for every k:
Task No. 8: What if the transition from n = 1 to n = 2 fails?
1. Try to prove by applying the principle of mathematical induction that: For
all n, If the maximum of two positive integers is n, then the two integers
are equal.
2. Suppose you proved part 1 successfully, show that it implies that all positive
integers are equal.
3. Comment on your results.
Here, the author highlights how the transition step between n = 1 and n = 2 fails and why
this causes mathematical induction itself to fail, even though a “convincing” proof might
make a student think otherwise. Movshovitz-Hadar argues that these types of activities
and tasks can reinforce students understanding of mathematical induction, remind students
of the importance of both steps of the inductive process, and address several of the common epistemological obstacles associated with mathematical induction. The next section
deals with literature exploring PMI proof construction associated with more semantic proof
production.
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It is important to note that the primary difficulties identified by the three studies discussed
above are tightly linked to the typical mathematical induction problems associated with
mathematical induction in transition-to-proof courses. In particular, these types of problems
often encourage procedural (routine algebraic equality verification or mathematical induction
proofs involving finite series) or semantic (routine checks using the definition of PMI and
relevant theorems) proof construction (See Section 2.3). These routine types of PMI problems
have been shown to cause problematic associations for students and can also make it difficult
for researchers to accurately isolate epistemological difficulties with PMI.

2.4.3

General Research with PMI

In addition to the issues and obstacles involved in the teaching and learning of mathematical mathematical induction discussed in the previous section, several other studies have
focused on the use of PMI as a proving technique. Smith (2006) found that some students
did not view mathematical induction as explanatory, but “as an algorithm they can apply
almost blindly” (pp. 80–81). The work reviewed in the previous two sections suggest that
one potential explanation for this belief is the focus on more procedural and syntactic proof
production in transition-to-proof courses’ treatment of PMI. Many authors have analyzed
the explanatory potential of mathematical induction proofs (Hoeltje, Schneider, and Steinberg, 2013; Lange, 2009; Smith, 2006; Styliandes, Sandefur, & Watson, 2016). To further
explore this issue, Styliandes, Sandefur, & Watson (2016) analyze mathematical induction
in the context of what they refer to as “explanatory proving” or “proving activity that is
explanatory for provers” (p. 21). The authors argue that for a proving activity to be explanatory, the prover or provers must receive some level of insight as to why the statement
is true. This notion of explanatory proving is consistent with Weber’s (2005) semantic proof
production detailed in Section 2.3. The authors offer an example of explanatory proving in
the contexts of PMI and Proof Construction.
Provers could use recursive reasoning (that is, reasoning relating to or involv-
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ing the repeated application of a rule or procedure to successive results) in their
exploration of a mathematical statement in ways that could help provers see informally the structure of the inductive step in a possible proof by mathematical
induction; the provers could subsequently apply mathematical induction to formalize their thinking and verify the truth of the statement. (Styliandes, Sandefur,
& Watson, 2016, p. 21).
The authors note that mathematical induction is an appropriate context through which to
explore explanatory proving as students often view mathematical induction as verification
rather than explanation. While many works focus on the explanatory value of a written proof,
the authors argue that experts instead identify explanatory value in how proof “provides new
insights into the field of application, new ways of reasoning about particular objects, or new
connections between fields of study” (Styliandes, Sandefur, & Watson, 2016, p. 22).
In order to frame their discussion of explanatory proving in the context of mathematical
induction, Styliandes, Sandefur, & Watson (2016) identify and describe two perspectives
involving the function of proof. The first perspective, called the subjective perspective, maintains that the purpose or function of proof is based on how it serves the prover or the reader.
The second, called the absolutist perspective, considers the function of proof as characteristics of the actual text of the proof (Styliandes, Sandefur, & Watson, 2016). In summary, a
subjective perspective focuses on the proving and an absolutist perspective focuses on the
proof. The authors primarily depend on the prior perspective for this proposal, as they
seek to explore students’ process of proving using mathematical induction. An important
characteristic of this research which distinguishes it from previous work on mathematical
induction is the way in which statements were worded. Rather than an explicit statement
to prove “for all n,” the authors described their activity construction below.
The problems we used in our study were not implicitly recursive: they were
posed as “make a conjecture about the conditions under which a statement P (n)
is true or false,” where it would likely appear to the student as if the statement
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could be true for one n-value but not the next. We consider statements in this
latter form as particularly rich as they are less obviously conducive to a proof by
mathematical induction – the statement to be proved is not given in the problem.
The students in our study therefore had to undertake some justified mathematical
exploration to arrive at a statement they needed to prove (Styliandes, Sandefur,
& Watson, 2016, p. 23).
This is important to note, as the current study will also follow a similar presentation model
for the mathematical induction activities given to participants.
The authors note a pattern in how expert mathematicians often approach a proving exercise. This pattern is summarized below.
1. Attempt to identify a reasonable method or technique to prove the statement. If one
can be identified, they may use the technique without necessarily thinking about why
the statement is true.
2. If no method can be immediately or easily identified, then the expert may try to
experiment with some examples to gain insight to possible proving strategies.
3. Use discoveries made in the previous step to inform the formalization of an argument.
The authors wanted to compare the behavior of their undergraduate participants with this
expert pattern. They hypothesized that students working on problems that do not offer explicit instruction or scaffolding directing them toward a particular proof technique or method
would also likely explore examples to gain insight. They further predicted that these explorations could aid students in constructing an informal inductive step. Such exploration could
potentially help students view mathematical induction as explanatory rather than just a tool
for verification (Styliandes, Sandefur, & Watson, 2016). The authors had trios of students
work on problems related to mathematical induction without specifying mathematical induction as a preferred technique. Their findings supported their hypothesis, and they claim
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that the use of problems that do not explicitly ask students to use mathematical induction
have the “explanatory power for them illustrates the success students can have when given
an appropriately phrased problem” (Styliandes, Sandefur, & Watson, 2016, p.33). The work
discussed in this section has primarily been focused on novice participants, which gives a
well-developed body of literature to which I will compare the findings from my study with
expert participants. While the research from this section provides some suggestions on the
explanatory potential of PMI, it is also important that we are able to classify how this
explanatory potential relates to the multiple associated pieces of cognition in PMI. Therefore, the following section will explore how APOS Theory has decomposed the process of
mathematical induction.

2.5

Preliminary Genetic Decomposition of PMI

This section primarily focuses on the work of two pairs of researchers who have developed
genetic decompositions of mathematical induction and situated PMI within the APOS Theory framework. The first section presents a genetic decomposition created by Dubinsky &
Lewin (1986, 1989). The second section covers a study which uses, then refines, this original
genetic decompositions. The two studies outlined below will serve as an integral part of the
methodology of the current proposal as discussed in Chapter 3. For a complete explanation
of genetic decompositions, please refer to Section 1.4.2.

2.5.1

Genetic Decomposition of PMI

Dubinsky and Lewin (1986,1989) conducted research with university students to better
understand their difficulties using mathematical induction in proofs. The authors provide
the following three steps for teaching a mathematical concept (like mathematical induction):
1. determination of a genetic decomposition of the concept;
2. helping students to perform the required reflexive abstractions; and
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3. explanation and practice
They constructed a preliminary genetic decomposition of mathematical induction which is
briefly summarized below.
1. Expand the schema of functions to include a function mapping the natural numbers
to a propostion-valued output f : N → P (N ).
2. Encapsulate logic into the implication p ⇒ k. The implication cognitively becomes an
object which be the value of the function f .
3. Create the schema of the implication-valued function g where g(N) = (P (N ) ⇒ P (N +
1)).
4. Interiorize the action of logical necessity into a process so that inputs P0 and PA ⇒ PB
allow one to conclude PB .
5. Coordinate the function g from Step 3 with Modus Ponens beginning with P (a) for
some base case a.
6. Encapsulate this inductive process into an object be connected to the Method of Proof
schema so induction can be applied as a proof method.
7. Generalize actions on the induction object within various problem types coordinated
with the Method-of-Proof schema until students can apply induction as a proof technique.
Dubinksy (1986, 1989) conducted two studies to evaluate this genetic decomposition. He
created a teaching experiment in a Finite Mathematics course in which he used SETL, “a
very high level procedural programming language with standard constructs of assignments
and procedures...” (Dubinsky, 1986, p. 308). In addition to the typical course material, some
activities within the course were specifically designed to test the above genetic decomposition for PMI. SETL was used within the course to help students learn and understand the
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mathematical syntax associated with mathematical induction. SETL was also used within
the teaching experiment to help students apply actions to specific concepts including mathematical induction.

The author evaluated the genetic decomposition by determining student success in two
goals: (1) describing and discussing the process of mathematical induction and (2) setting
up proper arguments and producing correct proofs using mathematical induction (Dubinsky,
1986). The experiment was assesed with take-home proof activities and short individual interviews focused on mathematical induction. Dubinsky discovered that each of the schemas
identified in the preliminary genetic decomposition materialized within these short interviews. The appearance of these predicted schema suggests that this genetic decomposition
could be successful in the study of mathematical induction. This genetic decomposition,
along with the refined version detailed in the following section, will inform the study design
as outlined in Chapter 3.

2.5.2

The Base Case and APOS

While Dubinsky’s work with mathematical induction provides a preliminary genetic decomposition for mathematical induction, Garcia-Martinez and Parraguez note that this initial research did not include the base step as a part of the analysis. This study was conducted
as an extension of Dubinsky and Lewin’s work detailed in the previous section. While Dubinsky and Lewin’s article highlight many of the aspects of learning PMI, Garcia-Martinez
and Parraguez (2017) note that the research did not include the base step as a central part of
the analysis. Seeking to bridge this gap in the research with their article, the authors created
a study analyzing mathematical induction with four university student participants in order
to assess the formulation of the base step of mathematical induction as a mental process.
Seeking to specifically address the base step, Garcia-Martinez and Parraguez (2017) analyzed
mathematical induction proofs from four university students to assess the formulation of the
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base step of mathematical induction as a mental process. The authors refined Dubinsky’s
genetic decomposition, adding the base step as a process on its own. An illustration of the
decomposition is pictured below.

Figure 2.2: Genetic Decomposition Illustration adapted from Garcia-Martinez & Parraguez (2017)

The authors conducted interviews with the four participants to assess their mental constructions of the base step. They summarize their findings in the following three statements:

• Process of logical connectives: The student in Case 2 shows this mental construction,
by omitting the use of the truth table for logical connectives to answer question 1.
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• Process of n ⇒ P (n): This construction is seen explicitly. In fact, in answering
questions 2 and 3 the student in Case 2 shows that to achieve this construction the
student must carry out the action of associating a number with a truth value of the
proposition associated with it.
• Process of the Basis Step: Shown only by the student in Case 2, when showing a
counterexample and confirming the importance of this step in the construction of
explain PMI.
The authors use this adapted genetic decomposition to analyze students through activity and interview. In particular, the addition of the base step as a process allows them to
specifically evaluate and describe the cognitive constructions associated with the base step
of mathematical induction. The authors then designed interviews based on this genetic decomposition to be used in conjuction with assigned proofs activities involving mathematical
induction. The findings of this study highlight the important ways in which the APOS
Theory can help pedagogical researchers “determine the constructions that underlie the difficulties students have and the strategies they use when carrying out a mathematics activity
with natural numbers or their isomorphic equivalent.”
This research is also an important example of an analysis of PMI which does not use
routine examples of PMI. The study uses nonstandard, geometric mathematical induction
problems. One of the problems from the study is pictured below.

Figure 2.3: Triangle Induction Problem from Garcia-Martinez & Parraguez (2017)
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Although this specific problem is not used in the current study, similar nonstandard mathematical induction problems are used for the CTA. Further, the interview protocol asks
participants to identify what method of proof they would use for given problems as well
as asking probing questions to understand the reasoning behind these choices, similarly to
the study design above. In these ways, the study by Garcia-Martinez and Parraguez (2017)
greatly informs the study design discussed in Chapter 3. In addition to these two genetic
decomposition studies, this proposed research will also use the ideas of schema development
as discussed and defined in Section 1.4.3. A more specific discussion of these ideas in the
context of PMI is discussed in the next section.

2.5.3

PMI and Schema Development

Schemata are complex and deeply individualized structures. It is almost certainly true that
no two people will have identical schemata for any given topic. Further, as with all cognitive
structures, a schema can be hard to observe from the outside. However, through the use
of cognitive theories, including APOS Theory, researchers can, over several interconnected
studies describe properties of a well-developed schema for a given mathematical concept.
Consider an excerpt from Ernest’s (1984) work which highlights his attempt to identify the
concepts related to and held within a student’s PMI Schema.
The first concept to be separated from mathematical induction is that of implication. Both the concept of implication as a binary sentential connective and the
concept of the proof of an implication statement are entailed. In addition to the
proof of an implication, the concept of an elementary proof in general is required
for an understanding of the method of MI, since it is a particular method of
proof itself... Mathematical induction also presupposes the concept of a defined
property of natural numbers, for mathematical induction ranges over those numbers which have a fixed property. Defined properties of natural numbers arise
from algebraic identities, but they also depend on the concept of a function, as
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does the concept of an algebraic identity... Out of the concept of a function
arises a particular type of function with direct links to mathematical induction,
the inductively defined function... The notion of an inductively defined function
interrelates with another concept which is a direct contributor to mathematical
induction, namely the concept of recurrence... The concept of recurrence can be
built on the notions of iteration and flow diagram, which also aid the development of the concept of inductively defined function. Finally, the concepts of flow
diagram, iteration and inductively defined function all arise from the ordering
of the natural numbers which is one of the major contributors to mathematical
induction (Ernest, 1984, p. 179).
This conceptual breakdown by Ernest suggests that the PMI schema involves several
other mathematical concepts (e.g. implication, function, iteration). His work gives some
possible insight to the basic building blocks students may need to initially construct the
PMI-Schema, and it is similar to the genetic decomposition of PMI described in the previous
chapter. However, while this type of conceptual breakdown informed the development of
the current study’s instruments, expert participants in the study already demonstrated a
solid grasp on these smaller mathematical concepts associated with induction. This study
sought to expand on the exploration of the PMI-Schema using the framework of schema
development discussed in Section 1.4.3. In particular, this study identifies characteristics of
experts’ behaviors in the study associated with each stage in the triad of schema development
(i.e. Intra, Inter, and Trans), and classifies the participants in the study according to which
of the three stages their behavior during the study most closely represents. The findings of
this part of the study can be found in Section 4.1.1.4.

2.6

Chapter Summary

This chapter explored the relevant literature pertaining to the elements of this research
proposal. The chapter began with research distinguishing experts from novices. In partic-
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ular, the section explores how experts construct, expand, store, and retrieve knowledge in
their field of expertise and highlighted the value of studying experts. Next, the proposal
explored works involving the use of mathematical activity within educational research. The
section details the value of using mathematical activities as a method of studying student
cognition and learning. The third section presents a few of the many studies concerning
the construction of proofs in general. This is followed by a section focusing on the research
specifically exploring the Principle of Mathematical Induction including its historical development, its two primary components (Base and Inductive Steps), and the epistemological
difficulties associated with PMI. Then, the chapter highlighted the two main research studies which have analyzed PMI within the APOS Theory framework. Both of these studies
present genetic decompositions of PMI, upon which much of this study is based. Lastly, PMI
was situated within works concerning Schema Development. The studies discussed in this
chapter, along with the epistemological perspectives and theoretical frameworks discussed
in Chapter 1, form the foundation for the methodological choices of this research proposal.
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3

METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, I will discuss the methodological choices of this study and situate them

within the broader contexts of qualitative research practices and research involving mathematical proof. As previously mentioned, cognitive processes and subjective constructs like
“understanding” cannot be entirely observed directly. Instead, research dealing with such
subjects must rely on observable actions and theoretical frameworks in tandem when studying such phenomena. As such, this type of exploration usually focuses on processes associated
with understanding rather than the products of understanding. In particular, this research
is focused on the proving process rather than the proof (as discussed in Section 2.4.3). Since
this research involves studying a variety of observable sources including dialogue, gestures,
and written work, qualitative data collection and analysis methods will be appropriate. Unlike many quantitative methods, qualitative research does not necessarily seek to provide
statistical or generalizable results from large samples of people. Instead, qualitative research
“emphasizes descriptive data in natural settings and emphasizes understanding the [subject’s] point of view” (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007, p. 274). There are three primary elements of
qualitative research.
1. Data collection methods (along with the methodology informing these choices)
2. The researcher’s epistemology (See Section 1.3)
3. The researcher’s theoretical perspective(s) (See Section 1.4)
Items 2 and 3 were discussed in Chapter 1. Methodological choices and the study’s methods
will be discussed in this chapter, and they will be situated within the contexts of APOS
Theory and the Expert theoretical framework discussed in Section 1.4. Section 3.1 will
discuss the research setting and participant criteria and selection. Section 3.2 will cover
the data collection methods used as well as providing justification for these methodological
choices and study design. Section 3.3 will cover the methods of data analysis.
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3.1

Research Setting and Participants

This research was primarily conducted in the 2021-2022 academic year. Participants for the
study were chosen based on several criteria. All participants were, at the time of interview,
graduate students in Ph.D. programs in mathematics. The participants were required to
have successfully passed all required qualifying exams for their program of study and to
have at least two years of graduate school experience at the time they were interviewed.
Participants were taken from two universities in the southeastern United States. An email
was sent to all graduate students at both universities informing graduate students about the
study. Of the students who responded to the email, six satisfied all selection criteria. Out
of these six initial participants who agreed to take part in the study, five of them completed
both interviews for the study. Three of the participants came from Institution 1, a large landgrant R1 institution with a student population of approximately 38,000. The remaining two
participants were recruited from Institution 2, a large, urban R1 institution with a student
body of approximately 32,000.

3.2

Data Collection Methods and Study Design

Data collected for this study included:
• Audio-Video recordings of interviews conducted with each participant. The interviews
included proof construction activities as well as semi-structured interviews guided by
questions from the protocols in Appendix Items B and C. The interviews are described
in detail in Section 3.2.2
• Transcriptions of each recorded interview.
• Copies of any written work created during the interviews.
The audio-video recordings were primarily used to transcribe the interviews, including notations of gestures or other inaudible cues (such as lengthy pauses in dialogue). Audio
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recordings were used to manually verify that the computer-generated transcriptions from
the interviews were accurate. Collected written work consisted of anything written down by
the participant during the interviews including pictures, scratch work, and formal proofs or
algorithms.

3.2.1

Cognitive Task Analysis

Some existing literature about CTA was explored in Section 2.1, and this section also
highlighted some of the merits of using CTA in research involving experts. In their textbook
on CTA, Shraagen, Chipman, & Shalin (2000) describe CTA as “the extension of traditional
task analysis techniques to yield information about the knowledge, thought processes, and
goal structures that underlie observable task performance. Some would confine the term
exclusively to the methods that focus on the cognitive aspects of tasks, but this seems
counterproductive. Overt observable behavior and the covert cognitive functions behind it
form an integrated whole” (p. 3). CTA is used to describe a host of qualitative research
techniques, but there are some defining characteristics of the method. The basis of CTA is
the study of participants as they work on a cognitive task. CTA has most often been used
to study expertise. The authors classify the direct observation of subject matter experts
(SME’s), including audio-visual recordings and careful qualitative coding of these interviews,
as one important type of CTA. In particular, the use of think-aloud protocols while SME’s
work on cognitive tasks has been shown to be an effective method of knowledge elicitation
(Schraagen, Chipman, & Shalin, 2000). In order to be most effective, CTA requires both
these think-aloud protocols in addition to a well-developed and adaptable set of probing
questions rooted in research relevant to the task. This current study has SME’s perform the
cognitive task of working on two non-standard mathematical induction problems, followed
by a semi-structured interview with probing questions developed based on the literature
detailed in Chapter 2 of the paper.
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3.2.2

Semi-Structured Interviews

For each of the five participants who completed all required components in the study, two
interviews, Interview 1 and Interview 2, were conducted, with each lasting a little over an
hour. Interview 1 consisted of two twenty-minute sessions where the participant worked on a
cognitive task associated with PMI, with each followed by a twenty-minute semi-structured
interview based on the Interview Protocol in Appendix Item B. During the two problemsolving periods, participants were encouraged to discuss their thought processes out loud
and to write down work whenever possible. This allowed the participants’ internal cognitive
processes to be more easily observed and studied during transcription and analysis. During
the post-problem-solving, semi-structured interview portions of Interview 1, the researcher
asked participants to discuss their work and solutions from the problem-solving section and
asked further probing questions in order to gain a deeper insight to the participants’ conceptual understanding. The mathematical induction problems given to participants in Interview
1 are discussed in Section (insert section number here).
During Interview 2, the researcher conducted a semi-structured interview with questions
about proof techniques and proof construction in general, as well as several questions focused on the participant’s conceptual development of PMI. For the interview protocol and a
complete list of the questions and prompts to be used in Interview 2, see Appendix Item C.
The interviews are intentionally arranged in this way so that the participants are not overly
predisposed to automatically think of mathematical induction during the problem-solving
section in Interview 1. In particular, the work by Styliandes, Sandefur, & Watson (2016)
discussed in Section 2.4.3 suggests that it is useful to observe participants when mathematical
induction is not explicitly known to be the appropriate method of proof. This allowed the
researcher to analyze the participants’ reasoning through their choice of proof technique.
Each question in the interview protocol was developed according to three primary criteria.
1. The question should be informed by the existing literature on PMI and Proof, particularly the research on epistemological issues with mathematical induction and the
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genetic decompositions of PMI.
2. The question should be designed to elicit responses that answer the Research Questions
outlined in Section 1.2.
3. Sub-questions for each top-level question should be developed in a manner that anticipates likely student responses so that the elicited knowledge during the interview is
maximized.
The questions were also strongly linked to the mathematical induction problems given to the
participants as cognitive tasks. These two problems are discussed in the following section.

3.2.3

Induction Problems

The participants in this study were given two mathematical induction problems to work
on during Interview 1. In order to address the research questions effectively, the problems
were chosen and written specifically to satisfy several conditions.
• The problems can be solved using mathematical induction, and are worded with
phrases typically associated with mathematical induction (e.g. “show for all n”).
• The correct base case for the property is not explicitly identified. The participants will
be required to determine the base case as part of the proof construction.
• The questions do not involve routine verifications of algebraic equalities or statements
involving sums.
• Induction is not explicitly mentioned in the phrasing of the problem.
The work discussed in Section 2.4.3 gives precedent for phrasing mathematical induction
questions this way and provides some evidence that this type of phrasing might allow the
researcher to observe more parts of the problem-solving process. Additionally, the second
requirement encourages the semantic proof production method of construction rather than

62
the procedural and syntactic productions discussed in Section 2.3. Weber (2005) argues
that such semantic production provides more learning opportunities than the other two,
providing some evidential support to use such semantic-centric proof construction activities
in studies seeking to study the problem-solving process. The two problems used for the
initial interview are provided below. For example solutions to each problem, see Appendix
Item A. The structure of the interview associated with these problems was detailed in the
previous section.
1. Show that there exists a minimal n ∈ N such that for all m ∈ N with m ≥ n, a 2m × 2m
chessboard with one missing tile can be exactly covered (no overhang) with “trominos”
that is, three tiles in an L-shape as pictured below (the trominos in the cover may be
oriented in any direction).

Figure 3.1: Tromino Problem

2. Assume that if you want to send a package, you must pay a certain amount of postage.
Show that there exists some minimal n ∈ N such that any package with a postage price
of m cents for m ∈ N and m ≥ n can be paid for using only 4 and 5 cent stamps.
3.3
3.3.1

Methodological Choices
The Role of APOS Theory and Genetic Decomposition

As this study aims to analyze cognition, it is important to mention that mental processes
and learning processes are deeply individualized and primarily internal, meaning that it is
impossible to observe them directly. However, theoretical frameworks focused on cognition
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provide us with strategies for studying cognitive processes via observable actions including
dialogue, physical movement, written work, and more. While imperfect, these strategies
allow researchers to create, test, and validate cognitive models. APOS Theory, discussed in
detail in Section 1.4.2, is one such cognitive framework.
In order to analyze the mental constructions and mechanisms related to PMI, Dubinsky & Lewin’s genetic decomposition for mathematical induction and Garcia-Martinez &
Parraguez’s reformulation of this genetic decomposition were used. These genetic decompositions were detailed in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, respectively. The decompositions served as
models through which the participants might be studied. In particular, Garcia-Martinez &
Parraguez’s conceptualization of the base step as a process will serve as an important point of
reference when analyzing the mathematical induction activities with unspecified base cases.
The interview protocols for this research were designed based on these genetic decompositions to help analyze the participants’ problem-solving strategies and activity solutions. The
genetic decomposition used for the proposed research as an initial genetic decomposition for
PMI, is an amalgymation of the two aforementioned decompositions and it is detailed below:
1. Expand the Function Schema to include a function mapping each natural number to
a propostion-valued output (f : N → P (N )).
2. Reversal through the existential quantifier to form a process of identifying and testing
an appropriate base case.
3. Encapsulate logic into the implication p ⇒ k. The implication cognitively becomes an
object which be the value of the function f .
4. Create the schema of the implication-valued function g where g(N) = (P (N ) ⇒ P (N +
1))
5. Interiorize the action of logical necessity into a process so that inputs P0 and PA ⇒ PB
allow one to conclude PB .
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6. Coordinate the function g from Step 3 with Modus Ponens beginning with P (a) for
some base case a.
7. Coordinate this implication valued function along with the base case process through
the use of modus ponens to explain the PMI.
8. Encapsulate this inductive process into an object be connected to the Method of Proof
schema so induction can be applied as a proof method.
9. Generalize actions on the induction object within various problem types coordinated
with the Method-of-Proof schema until students can apply induction as a proof technique.
10. Generalize actions to the base case object until students can identify an appropriate
base case in novel problems where it is not specified.
Although this decomposition has been tested by two research studies (Dubinsky, 1989;
Garcia-Martinez & Parraguez, 2017), this proposed research will test the decomposition
with expert participants to determine if there is a difference between experts’ and novices’
mathematical induction schema decomposition and if the decomposition needs needs revision to include any actions, processes, or objects found in the analysis of experts’ use of
mathematical induction.

3.3.2

Case Study

Case studies are in-depth examinations of a single setting, a single subject, a single phenomena, etc. (Bogdan & Bikklen, 2007). Case studies are commonly used within qualitative
researchers and their use is well-documented. If the researcher conducts these in-depth examination on multiple subjects, the process is sometimes referred to as a multi-case study
(Bogdan & Bikklen, 2007). Case studies have been widely used in research involving mathematical proof (Garcia-Martinez & Parraguez, 2017; Maher & Martino, 1996; Schwarz et.
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al., 2008; Weber, 2004;) This study will include a multi-case study with an 5 total participants. The multi-case study design was chosen to allow a deep exploration of several
experts’ problem-solving processes. In addition, many of the studies discussed in Chapter
2 focusing on proof and PMI (Dubinsky, 1986, 1989; Garcia-Martinez & Parraguez, 2017;
Inglis & Alcock 2012; Weber 2005) use the multi-case study design, suggesting that it is
an appropriate choice for the current proposal. In particular, when evaluating the validity
of a genetic decomposition, “Case studies are part of the research cycle of APOS theory
to conduct a coherent analysis of the work of participants with the proposed GD” (GarciaMartinez & Parraguez, 2017). The multi-case study for this proposed research will include
interviews, recordings, transcripts, and the participants’ written work.

3.4

Data Analysis

A computer-generated transcription was initially created for each interview. These transcriptions had mid-level accuracy. Each interview was re-watched twice during the transcription phase. The first re-watch was used to edit the transcription and correct errors.
The second re-watch was used to verify the transcription corrections for accuracy and to
note any non-verbal components of the interview, including gestures and lengthy pauses in
dialogue. During this second phase of transcription, sections of dialogue were also linked to
corresponding sections of the written work for ease of later interpretation.
After transcription was complete, each transcript received several reading and coding cycles. First, the transcript was read and any initial thoughts by the researcher were noted
in relation to specific passages, with particular attention paid to recurring themes throughout the interview. The notes created during this iteration of coding provided most of the
foundation for the thematic analysis detailed in Chapter 4. Second, the researcher made
note of any obstacles or difficulties the participants encountered or described during the
interviews. Next, the researcher linked passages of dialogue to any relevant literature from
Chapter 2 so that the analysis and interpretation of results could be situated within exist-
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ing work. Next, the researcher coded passages according to the APOS Theory Framework
and Expert Frameworks Discussed in Chapter 1. This included breaking down portions of
dialogue during the problem-solving periods according to the four stages of APOS as well as
noting passages of dialogue which were indicative of schema activation. After each coding,
the resulting coded transcripts were sent to a second researcher to be read and checked. The
second researcher included extra codes and clarified pre-existing codings, when necessary.
In any cases where there was disagreement, the two researchers discussed the passage and
collaboratively decided on a code.
The results of these initial codings were used to construct a coding framework through
thematic analysis (discussed in detail in Section 3.4.1) with which a second, more thorough,
line-by-line coding cycle could be conducted. For this second round of coding, the transcripts
were uploaded to the qualitative research tool, NVivo 12. In total, 538 unique sections of
participant dialogue were collected from the ten interviews. These sections ranged in length
from one sentence to several paragraphs. Sections which contained no usable data were
removed. A section was considered to have “no usable data” if it met one or more of the
following criteria.
1. The section included a single affirmative negative word or phrase answering a question
asked for the interviewer. This included instances like“MmHmmm” or ”Yes, that’s
correct” or ”Nope.”
2. The section consisted only of the participant repeating part of a question asked by the
interviewer. For instance, if the interviewer asked, “Is the sky blue?” and the participant responded, “The sky?” this section would have been removed from consideration
for the line-by-line analysis.
3. The section consisted only of the participant asking a logistical question like “Where
should I email my written work?”
After all sections satisfying the conditions above were removed, 460 sections remained. These
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460 sections of participant dialogue contained approximately 2,280 unique sentences of dialogue. The line-by-line coding was applied to this group of unique lines. Each line was coded
into an appropriate category in the coding framework developed by the initial round of coding. If a line represented more than one category in the coding framework, it was multi-coded
into every relevant category. A more in-depth explanation of this coding process is given in
the following section.

3.4.1

Thematic Analysis

Thematic Analysis is a method of data analysis widely used in qualitative research. Historically, the term thematic analysis has been applied to a broad span of research involving
the identification of patterns within qualitative data. However, more recently there has been
effort to formalize and structure the approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2012, 2017; Kiger
& Varpio, 2020). Broadly speaking, thematic analysis involves searching across a qualitative data set to identify and analyze recurring patterns (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic
analysis is an appropriate and powerful method to use when seeking to understand a set
of experiences, thoughts, or behaviors across a data set (Braun and Clarke 2012). Integral
to any discussion of thematic analysis is an operational definition of the word theme. The
current study takes a definition for theme derived from the existing literature on thematic
analysis. For the purposes of this study, a theme satisfies the following conditions.
1. It is a “patterned response or meaning” derived from the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006,
p. 82).
2. It “informs the research question(s)” (Kiger & Varpio, 2020, p.3)
3. It “captures and unifies the nature or basis of the experience into a meaningful whole”
(DeSantis & Ugarriza, 2000, p. 362)
It is highly important to note that a theme is not necessarily dependent on quantifiable
measures such as its frequency in the data set. Instead, a theme is determined by its ability
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to capture something important in relation to the overall research question(s) (Braun &
Clarke, 2006). Braun and Clarke (2006) offer a six-phase guide to conducting a thematic
analysis which is now one of the most widely-used models in thematic analysis (Kiger &
Varpio, 2020, p.3, Nowell et al., 2017). The six phases of the guide are shown in the Table
3.1.
Table 3.1: Six Phases of Thematic Analysis by Braun & Clarke, 2006

Phase
Familiarizing yourself with data
Generating initial codes

Searching for themes
Reviewing themes

Defining and naming themes

Producing the report

Description
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading
the data, noting down initial ideas.
Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic
fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant
to each code
Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data
relevant to each potential theme.
Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded
extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a thematic ‘map’ of the analysis.
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme,
and the overall story the analysis tells, generating clear
definitions and names for each theme.
The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid,
compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected
extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research
question and literature, producing a scholarly report of
the analysis.

This coding framework can be applied either inductively, using pertinent patterns identified
in the data to develop the coding framework, or deductively, where the coding framework
is predetermined and guided by specific theories or theoretical frameworks (Attride-Stirling,
2001; Braun & Clarke, 2006). This six-phase framework was used in two phases of the
data analysis. First, the nine-item expert knowledge framework was used as to conduct a
deductive thematic analysis on the data. This thematic analysis is discussed in detail in
Section 4.2.3. Secondly, an inductive thematic analysis was also conducted on the entire
data set to identify any other pertinent themes that address some, or all, of the research
questions but were not captured by the APOS Theory or Expert Knowledge frameworks.
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This inductive analysis is presented in Section 4.3. Braun and Clarke (2006) note that it is
important to acknowledge the type(s) of thematic analysis conducted (inductive or deductive)
as well as the epistemological viewpoint through which the analysis was conducted. This
study operates from the constructivist view as discussed in Section 1.3, and the thematic
analyses were conducted from this perspective.

3.5

Chapter Summary

This chapter presents the methods an methodology of the study. The initial section
described the research setting and the selection of participants. The following section detailed
the methods of data collection as well as the study design including a description of Cognitive
Task Analysis and semi-structured interviews. Next, the methodological choices for the
study were described in detail and situated within existing literature. Finally, methods of
data analysis were presented including a detailed description of thematic analysis, which was
used extensively during two stages of data analysis. The results of this data analysis process,
as well as a contextual discussion of these results, is discussed in Chapter 4.

4

RESULTS
This chapter presents an overview of the findings of the study as well as some interpre-

tations of these findings. The primary purpose of this chapter is to link the data and data
interpretation to the research questions outlined in Section 1.2. Rather than splitting the
chapter by research question, the questions will be connected to the data throughout each
section within the contexts of the relevant theoretical frameworks discussed in Section 1.4.
First, Section 4.1 provides a description of the data analysis conducted using APOS Theory,
as discussed in Section 1.4. This section also includes a discussion of the genetic decomposition discussed in Section 3.3.1 and the triad of Schema Development detailed in 2.5.3.
Section 4.2 highlights the results of the deductive thematic analysis (see Section 3.4.1) based
on the nine-item expert knowledge framework discussed in Section 1.4. The chapter con-
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cludes with Section 4.3, which presents the inductive thematic analysis. Several recurring
themes from the data that were not captured by the APOS Theory analyis or the deductive thematic analysis are highlighted and analyzed, and a philosophical discussion of one
interesting result arising from the data is also explored.
As discussed in Section 1.3, the notion of broad “generalizability,” or the desire to identify
results that can be widely generalized across an array of different contexts, is not necessarily
the primary goal of qualitative research. It is important to note that, since this study is
qualitative in nature, the results of the data analysis may appear different than a standard
or traditional quantitative study, and it is appropriate that they should be considered under
a different lens. The APA Publications and Communications Board Task Force Report says
the following of qualitative research:
Qualitative data sets typically are drawn from fewer sources (e.g., participants)
than quantitative studies, but include rich, detailed, and heavily contextualized
descriptions from each source. Following from these characteristics, qualitative
research tends to engage data sets in intensive analyses, to value open-ended
discovery rather than verification of hypotheses, to emphasize specific histories
or settings in which experiences occur rather than expect findings to endure
across all contexts, and to recursively combine inquiry with methods that require
researchers’ reflexivity (i.e., self-examination) about their influence upon research
process (Levitt et al., 2018).
With this reminder, the remainder of the chapter will seek to address the research questions
using the analysis of the qualitative data collected during the study. The research questions
are included again below for convenience and labeled with the designation that will be used
in the chapter’s discussion (RQ1, RQ2, etc.).
RQ1 How do experts describe the development of their conceptual understanding of PMI
over time?
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RQ2 How do experts situate their conceptual understanding of PMI in relation to the notions
of proof and proof technique?
RQ3 When viewing a novel problem, how do experts determine whether or not mathematical
induction is an appropriate method for proving a statement?
RQ4 What obstacles, if any, do experts face when solving mathematical induction problems
in which mathematical induction is not explicitly specified as the technique to use?
RQ5 How do experts explain and define the two primary parts of PMI (the base step and
the inductive step) and the perceived relationship, if any, between these two primary
parts?
These research questions informed all aspects of the study and will likewise guide both the
discussion and interpretation of results included in the remainder of the chapter.

4.1

APOS Theory

APOS Theory, including the theory of Schema Development, was discussed in detail in
Chapter 2. This section will present the results of the data analysis in the context of
APOS Theory. Section 4.1.1 will reiterate the preliminary genetic decomposition discussed
in Section and give a worked example of the APOS coding process for a small excerpt. Section
4.1.2 will describe the results of the APOS Coding Process for each participant’s work on
the cognitive tasks, giving notable and relevant examples from the data. Section 4.1.2
will discuss examples Schema Development identified by the study. Finally, Section 4.1.3
will conclude the section with a summary of results and conclusions based on the findings,
including suggested revisions and additions to the preliminary genetic decomposition.
4.1.1

Analysis Using APOS Theory and Preliminary Genetic Decomposition

The role of genetic decompositions in work using APOS Theory was discussed in detail in
Section 1.4. Recall that a genetic decomposition is a contextual description which attempts
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to capture a sequence of actions, processes, objects, and schemas that students may progress
through when constructing knowledge for some concept, as well as the mental mechanisms
(e.g. interiorization, coordination, encapsulation, etc.) by which those constructions are
possibly created. As has already been mentioned, learning is a deeply individualized process, and it is not expected that a genetic decomposition will exactly capture every single
individual’s knowledge construction. Instead, a quality genetic decomposition will capture a
large part of construction which is representative of most learners. As discussed in Chapters
2 and 3, two previous studies have done work with a preliminary genetic decomposition for
PMI (Dubinsky & Lewin; Garcia-Martinez & Parraguez). The findings of these two studies
were coordinated to identify the genetic decomposition below, which was used as the guiding
genetic decomposition for the current study and will be evaluated and modified in in Section
4.1.3.
1. Expand the Function Schema to include a function mapping each natural number to
a propostion-valued output (f : N → P (N )).
2. Reversal through the existential quantifier to form a process of identifying and testing
an appropriate base case.
3. Encapsulate logic into the implication p ⇒ k. The implication cognitively becomes an
object which is the value of the function f .
4. Create the schema of the implication-valued function g where g(N) = (P (N ) ⇒ P (N +
1))
5. Interiorize the action of logical necessity into a process so that inputs P0 and PA ⇒ PB
allow one to conclude PB .
6. Coordinate the function g from Step 3 with Modus Ponens beginning with P (a) for
some base case a.
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7. Coordinate this implication valued function along with the base case process through
the use of modus ponens to explain the PMI.
8. Encapsulate this inductive process into an object be connected to the Method of Proof
schema so mathematical induction can be applied as a proof method.
9. Generalize actions on the mathematical induction object within various problem types
coordinated with the Method-of-Proof schema until students can apply mathematical
induction as a proof technique.
10. Generalize actions to the base case object until students can identify an appropriate
base case in novel problems where it is not specified.
This preliminary genetic decompostion informed the study design, including the methodological choices and interview protocols discussed in Chapter 2. In the following sections,
the results of data analysis are presented and are interpreted using the APOS Theory Framework as well as this preliminary genetic decomposition. In section 4.1.1.1, the APOS Coding
process is explained in greater detail along with a worked example to illustrate the coding
process. Then, in 4.1.1.2, notable findings are discussed and interpreted. Finally, in Section 4.1.1.3, conclusions based on the findings of the APOS data analysis are presented and
contextualized within the study’s guiding research questions.

4.1.1.1

Worked Example of APOS Coding Since the participants in this study are

mathematical experts, their work during the CTA was intricate and nuanced. In many
cases, one line of spoken dialogue encompassed numerous cognitive processes. Therefore,
performing APOS coding on the transcripts was an involved and lengthy process. In order
to provide insight to some steps in this process, a worked example is included in this section.
In general, the following set of steps served as a guideline for the coding process. Note
that these steps take place after the initial transcripts have been computer-generated and
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manually checked for accuracy several times, and the video-recordings have been reviewed
multiple times to ensure consistency between the recordings and transcripts.
• Step 1 Carefully read through the transcript, referencing the video-recordings and
written work when dialogue in the transcript is unclear.
• Step 2 The first coding involved identifying large passages where any of the stages of
APOS Theory (e.g. action stage, process stage, etc.) appear in the transcript without
necessarily elaborating or explicating.
• Step 3 Revisited the codes assigned in Step 2, this time reading the passage associated with a stage and giving a line-by-line description of the passage in the context of
the four stages of APOS Theory.
• Step 4 Revisited the codes from Steps 1-3, this time including a discussion of any
exhibited APOS Theory mechanisms (e.g. interiorization, coordination, encapsulation,
etc.) which link the stages of knowledge construction together in each passage.
• Step 5 Sent coded transcript to a secondary coder for verification and edits or additions.
• Step 6 If any disagreement occurred, the two coders met and discussed the issue(s)
in order to arrive at an agreement.
Steps 5 and 6 are to ensure consistency in the data and to reduce bias that can occur if a
single researcher is the sole source of data analysis or interpretation. These two steps are
not included in the worked example below. Instead, Steps 1-4 are illustrated by this worked
example to give the reader insight to what coding an interview using APOS Theory is like.
The example that follows analyzes an excerpt from Participant 3’s solution to the first cognitive task (tromino problem), following Steps 1-4 of the coding process detailed above.
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• Step 1: First, the excerpt from the transcript was linked to the participant’s written
work and any non-verbal cues were added to the excerpt. Any additions are coded in
red to help distinguish them from the original excerpt.
• Step 2: Additions from the first APOS Coding are coded in blue.
• Step 3: The line-by-line descriptions added in the second coding are coded in green.
• Step 4: Additions made in the third coding, including mechanisms, is coded in purple.
Action Stage: [So, I’m taking a copy of the 8 by 8, and I have the empty cell in
the top left corner. And I’m going to make a copy of it. And I’m going to rotate
it around so I’m just gonna, like, put 4 copies of it.] [Performs the action
of copying an 8 × 8 grid four times, then creates a 16 × 16 grid using
these four copies (as pictured in the written work below)] This action
is linked to the external stimuli of the written work, the participant
physically performs these actions.
[Here, he holds up Part C of the written work to the camera.]

Figure 4.1: Participant 3 Written Work

Process Stage: [Okay. Okay, okay so I took um, my 8 by 8 and that missing
tile was in the bottom right corner. I don’t know if it’s mirrored for you, but it
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was in one of the bottom sides and then I made a copy of it rotated it. So that
the. . . all of the empty squares, all the empty corners, and either the copies are
at the center of the grid.] [He has reflected on the action of constructing a
16 × 16 board from four copies of the 8 × 8 board, and can now visualize
this process in his mind.] As he reflects on the action of constructing
the board, he interiorizes this action and is able to visualize the process in his head without the need for the external stimuli.
[Here, he is pointing to the four quadrants and making rotational gestures with his hands.]
Process Stage: [And so, if you think of it like that, then okay well, now there’s
4 empty cells. Right? But the thing is that reduces it down to a two by 2, which
we said we can already tile, which is our base case, right? And we can definitely
tile that and leave, like, one empty cell.] [He has reflected on the action of
tiling a 2 × 2 chessboard, which he performed during the base step, and
is now able to visualize the process in his mind.] Instead of having to
perform the action of tiling an 8 × 8 chessboard, he has reflected on the
action and is now able to imagine the interiorized action as a process
in his mind without the need to perform the action itself.
[During this section he is pointing to the center 2 × 2 grid.]
Object Stage: [So what that leaves you with if I tie that one let’s just say I’m
going to choose. Um, my empty cell to remain in just the top left 8 by 8. Um,
from there, we can just go back to the previous case and say, like, okay, well,
I know from the previous case that I can get the cell everywhere within that 8
by 8.] [The participant is able to think of the process of generating
tilings for an 8 × 8 in totality and apply other processes (like rotation
and iteration) to this tiled object.] After performing the action of
tiling the 8 × 8 using the external stimuli of his written work and hav-
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ing interiorized this action into a process he can imagine performing
in his mind, the participant is now able to imagine the tiled 8 × 8 in
totality, and thus deomonstrates that he has encapsulated this tiling
process into an object.

Right. And, um, in order for me to get this thing

to a new grid,[By this, he means shifting the missing tile to a different
quadrant.] Object Stage: [I can just, like, rotate by 90 degrees, right? And
actually don’t even need to rotate the whole grid. You can just rotate the center
2 × 2 so, once you have the empty cell in the center, then you just rotate that like
that two by two in the middle with the L and the empty square. And that’ll put
it into a new quadrant and then you can do all of your rotations from there. ]
[The participant is able to visualize the process of rotation in his mind
without needing to perform the action on paper, and as he reflects on
these rotations, he is able to think of them in totality and exhibits the
ability to compose multiple rotations.] Initially, the participant used
the external stimuli of his written work to draw rotations of the board.
As he reflected on this action of rotation, he was able to interiorize the
rotation action into a rotation process that he could visualize inside
his mind. It is important to note that there are two different kinds of
rotations involved- whole board rotation and sub-board rotation. The
participant demonstrates the ability to imagine applying a composition process to the rotations, suggesting that he has encapsulated the
rotation processes into objects to which he can apply other processes.
This excerpt is only part of Participant 3’s solution to the tromino problem, but it captures
examples and coding of action, process, and object stages of APOS Theory. Within this part
of his problem-solving process, he performs actions, reflects on these actions and interiorizes
them into processes that he can imagine performing in his mind. After the actions have
been interiorized, he continues to reflect on these processes until he can imagine them in
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totality and has encapsulated these processes into objects to which he can then apply other
processes. The worked example above is representative of the complexity and intricacies of
APOS coding. This coding process was used for all interviews in the study. The coding steps
were used to analyze both the CTA portion of the interviews as well as the semi-structured
interviews that followed the CTA. It is clear that, even in the short excerpt above, the
participant exhibits several cognitive constructions and employs the use of multiple APOS
Theory mechanisms. This was commonly seen among the participants during the CTA. Some
relevant findings based on the APOS Theory coding are detailed in the following section.
4.1.1.2

Action, Process, Object Pattern During Cognitive Tasks Recall that

Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson (2016) identified a pattern of behavior exhibited by experts while they worked on tasks using PMI. The three steps are included again below for
convenience. In particular, the authors observed that experts would:
1. Attempt to identify a reasonable method or technique to prove the statement. If one
can be identified, they may use the technique without necessarily thinking about why
the statement is true,
2. If no method can be immediately or easily identified, then the expert may try to
experiment with some examples to gain insight to possible proving strategies.
3. Use discoveries made in the previous step to inform the formalization of an argument.
This pattern of behavior was consistently modeled by participants in the current study, and
as a result, this model is used in several sections throughout this chapter to help interpret
the data. The three steps above can clearly be seen in the worked example in Section 4.1.1.1.
In fact, these three steps can be translated to the following mental constructions in APOS
Theory.
1. If no method or proof can be easily or immediately identified, an expert may begin by
performing the action of solving small examples.
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2. The individual may reflect on these actions until they can be interiorized into processes
that they can imagine in their mind.
3. The individual may search for relationships or patterns between successive examples.
This could also be equivalent to coordinating the process from Step 2 with the proccess
of succession to identify a relationship between cases n and n + 1.
4. Once the individual has identified this pattern or relationship, they may be able to
reflect on it until they are able to coherently understand the process in totality and
encapsulate it into an inductive step object, which can serve as a formalized argument.
This pattern offers a general description of behaviors that captures the majority of the
problem-solving behavior exhibited by experts in the study. The remainder of this section
will present examples of this pattern as it appeared in the data. Since Schemata are explored
in detail in the following section on Schema Development, this section will primarily focus
on the Action, Process, and Object stages of APOS Theory as they pertain to the pattern
above along with relevant examples from the data which contextualize these steps in the
context of the study’s two mathematical induction problems.
Action Stage
As indicated by Styliandes, Sandefur and Watson (2016), experts demonstrated a tendency
to use examples when they could not immediately identify a proving strategy. This study
corroborates this finding, and examples of this behavior observed during the CTA are detailed
below.
1. Problem 1- Tiling Action: While working on Problem 1 (tromino problem), every
participant performed the action of tiling a chessboard or multiple chessboards. This
action was grounded in the physical act of tiling the board in their written work. Table
4.1 shows an example of each participant’s tilings. The tiling actions pictured took
place at the beginning of the problem solving section for Problem 1 for all participants
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except Participant 5, who began by proving an adjacent counting problem on the
number of tiles and trominos. After constructing this proof, she returned to the tiling
problem and performed the tiling action for the 2×2 and 4×4 chessboards. The largest
board that was physically drawn and tiled was an 8 × 8 board, drawn by Participant
3 and pictured in the table below. The other four participants did not manually tile
boards larger than 4 × 4.
There is one notable pattern of behavior related to the tiling action. Since the missing
tile could be located anywhere, a few of the participants tiled a couple of 4 × 4 chessboards (Participants 2, 3, and 5). However, some of the participants only tiled a single
4 × 4 board with the corner tile missing (Participants 1 and 4), and seemed convinced
that the statement held for n = 2, despite not verifying this for other missing tiles.
No participant performed the action of tiling for more than two different 4 × 4 boards.
The participants seemed to accept one or two examples of a tiling to be sufficient to
accept the claim as true. This suggests participants may have been able to interiorize
a single tiling action into a process of tiling with a missing tile. That is, they were able
to imagine what would happen if the missing tile was located elsewhere. For instance,
after performing the action of tiling the two 4 × 4 boards pictured in Table 4.1, Participant 5 said, “I think I’m like. . . after these 2 examples, I think if I choose a missing
tile, then that thing makes like a two cross two square. And then for the remaining, I
think that there should be a way to figure out the tiling. I guess what I’m trying to
say is like, uh, if I choose a blank tile anywhere, it should work.”
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Table 4.1: Images of Tiling Action

Participant

Image of Tiling Action
2 × 2 and 4 × 4 chessboards.

Participant 1

2 × 2 and 4 × 4 chessboards.
Participant 2

8 × 8 chessboard.
Participant 3

4 × 4 chessboards.
Participant 4

2 × 2 and 4 × 4 chessboards.

Participant 5

This phenomenon illustrates findings by Weber (2008) that were discussed in Section
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2.1.2. Weber (2008) noted that the mathematical experts in his study would use what
he called example-based arguments, or arguments when the participant accepted the
validity of a claim solely by examining the statement in the context of carefully chosen
examples. He notes that, while proof by example is certainly not a valid proof technique, experts seemed to be convinced by the exploration of a single example. This
behavior was exhibited by the participants who accepted the claim that a 4 × 4 board
missing any tile could be covered with trominos based solely on their ability to tile the
board in the case of one or two specific missing tiles. Weber (2008) offered two hypotheses for this behavior. He believes that either (1) it is possible that the mathematicians
understood how their example-based inductive reasoning could be generalized, but did
not express this in a way that was directly observable or (2) it is possible that the participants were only requiring a high level of confidence in a statement’s validity, rather
than absolute certainty. The second hypothesis is explored further in Section 4.3 in
the section about formal and informal types of proving. Only Participant 3 offered a
rigorous explanation of how a tiling with one missing tile could be used to generate
tilings for a board missing a tile in a different location. This will be explored in the
following item.
2. Problem 1- Rotation Action: As seen in the worked example in Section 4.1.1.1, Participant 3 used rotational symmetry as part of his argument. While one other participant
(Participant 4) also spoke about rotational symmetry, Participant 3 was the only one
to link rotation to an external stimuli by drawing several examples of rotation in his
written work. He exhibited three different rotation actions: Full-Board rotation by
90◦ , Quadrant Rotation by 90◦ , and 2 × 2 Sub-board Rotation. These are pictured
below in Participant 3’s work.
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Figure 4.2: Participant 3 Rotation Actions

After initially reading the problem, Participant 3 was immediately interested in the
fact that the missing tile could be anywhere on the board. These rotational actions
served as the foundation for what became a rigorous explanation to account for the
location of the missing tile. Initially, the participant relied on the images in Figure 8
to help him see where a missing tile would shift to for a given rotation. That is to
say, he relied on this external stimuli in order to understand the relationship between
the tilings for different missing tiles. For example, when working on the 4 × 4 board
pictured in the center of Figure 8, he said, “And then rotate so that the empty square
is like, um, inside. So it’s over. . . let me draw it. So, it’s over there. Well, now there’s
a new two by two square that I can rotate, um. I’ll try to, like, highlight it so then
that now I can rotate that two by two little grid.” This illustrates his initial reliance on
the visual stimuli of his drawings to help him visualize the results of these rotations.
Later, he was able to begin interiorizing this action so that he could imagine it in his
mind. This will be discussed further in the section on the Process Stage. Examples of
action-stage behavior for the second problem are explored in the following item.
3. Problem 2- Linear Combination Action: For the stamp problem, all five participants
began by explicitly writing out small package prices and attempting to cover them
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with the given stamp values. Consider Participant 5’s work below along with the
corresponding excerpt from the transcript.

Figure 4.3: Participant 5 Enumeration Actions

P5: So n=4 works. Then, um, so. . . . And of course 5 works. But n = 6
doesn’t work, because we can’t make up 6 out of 4 and 5. Um, so, n = 5
doesn’t work as the minimal. Okay, so now I’m thinking maybe I should
start with the n = 9, like, as an example. So 9 works, 10 works, but n = 11
doesn’t work. . . Maybe I should try with like the lcm. So if m = 20... So,
20 works. 21 works. Does 22 work? Yeah, 22 because I can do 12 + 10.
23. . . works too. And then 24 will work because 20 worked. So, I guess
if I check just like 4 consecutive numbers. Then, like, each higher would
work. So I guess the question is, um. What is the minimal n, such that n,
n + 1, n + 2, and n + 3 can be written as a sum of fours and fives? Okay,
so I have a candidate which is n = 20. I guess at this point, I would just
like, uh, do, like a trial and error. Because I checked up until, like, n = 9.
And then I would just, like, check after that. Okay, because I only have to
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check numbers between 9 and 20 and, like, because I think it’s going to be
a fast process. I know n = 9 doesn’t work, n = 10 doesn’t work and n = 11
doesn’t work. And all 3 of these don’t work. . . Don’t work because of um,
11. Because 11. . . yeah. . . yeah 11 doesn’t work. Does n = 12 work? 12
works, 13 works. Does 14 work? 14 works. Does 15 work? Yeah 15 works
too. Okay, then, um. Yeah, so my answer is n = 12 is the minimal n.
Here, Participant 5 exhibited an action stage of of construction, since she used examples to figure out two parts of the solution. First, she used the examples to perform
the action of identifying the necessary number of consecutive numbers needed for her
argument. Second, she used example action to identify the minimal number satisfying
the condition. Similar written-work and dialogue pairs were observed during Problem
2 for the other participants, although not all participants identified the need for four
consecutive integers. While only three of the participants (Participants 3, 4, and 5)
were able to construct a complete proof for Problem 2, all five participants successfully
identified n = 12 as the minimal n using the Linear-Combination Action. However,
the same type of example-based argument also appeared in this problem. Participant
1, who was unable to construct an argument showing that any package price greater
than n = 12 could be exactly paid still believed that n = 12 was correct based on a
limited number of examples. In particular, he performed the action of covering the
integers 12-40 using 4 and 5 cent stamps, then made the claim that n = 12 was the
minimal n. Again, this exhibits the same type of behavior identified by Weber (2008),
since this argument is not logically sufficient to prove that 12 is the minimal n. This
case seems to better support Weber’s second hypothesis explaining this behavior. In
particular, Participant 2 was unable to construct any argument for why an arbitrary
package could be covered. It is therefore unlikely that he understood how his small
examples could be generalized and much more likely that the 28 consecutive true cases
were enough to give him a high degree of confidence.This indicates that Participant 1
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was not able to interiorize these actions into a process, keeping him from identifying
an argument for the remainder of the problem.
Process Stage
Most of the items associated with the Process Stage of APOS Theory are the processes
resulting from the interiorization of the actions mentioned above, with one exception. The
participants who recognized the relationship between successive chessboards (namely, that
increasing n by 1 yields a chessboard that is four times the previous board size) did not necessarily perform any observable action or use any visual stimuli related to this relationship,
but were able to imagine the process in their minds and describe this process out loud. The
themes linked to the Process Stage of development are listed below. The processes described
below illustrate the second behavior in the pattern of behavior discussed at the beginning of
this section: “The individual may reflect on these actions until they can be interiorized into
processes that they can imagine in their mind.”
1. Problem 1- Tiling Process: Once the participants reflected on the tiling action and
began to be able to imagine the process of tiling in their minds, the action was thought
to be interiorized into a tiling process. Consider the excerpt from Participant 1’s
interview below.
P1: And then I drew the 8 × 8 grid and then saw that if I could do large
“L’s,” [Here, he means three of the four quadrants of a chessboard.]
then that would limit me down to a smaller square. Um. And I could work
from there, so I guess I never never even drew the 8 × 8. I just understood
what it should look like from a 4 × 4.
This excerpt is indicative that the participant is operating at the process stage of
tiling, since he is able to visualize the 8 × 8 tiling in his mind. Participants 2 and
3 also demonstrated the ability to imagine the tiling process in their minds without
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continuing to rely on the external stimuli of their drawings. In contrast, Participants
4 and 5 did not exhibit signs of progressing past the tiling action. While they were
able to generate the tiled boards pictured in Table 4.1, they were unable to progress
further in the problem and gave no observable sign that they could imagine this tiling
process without the use of their drawings. It is important to note that Participants 4
and 5 did not successfully construct a proof for this problem, indicating that the ability
to interiorize the actions associated with examples may be important for constructing
proofs by PMI.
2. Problem 1- Rotation Process: Consider again a small subsection of the excerpt used
for the worked example in Section 4.1.1.1.
P3: I can just, like, rotate by 90 degrees, right? And actually don’t even
need to rotate the whole grid. You can just rotate the center 2 × 2. so, once
you have the empty cell in the center, then you just rotate that like that
2 × 2 in the middle with the L and the empty square. And that’ll put it into
a new quadrant and then you can do all of your rotations from there.
Again, Participant 3’s description here indicates that he is able to imagine these rotations in his mind, which indicates that the rotation action has been interiorized into
a rotation process. Participant 3 was the only participant who used rotation as part
of his mathematical induction argument for Problem 1. He did not draw any boards
or refer to any of his previously drawn boards or rotations during the excerpt above.
This suggests that the rotational process for multiple kinds of rotations (he refers to
both whole-board rotation and 2 × 2 sub-board rotation in the excerpt above) has been
interiorized into a rotation process so that he is able to imagine these various kinds
of rotations in his mind. Further, he exhibits the ability to coordinate the processes
of multiple kinds of rotations (e.g. he talks about rotating the center 2 × 2 and then
performing a whole-board rotation). Later, he exhibits the ability to encapsulate these
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rotation processes into rotation objects, and this is discussed in the section on Object
Stage.
3. Problem 1- Quadrupling Process: The relationship between successive boards was a
crucial part of the tromino problem. Namely, for any n ≥ 2, a 2n × 2n chessboard
consists of four copies of a 2n−1 × 2n−1 boards. Four of the five participants exhibited
behaviors that indicated they were able to imagine this quadrupling process in their
minds without having to perform an associated action or to rely on external stimuli.
Consider the excerpt from Participant 2’s interview below.
P2: I started to think about the size of the chessboard because it’s not
increasing arbitrarily. It’s increasing by doubling the rows and the columns.
Every time you have doubled the amount of area. . . Is it double the area?
no it is four times the area. . .
When referencing this growth, Participant 2 was not referencing any written work or
relying on any external stimuli that could be observed in the video recording. Instead,
he is able to imagine the growth of the chessboard in his mind, indicating that he is
operating at a process-stage of construction. Participants 1, 3, and 5 also exhibited
behavior that indicated they could imagine this quadrupling behavior in their minds, as
demonstrated by their verbal discussions of the process of growth similar to the excerpt
above. However, Participant 5 was unable to identify this relationship and exhibited
behavior that indicated he could not imagine this process in his mind. Consider the
drawing from his written work below.
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Figure 4.4: Participant 4 Issues with Chessboard Growth

This image was supposed to represent a 2m × 2m chessboard. However, the picture
drawn actually has dimension (2m−1 + 2) × (2m−1 + 2). This suggests that, not only
was the participant unable to imagine the growth process in his mind, but he was
also unable to perform the action of representing the growth in his written work. The
ability to visualize this process of chessboard growth was strongly linked to success
in constructing a cohesive mathematical induction proof, and this is explored further
in Section 4.2.1. In general, it is important to note that the inability to identify the
relationship in a single problem is not necessarily indicative of the individuals ability
to identify similar patterns in general, and it is possible that the Participant would
have been able to identify the pattern of chessboard growth with certain prompting.
4. Problem 2- Linear Combination Process: There were 3 participants who successfully
constructed a proof for the stamp problem (Participants 3, 4, and 5). In order to
construct this proof, these three participants interiorized the linear combination action
discussed above in the Action Stage section. In particular, they were able to imagine
the process of covering an arbitrary package price with stamps. Consider the written
work and corresponding transcript excerpt from Participant 3’s interview below.
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Figure 4.5: Participant 3 Stamp Problem Linear Combination

P3: Okay, like 4x + 5y = m and I’m adding one to both sides. Well, I can
make one by taking. . . adding a 5 and subtracting a 4. Because 5 minus 4
of course is equal to one, and then as long as the number of fours, I have is
bigger than zero. then I can actually do this like, add one to the y. Because
we want to make sure that we’re actually using, like, positive number of
postage stamps. Um, so the issue then arises if x is equal to 0, in the case
where x is equal to 0, then you have to make one another way. And that
is by, um let’s see. Okay this is for x greater than 0 and then this is for x
equals 0. Okay. Wait a minute no, no, I’m not crazy. Okay, so this should
work, um, when. . . when x is actually equal to 0, um, then you take away
3 of the um, fives and then add. . . is that right? Or it should be four fours.
Ah four times four is 16. That’s 4. Okay. There we go.
The participant exhibits the ability to imagine the process of removing and adding
stamps to cover a package price (contextualizing this addition and removal algebraically
using linear combinations). It is important to note that the written work above was
written after the dialogue above. The participant was reasoning aloud, but the calculations were taking place primarily inside his head, suggesting that he was operating
at the process stage.
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Object Stage
The Object Stage was primarily observed toward the end of problem-solving sessions and
primarily involved participants being able to reflect on the processes discussed in the previous
section and to imagine them in totality until they were able to encapsulate them into objects.
This stage is primarily associated with steps 3 and 4 in the pattern of behaviors associated
with PMI detailed at the beginning of the section.
1. Problem 1- Tiling Object: After continuing to reflect on the process of tiling a board,
the participants were able to imagine this process in totality and encapsulate the
process into a tiling object. Namely, participants exhibited the ability to think of a
tiled board as its own entity without imagining the process of tiling. Further they were
able to apply the quadrupling process discussed in the previous section to these tiled
board objects in order to generalize the tiling to larger boards and thus, develop an
inductive argument. Consider the image from Participant 1’s written work below.

Figure 4.6: Participant 1 Tiling Object

The “tiles” in this image are not single unit tiles. Instead, each tile in the picture
represents a tiled 2k board. This indicates that Participant 1 has encapsulated the
tiling process into a tiled board object, to which he can apply other processes, like
the quadrupling growth process discussed in the previous section. Participants 2 and
3 also exhibited this same Object Stage of tiling. Participants 5, though she showed
that she had interiorized the action of tiling a 4 × 4, seemed unable to encapsulate this
process in order to be able to think about a tiled board as an object to which she could
apply other processes. Participant 5, as previously discussed, was unable to interiorize
the action of tiling.
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2. Problem 1- Rotation and Mapping Object: After continuing to reflect on the process of
tiling a board, Participant 3 was able to imagine this process in totality and encapsulate
the process into a rotation object. Namely, he exhibited the ability to think of rotations
as functions. This was demonstrated by his ability to apply the process of composition
to these rotations. These composition processes were coordinated to create a Mapping
object which takes a tiling as an input and outputs a tiled board with a different
missing tile. Consider the excerpt below which illustrates this mapping object.
P3: I guess this 8 × 8 is actually split up into four 4 × 4s, and they are all
very similar. Um, if we’re ignoring. . . there’s one piece that you kind of have
to ignore for this, but the pattern in all of these is pretty much the same.
Just rotated versions of it. So, I think if you can show that you can move it
anywhere in one of these little sub grids, right? If I can move it anywhere
in one of these sub grids, then I can just rotate the whole thing. Right, and
then the empty Square just goes to the rest of it.
Here, we can see him imagining the various rotational processes in his mind, then
coordinating them to form a chain of rotations, which is then encapsulated into a
mapping that he can visualize in totality as taking one tiled board and mapping it to
a tiled board with a different missing tile. As previously stated, Participant 3 was the
only participant in the study to use these rotations as part of his argument.
Participant 3’s proof to Problem 1 most successfully captured the pattern of behavior discussed by Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson (2016), though all the participants participated
in some or all of these steps, as indicated in the examples given throughout this section.
The results presented in this discussion identify some aspects of the mental constructions
involved in proofs by PMI which may not be completely captured by the preliminary genetic
decomposition used for the study. This will be explored in Section 4.1.3. While this section
offered some descriptions of results collected during the CTA portion of the interview, the
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following section explores the Base Step and Inductive Step of PMI in more generality.
4.1.1.3

The Base Case and Inductive Step Research Question 5 of this study asks,

“How do experts explain and define the two primary parts of PMI (the base step and the inductive step) and the perceived relationship, if any, between these two primary parts?” While
the CTA-specific examples given in the previous section provide some insight to this question,
this section will further explore the base case and inductive step in broader contexts using
the APOS Theory framework. In particular, this section explores results associated with the
two steps of mathematical induction as well as the participants’ perceived relationship, if
any, between the two parts. Results discussed in this section cover results discussed outside
of the CTA, during the semi-structured question and answer portion of the interviews.
Base Step
When asked about how the base case fits in to the overall technique of mathematical induction, Participant 2 said, “It depends on how trivial it is if it’s like a really basic base case,
I almost don’t think about it at all. I’m like, It’s clearly true and then I move on.”This
sentiment was echoed by other participants. Consider Participant 1’s answer to the same
question below.
P1: In principle I know that you need the base case, because you can write things
where you’re trying to prove something inductively and a base case doesn’t work.
Sorry. And it, the proof fails because the base case doesn’t work and you’re
proving something. So, like, in practice the base case is really for me, almost
a triviality because what I’m... If I’m trying to prove something, I will have
already checked that it works in the most trivial case I can check, which would
be the base case... Actually. Um, most of the time the base case for me, usually
has almost no content. It’s, it’s checking that the thing works at the very sort
of most trivial level, and often at the... well, I’m calling it the trivial level, but
often that the, the level of the base case, it’s hard to understand what what is
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actually going on, whereas all the content content and inductive proof for me
is contained in the inductive step, which really tells you how to go from one
situation to another.
These statements represent a limited and rudimentary description of the base case, consisting
only of checking a small case and requiring little to no attentional effort or thought. However,
even this simple description of the base case is indicative that the participants are operating
at least at a process stage of construction of the base case, since they are able to imagine
the process of checking a base case in their minds. While Participant 1 said, “at the level of
the base case, it’s hard to understand what’s going on.” Participant 4 offered a somewhat
differing opinion and indicated that, “sometimes the base case shows you how to do the
general construction.” This statement is supported by the examples from the CTA, where
participants used the base case to inform the rest of the inductive proof. The relationship
between the base case and the rest of PMI is explored later in the section.
Participant 5 offered a more nuanced description of the base case. She was asked how she
might identify a base case if it isn’t identified for her. Consider her answer in the excerpt
below.
P5: I think like, depending. . . Okay. I think look at, like, the simplest things in
that area and I. . . that’s generally the base case, like n=0 and n=1 if it’s like
natural numbers. Or like a point if it’s geometric. And if it’s like groups, then
the trivial group.
I: Okay. And then if those very, very low-level ones don’t work, then what?
P5: Okay. I will keep trying like, 2 and 3, if it’s not working, then probably the
problem is wrong. Try like a line if it’s geometric or a circle. So increment up in
level of difficulty. Yeah. See if something happens there.
In this discussion of the base step, the participant is not relying on any external stimuli
(like a specific problem or a statement P (0) or P (1)) to discuss the base case. Instead, she is
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able to imagine the process of checking a base case in numerous scenarios(e.g. trivial group in
algebra, a point in a geometric proof, etc.). In particular, this description is indicative that
she has, at minimum, interiorized the base case action into a process, since she demonstrates
the ability to imagine the process of proving a base case in her mind. It is crucial to the
development of conceptual understanding of PMI that an individual is able to at least operate
at the process stage of the base case, since successful use of PMI requires an individual to
coordinate the base case process with the inductive step process. Despite giving a variety of
different explanations of the base case, all participants exhibited at least a Process Stage of
understanding of the base case, since all participants were exhibited the ability to imagine
the process of proving a base case without actually performing the associated action. This is
demonstrated in the two excerpts above for Participants 1 and 5, but was also exhibited by
the remaining three participants in similar base case discussions. Participants’ conceptual
understanding of the base case was also highlighted when they were asked how they would
explain mathematical induction to someone with no mathematical background. Three of
the participants (Participants 1, 2, and 4) responded by giving analogies of PMI. These
are explored in greater detail in Section 4.2.5.1. However, they are briefly mentioned here
since these analogies did demonstrate an object stage of construction for the base case. In
particular, in order to analogize a concept, an individual must be able to apply the process
of comparison to the concept, requiring at least an object-stage of construction. Thus, these
participants’ ability to construct solid analogies for the base case provides evidence that they
have at least an object-stage of understanding of this step of PMI. For example, Participant
2 used the analogy of walking up a staircase to represent the technique of mathematical
induction. His description of the base case using this analogy follows.
It is like the foundation that your build needs. Stairs. . . again, coming back
with that analogy, they don’t start at the second step or at the third one, they
start at the first one, which is right at the floor level... We need to be sure is that
we have that first step from where we begin. That’s where we need. . . that’s
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why we need that particular case where this actually happens. So then, because
if I’m on one step and if I can go to the next step, then I can go one next step
and one next step... so that is the idea.
Here, the participant compares the base case to the first stair on a staircase. In terms of
APOS Theory, his ability to compare the base case to the first step in a staircase would
require him to be able to imagine the base case as a total object to which he can compare
other known objects (e.g. a staircase). Therefore, the ability to create a successful analogy
relies (in part) to a Participants ability to conceptualize the concept they are analogizing as
an entire object. While most the participants primarily exhibited a strong level of understanding of understanding of the base case, in general, most of the data indicates that other
participants agree with Participant 1’s statement, “all the content of an inductive prood for
me is contained in the inductive step, which really tells you how to go from one situation to
another.” A discussion of the inductive step follows.
Inductive Step
Many of the participants were able to describe the general process of the inductive step
without relying on external stimuli, suggesting that they were operated on at least an processstage of construction. In some cases, participants specifically visualized the process of the
inductive step in the context of standard algebraic PMI problems. Consider the excerpt
from Participant 2 below. He was asked about the strategies he uses when trying to prove
the inductive step. He responded as follows.
P2: Well, I talk about like, two things I can do. Uh, one is the common thing
to do that is like, okay, take P (n + 1), let’s see how we can get P (n) over there
plus whatever up here. Apply the inductive hypothesis to that P (n) and then
try to do some other things and play with that other thing that he was like over
there and see how we can get there? So that’s one thing. The other one that
is like, actually, um. Because usually you have, like, equality over there. So I’m
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trying to see what’s happened on the left side of the equals. See, what you can
get going to on the right, and then try to see how to connect those two when you
are, like, trying to play around with those. Those are two things that I would
do.
Taken alone, this excerpt could be indicative of an underdeveloped mathematical induction
schema, since the process of the inductive step is specifically linked here to a limited subset
of problems using PMI. The use of standard mathematical induction problems is explored
in depth in Section 4.3. However, regardless of the specific context, Participant 2 still
demonstrated the ability to imagine the process of proving the inductive step in his mind
without the use of external stimuli. The discussion of the participants’ PMI analogies above
also applies to the inductive step of PMI. Namely, the ability to analogize the technique
requires at least an object stage of understanding of the inductive step. As mentioned in the
Base Case discussion, participants in general expressed that the inductive step is the more
difficult of the two. They also discussed some difficulties associated with the inductive step
that they faced when learning mathematical induction for the first time. Participants were
asked what part of the inductive step they struggled with when learning or what parts of
this step students may struggle with.
Avital and Libeskind’s (1978) work identified several obstacles associated with PMI. Once
conceptual difficulty they identified related to the inductive step. They found that advanced
students were asking questions like “How can you establish the truth ofP (k + 1) if you don’t
even know that P (k) is true?” The authors argue that this difficulty arises from a gap in
knowledge regarding the logic of implications. Namely, proving p ⇒ q does not inherently
show anything about the truth value of p itself. In APOS Theory language, this indicates
that participants experiencing this difficulty may be operating at the pre-Implication stage
of development, and may not have interiorized the actions of antecedent and consequence
of an implication. Both Participants 4 and 5 identified the same issue when speaking about
their experience learning PMI for the first time. Participant 5’s response to the question is
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below.
P5: I think this used to happen to me too. It’s like, if it says P (k) implies
P (k + 1)... What I would try to do is like, figure out how I even get P (k), like
how to get to the step that we are assuming- that P (k) is true. And understanding
that we are not trying to show it. I think that’s like a leap of faith. And that
makes a lot of students uncomfortable. Like, they don’t... And, like... even I
didn’t understand that, like, no, no, you don’t have to check this or like show
that it’s true. You just like work with the fact that it’s true, and then try to
show the next thing. You don’t have to show that both P (k) and P (k + 1) are
true. But it’s like, there’s the thought of like you, you’ve already checked the
base case and, like, if you assume the P (k) case too, why can’t you assume like,
the problem that you’re given is true?
This discussion brings to light three important points.
1. The participant indicates that she no longer struggles with this issue, suggesting that
her understanding of the inductive step has developed and matured over time.
2. The described difficulty indicates an underdeveloped logic schema, since the misunderstanding is based on a misconception about the role of the implication in the inductive
step. This will be discussed further in the following section.
3. This excerpt corroborates Ernest’s (1984) work identifying common epistemological
obstacles with PMI, as discussed in Section 2.4.2. Namely, he says that “mathematical
induction is neither self evident nor a generalization of previous, more elementary
experience.” Therefore, students may struggle with the basis and justification for PMI
(Ernest, 1984, p. 181-183). This is validated by the struggles discussed above, as
the participant is describing a fundamental misconception concerning the way PMI is
justified.
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In addition to analyzing Participants’ views on each step individually, the study also sought
to understand participants’ perceived relationship between the two.
Relationship between Base Case and Inductive Step
The participants demonstrated varying levels of understanding relating to the relationship
between the base case and inductive step. For instance, when asked about the perceived
relationship between the base case and inductive step, Participant 1 replied, “I guess I, I
almost think of them very not very related at all.” It is important to reiterate that this
study can only present observable behaviors in an attempt to link them to the unobservable
cognitive processes happening inside a participants mind. With this being said, it is highly
possible that the excerpts discussed here do not fully capture the entirety of the participants’
understanding of this relationship. This is important since, even when participants expressed
underdeveloped understanding of the relationship between the base case and inductive step,
this expression was not aligned with their behavior during the CTA. In particular, Participant
1 did use the relationship between the base case and successive cases to make his argument.
Other participants responded to this question by simply restating the two parts of mathematical induction without explicating the relationship. Consider Participant 2’s response
to the question.
P2: So. We might have our first case, and we know that that is true for that.
But then we don’t have the tools to say, hey, the next one is true as well. And
why is that? Because the first one was true, we don’t actually have the proof.
So the induction is actually telling you that, hey, you know, for this case, then
for the next one is also true.
Here, while the participant demonstrates the ability to imagine both the process of the base
case and the process of the inductive step in his mind, there is no explicit evidence that these
processes are coordinated, and there is no verbal description that illuminates how they work
together to form the basis for an argument using PMI. In contrast, Participant 3 offered a
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response to the same question that specifically exhibits this type of coordination. Consider
the excerpt below.
P3: I think in a good proof by induction they’re related, um. I feel like in this
case um, like, the base case is like heavily related to the inductive step, right?
Because like, how did we show it was true for the 2 × 2? Oh, well. I can just put
an L in let’s say the empty spare the empty spaces in the corner. I can put an L
in, and then I can just rotate it around to get the empty square everywhere else,
right? If I want to do it for 4 × 4, I took those 2 × 2’s and just tile them around.
That original idea of putting an L and tiling it somehow and then rotating it
around was actually how my, like, inductive argument worked, right? I started
with some base case that I knew, I could tile and rotate around so I can get the
empty cell and or empty cell on every single thing um or empty space in every
single cell. Uh, and then I use that fact to build a larger one by making up a
bunch of grids that are copies of the original one that I knew, um, in that case,
they’re very related, um, sometimes in proof by induction arguments that I think
are kind of bad, for the base case, you don’t have to do anything for so it doesn’t
feel... it always feels fishy to me.
There are two observations of note in relation to this excerpt. First, this excerpt indicates
that the base case process and the inductive step process have been coordinated in the participant’s mind since he is able to discuss the linkages between them. Second, the participant
mentioned that when he cannot see a relationship between cases, a proof using mathematical
induction feels “fishy” to him. He indicated that this usually happens when he cannot see the
relationship between the base case and the inductive step, suggesting that this relationship
may be central to his understanding of PMI. This section focused primarily on the Action,
Process, and Object stages of construction. The following section will address the Schema
stage.
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4.1.1.4

Schema Development of PMI The three stages of schema development, intra,

inter, and trans were identified and discussed in Section 2.5.3. First, this section gives a brief
description of the three stages of schema development in the context of the Mathematical
Induction Schema (also referred to as the PMI Schema). Second, the section briefly classifies each participants’ overall behavior in the study into one of the three levels of schema
development, providing relevant details for each. Recall, the initial stage, Intra-, is identifiable when Actions, Processes, or Objects within the Schema are viewed as isolated from
one another. The next stage, Inter-, is characterized when some relationships begin to form
between Actions, Processes, or Objects within some Schema. The last stage, Trans-, can
be characterized by an implicit or explicit coherence and understanding of relationships developed in the Inter- stage. Consider the table below, which identifies the triad of schema
development in the context of PMI, and describes some of the characteristics that may be
representative of the three stages. The first column identifies the stage, the second gives
descriptions of characteristics indicative of the stage of development, and the third column
lists the mental structures necessary for an individual to satisfy the descriptions. The table
was developed based on the results outlined in the previous section.
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Table 4.2: PMI Triad of Schema Development

Triad Level

Description

Necessary Mental Structures

• An inductive proof is analyzed in terms of its technical properties (e.g. algebraic manipulations) or in an
algorithmic way (e.g. plug in n = 1, then plug in n
and rearrange to find n + 1).
Intra-PMI

• Explanations of PMI are linked to specific classes
of mathematical induction problems (e.g. algebraic
equalities or sum properties).

At least an action conception of base step,
inductive step, implication.

• The components of the PMI schema (e.g. base step,
inductive step, implication) are isolated structures.

• Connections are identified between some isolated components from Intra-PMI (e.g. Base Step and Inductive
Step form the antecedent of an implication which results in a claim for all n ∈ N).
Inter-PMI

• The necessity of the isolated components from the
Intra-PMI stage is recognized in the broader context
of the proving technique.

At least an object conception of the base step
and inductive step and at least a process
conception of the implication.

• Relationships are formed between the algorithmic
process associated with more routine problems from
Intra-PMI stage and more general mathematical induction problems (e.g. geometrical, abstract).

• Constructs a complete understanding of the PMI
schema and perceives more global applications of the
principle to a wide array of problems.

Trans-PMI

• Can coherently explain each step in the inductive
process without referring to a specific problem type
(e.g. the purpose of the base case without mentioning
“plugging in”) and can give examples of each step in
various contexts (e.g. what the base case may look
like in different fields).

At least an object understanding of the Natural Numbers, Implication, Base Step,
and Inductive Step.

• Can identify how each separate part of the mathematical induction coheres to form an effective proof
technique and how mathematical induction relates to
the natural numbers.
• Can compare and contrast the method of PMI with
other proving techniques and classify scenarios when
PMI is an appropriate technique.

The participants in the study exhibited behaviors consistent with different levels of schema
development. A brief description of each participant in the contexts of the findings in Table
4.2 is included in the discussion that follows.
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• Participant 1 : Some statements made by Participant 1 were indicative of an Intra-PMI
level of schema development, including the excerpt below.
P1: I guess I, I almost think of them very not very related at all. Actually.
Um, most of the time the base case for me, usually has almost no content.
It’s, it’s checking that the thing works at the very sort of most trivial level,
and often at the. . . well, I’m calling it the trivial level, but often that the,
the level of the base case, it’s hard to understand what what is actually going
on, whereas all the content content and inductive proof for me is contained
in the inductive step, which really tells you how to go from one situation to
another.
Here, he described the components of PMI as being isolated from one another and also
exhibited a shallow conceptualization of the base case as “having no content.” However, in other instances, he exhibited characteristics of an Inter-PMI level of schema
development, saying, “In principle I know that you need the base case, because you
can write things where you’re trying to prove something inductively and a base case
doesn’t work, and the proof fails because the base case doesn’t work.” This exhibits
that he understands the necessity of the base case within the broader context of PMI.
He also exhibited the ability to apply the technique of induction in nonstandard PMI
problems (as exhibited by his ability to solve Problem 1 during the CTA). In general,
Participant 1 did not exhibit many of the characteristics of the Trans-level of schema
development. His explanations of PMI during the semi-structured interview were primarily limited to references to specific problems in the CTA (i.e. linked to specific
problem types, rather tht general explanations of the theorems). His inability to identify PMI as an appropriate technique for Problem 2 is also indicative that he may still
struggle applying PMI in a wide array of scenarios. Taken together, these findings are
indicative that Participant 1 was primarily operating in the Inter-PMI level of schema
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development during the study.
• Participant 2 : Participant 2 primarily exhibited behaviors consistent with the ItraPMI Level of Schema Development. Consider his description of the inductive step
below.
P2: Well, I talk about like, two things I can do. Uh, one is the common
thing to do that is like, okay, take P (n + 1), let’s see how we can get P (n)
over there plus whatever up here...the other one that is like, actually, um.
Because usually you have, like, equality over there. So I’m trying to see
what’s happened on the left side of the equals. See, what you can get going
to on the right, and then try to see how to connect those two when you are,
like, trying to play around with those.
Here, his description of the inductive step is strongly linked to standard mathematical
induction problems involving algebraic manipulations, as illustrated by his reference
to “what’s on the left side of the equals.” This indicates that strong relationships
between routine problems and more general applications of PMI may not yet have
been formed. This was also seen elsewhere in his description of the base case when he
said, “...usually the initial step, you can see it from the statement, like, from n = 1 or
something or they give you like the endpoint.” Again, this exhibits a strong association
with the components of PMI and standard mathematical induction problems involving
sums. While he was able to capture the necessity of both steps of induction in his
staircase analogy discussed in a previous section, the descriptions of each step above
still indicate an understanding that is strongly linked to a specific type of problem and
are indicative that the participant is primarily operating at the Intra-level during most
of the interview.
• Participant 3 : Out of all the participants, Participant 3 best exemplified a student
at the Trans-PMI level of schema development. He successfully identified PMI as an
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appropriate method of proof in both CTA Problems and was able to successfully apply
the principle in both cases to successfully construct a complete proof. He frequently
emphasized the relationship between the base case and the inductive step of PMI during
his explanations saying that “in a good proof by induction, they are related to each
other.” Further, he emphasized the importance of being able to apply PMI outside of
the standard types of problems associated with mathematical induction. Consider the
excerpt below:
I don’t know, I mean, to me, like for these mathematical induction proofs to
make sense I need to feel in my like, core that, like the reason it’s true for
the next thing is because of the previous case and it was very clear why it
was true. For that problem it was only clear why it was true for the next
case, when I literally built it up from the previous case. Whereas like, with
these standard mathematical induction ones, it’s like, oh, like you start with
this k + 1 case and then if you, you know, boil things out and move things
around it, like, magically pops out, but it doesn’t make me feel to my core
that, like the k. . . or that the fact that it’s true for the kth iteration means
that it has to be true for the k + 1st iteration. So I feel like those problems
aren’t very useful.
Here, he indicates that the algorithmic approaches to standard PMI problems do not
necessarily represent the full essence of PMI, and instead he prefers more global applications of the principle that are more illuminating to the technique. This preference
could be seen in his approach to the problems during the CTA. Instead of approaching
them using an algorithmic application of PMI, he began exploring the problem via the
action of working examples (e.g. tiling action, rotation action). He was quickly able
to reflect on and interiorize these actions into process which he used to inform the
construction of a solid proof by mathematical induction. His success in the CTA and
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his ability to coherently explain steps in the PMI (as exhibited by his communication
strategies detailed in Section 4.2.5) both exemplify a student at the Trans-PMI level
of schema development.
• Participant 4 : Participant 4 demonstrated some behaviors associated with both the
Intra-PMI and Inter-PMI level of development during the study. For instance, consider
the excerpt below.
P4: I still find induction harder to find the holes in them. Just for me, I
struggle to be able to... um, to as closely be able to say like, oh, this is like
a problem in this inductive argument.
This difficulty may be indicative that Participant 4 struggles with some part of the
underlying structure of a proof by PMI. This struggle could be with understanding an
isolated part (e.g. base case or inductive step) or the in understanding the connections
between isolated parts (e.g. relationship between the base case and inductive step).
In either case, his understanding of PMI is underdeveloped enough that he sometimes
struggles to be able to identify what he refers to as “holes” in the inductive argument.
However, in other cases, he demonstrated the ability to make connections between these
isolated parts. When speaking about the base case, he mentioned that “sometimes the
base case shows you how to do the general construction.” Which indicates that he,
to some extent recognizes the necessity of the isolated component of the base case.
Additionally, he described the relationship between a standard problem using PMI
and a nonstandard problem using PMI. Consider the excerpt below.
P4: Yeah, so the only other area where I’ve ever done. . . where I really do
induction is in discrete math, and I would say the difference is. . . especially
like, in graph theory, those kinds of number problems. A lot of the inductive
steps are algebraic in nature. You do a lot of them simply by algebraic
operations and in graph theory, you do very little of that. So your inductive
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steps are more like manipulating abstract objects. And that’s very different.
And in some ways, I like the abstract object one more than the algebraic
manipulation ones.
This is indicative that he has formed relationships between routine PMI problems and
more general PMI problems, which is indicative of the Inter-PMI level of schema development. In addition to these observations taken from the semi-structured interviews,
the CTA also gave some insight to Participant 4’s PMI-schema. While he was able to
solve Problem 2 (stamp problem), he struggled with recognizing the pattern in Problem 1 (i.e. was unable to interiorize the tiling process), which suggests that he may still
struggle to apply PMI in more general scenarios. When all behaviors during the study
are considered holistically, the data indicates that he operates somewhere between the
Intra-PMI and Inter-PMI levels of schema development.
• Participant 5 : Participant 5 primarily demonstrated behaviors consistent with the
Inter-PMI level of schema development. For instance, recall her discussion of the base
case presented in the previous section.
P5: I think like, depending. . . Okay. I think look at, like, the simplest things
in that area and I. . . that’s generally the base case, like n = 0 and n = 1
if it’s like natural numbers. Or like a point if it’s geometric. And if it’s like
groups, then the trivial group.
This exemplifies the ability to identify relationships between algorithmic processes
associated with standard problems involving PMI and more general mathematical induction problems. Namely, she is able to translate the base case in a standard PMI
problem (n = 0 or n = 1) to the base case involved in less routine problems (e.g. trivial
group or point). Further, she demonstrated that she recognized the importance of the
base case within the overall technique of mathematical induction. When asked about
the importance of the base case, she said, “I mean, the base case is pretty important

108
because if it fails for the base case, then the whole thing fails. So it’s usually easy, but
it’s also important.” Further, during the CTA, Participant 5 translated Problem 1 into
a related number theoretic problem which she solved using PMI, then translated that
proof back to the original context to help her work on the tromino problem. This will be
discussed in greater detail in Section 4.2. However, this does demonstrate relationships
between number theoretic applications of PMI with more nonstandard applications of
the technique, which is another characteristic of the Inter-PMI level of schema development. Taken altogether, the results of the study indicated that Participant 5 is likely
operating at the Inter-PMI level.
There are a few important notes related to the participant classifications above. First, the
same participant can and did exhibit behaviors characteristic of more than one level of
schema development. As discussed with the progression through the four stages of APOS
Theory, schema development is not necessarily linear. Individuals may oscillate between
different levels as they develop their schemata. Second, as has been mentioned several times,
it is impossible to directly observe cognitive processes and structures since they are internal.
The classifications above are based on the observable characteristics demonstrated by the
experts during the study. The following sections detail the findings identified during the
data analysis as they relate to the guiding theoretical framework of APOS Theory.

4.1.1.5

Conclusions The results of the data analysis presented in this section provide

several findings relevant to the current study. First, the observations from the CTA detailed
in Section 4.1.1.2 corroborate the work done by Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson (2016).
In particular, this study’s participants exhibited behavior that suggests the following model
may effectively capture most of the proving strategies of experts working on mathematical
induction problems.
1. If no method or proof can be easily or immediately identified, an expert may begin by
performing the action of solving small examples.
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2. The individual may reflect on these actions until they can be interiorized into processes
that they can imagine in their mind.
3. The individual may search for relationships or patterns between successive examples.
This could also be equivalent to coordinating the process from Step 2 with the proccess
of succession to identify a relationship between cases n and n + 1.
4. Once the individual has identified this pattern or relationship, they may be able to
reflect on it until they are able to coherently understand the process in totality and
encapsulate it into an inductive step object, which can serve as a formalized argument.
This model will be further explored together with the preliminary genetic decomposition in
Section 4.1.3.
In addition to this model, the section highlights six other relevant findings pertinent to
RQ5. These are listed below.
1. Experts demonstrate behaviors indicative of varying levels of development within the
APOS Theory framework for both the base step and inductive step of PMI.
2. Most of the data indicates that the experts in the study have at least a process-stage
of understanding of both of the primary parts of PMI.
3. While some participants view the base case as being easy, all of the participants demonstrated recognition of the necessity of the base case as part of the technique of mathematical induction.
4. Experts in the study demonstrate growth in their conceptual understanding of PMI
when compared to their initial conceptual understanding of the technique.
5. Some participants are more successful at describing the relationship between the two
steps of mathematical induction, but all of the participant behavior during CTA indicates that all participants have, to some extent, coordinated the base case process and
the inductive step process.
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6. While experts in the study demonstrate behaviors indicative of varying levels of schema
development, they all demonstrate a cohesive PMI-schema which includes a solid grasp
on both parts of PMI, the base case and inductive step, as well as the ability to apply
the technique in some novel cases.
These six items primarily give insight to RQ1 and RQ5, since they deal with participants’
understanding of the two parts of mathematical induction and how it has developed over
time. Overall, while the findings do indicate differences among participants, all participants
exhibit the ability to describe the purpose of each step within the context of mathematical
induction. Some participants were able to reflect on difficulties or obstacles they experienced when learning mathematical induction for the first time, but were able to identify the
misconceptions, and their behavior indicated that they no longer experience these same difficulties, suggesting that they have reached higher levels of conceptual development over time.
In particular, the analysis of each participant’s demonstrated level of schema development
provides insight to their understanding of PMI. Those who exhibited higher levels of schema
development were better able to (1) discuss the relationship between some isolated parts of
PMI (like the base case and inductive step); (2) apply PMI in a brad range of contexts; and
(3) situate PMI outside of routine contexts of application (like standard PMI problems.

4.1.2

Revised Genetic Decomposition

Although the findings of this study support all of the constructions and associated mechanisms described by the preliminary genetic decomposition, they also indicate that some
steps in the preliminary genetic decomposition need to be refined and additional steps should
be included. In particular, the preliminary genetic decomposition does not seem to effectively capture some of the behavior exhibited by expert participants in both previous studies
(Styliandes, Sandefur, & Watson, 2016; Weber, 2008) and the current study. Namely, there is
behavior exhibited during the transition from proving the base case to proving the inductive
step which seems overlooked by the preliminary genetic decomposition. This section presents
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the following revised genetic decomposition. The proposed additions and modifications are
indicated in bold.
1. Reversal through the existential quantifier to form a process of identifying and testing
an appropriate base case P (a).
2. Interiorize the action of a logical statement P (N ) for a given statement P
and an arbitrary N ∈ N.
3. Coordinate the process of P (N ) from Step 2 with the process of identifying
and testing an appropriate base case from Step 1 to form a process of testing
a statement P (N ).
4. Encapsulate the coordinated processes from Step 2 into the statement object P (N ) for any N ∈ N.
5. Expand the Function Schema to include a function mapping each natural number to
a propostion-valued output (f : N → P (N )).
6. Encapsulate logic into the implication p ⇒ k. The implication cognitively becomes an
object which is the value of the function f .
7. Encapsulate P (N ) and P (N + 1) into the logical implication p ⇒ k to form
the implication P (N ) ⇒ P (N + 1)
8. Create the schema of the implication-valued function g where g(N) = (P (N ) ⇒ P (N +
1))
9. Interiorize the action of logical necessity into a process so that inputs P0 and PA ⇒ PB
allow one to conclude PB .
10. Coordinate the function g from Step 7 with Modus Ponens beginning with P (a) from
Step 1 for an appropriate case a.
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11. Coordinate this implication valued function along with the base case process through
the use of modus ponens to explain the PMI.
12. Encapsulate this inductive process into an object be connected to the Method of Proof
schema so mathematical induction can be applied as a proof method.
13. Generalize actions on the mathematical induction object within various problem types
coordinated with the Method-of-Proof schema until students can apply mathematical
induction as a proof technique.
14. Generalize actions to the base case object until students can identify an appropriate
base case in novel problems where it is not specified.
The four items added to the genetic decomposition (Items 2, 3, 4, and 7) above are supported
by several sources.
• These items capture the phemomena identified during the cognitive tasks of the current
study. Participants routinely exhibited with behavior corresponding to these cognitive
constructions.
• These items are also related to expert behaviors identified by Styliandes, Sandefur, and
Watson (2016). Namely, they capture the actions of using small examples of the given
statement P (N ), coordinated with the other mechanisms involved with mathematical
induction, and using these small examples to generalize to a formal argument using
PMI.
• These added items are also supported by Ernest (1984), who says, in order to construct
a proof for the inductive step of PMI, students should “be able to prove an implication
statement by deducing a conclusion from a hypothesis” he argues that, in general, this
consists of the ability to make deductions from small examples of the given statement
(p.177).
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• These added steps in the genetic decomposition also broadly encompass Weber’s (2008)
finding that the use of example-based argumentation may be integral to how experts
convince themselves of a statements validity and may be used to inform their formal
use of proof techniques.
This revised preliminary genetic decomposition should be tested in future studies in order
to test its validity and to evaluate the need for any more potential modifications. This is
discussed further in Chapter 5. The next section discusses the results of data analysis in the
context of the Expert Knowledge Framework.

4.2

Expert Cognition and Knowledge Organization

The Expert Knowledge Framework, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, provides a method for
discussing several ways in which expert knowledge is organized and retrieved. Each of the
items in the framework has been identified and validated by the various studies on expert
knowledge discussed in Section 2.1, and this chapter will further contextualize each item
within the specific context of the current study. This framework offers one important lens
through which to analyze the research questions outlined in Section 1.2. RQ1 deals with the
development of knowledge and understanding over time, and this framework will allow for
comparison between the experts demonstrated knowledge organization as graduate students
and their recollections of knowledge organization, or lack thereof, when they were initially
learning about proof and PMI. RQ2 and RQ5 deal with the relationships between different
concepts and ideas associated with proof, proof technique, and PMI. These relationships are
intrinsically linked to how experts’ knowledge about proof PMI is organized and accessed during proof-related activities, making this framework of particular interest. RQ3 concentrates
on the determination of how appropriate PMI is for a given problem. This determination
is related to several of the items in this framework including, but not limited to, Pattern
Recognition and Contextual Conditioning. Lastly, RQ4 deals with potential obstacles experts may face when solving problems related to PMI. This Expert Knowledge Framework
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importantly includes items addressing gaps in expert knowledge (Variable Communication,
Novel Application, and Comprehension Monitoring). These items will be useful in the discussion of RQ4 and the epistemological difficulties identified in the data. A description of
how the framework was used as part of the data analysis follows.
As discussed in Section 3.4.1, this nine-item framework was used to conduct a deductive
thematic analysis according to the six-phase framework by Braun and Clarke (2006). Two of
the nine items in the framework, Flexible Retrieval and External Exploration had significant
overlap in the contexts of the study, and they were collapsed into a single item under the
umbrella term Flexible Retrieval. The remaining seven items in the framework were treated
separately, though the interaction between items is discussed at the end of the section. It is
crucial to emphasize that this first thematic analysis was deductive in nature. When working
through the six-phase process for this thematic analysis, the nine-item framework informed
each phase. A worked example of these six phases in the contexts of this deductive analysis
is detailed below. In the excerpt used for the table below, Participant 1 was asked how he
chooses a proof technique for a given proof construction problem.
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Phase
Familiarizing Yourself
with the Data

Generating initial
codes

Worked Example
Below is an excerpt from Participant 1’s transcript that we will use to
illustrate the steps of the deductive thematic analysis:
“Yeah, that is, I think, hard to analyze. Somehow it’s just whatever
feels right about the problem. I guess like, for example, in this case,
it felt like there was... so I guess I have some, like like, proof strategy
toolbox things. Yeah. So one is induction, right? So, here, when I could
relate something to a smaller version of itself, then I’m immediately
thinking induction that says that type of induction flavor argument.
Other times, I’m particularly. . . like the playing around to try and prove
something idea lends itself to thinking about contradiction. Because
what a proof by contradiction can do is often give you an example that
you’re trying to find some problem with. Um, so if I, if I start there, then
probably. The main idea is contradiction though, eventually I could use
the contrapositive. Often sometimes what happens with contradiction
is you find why something doesn’t work and then you can see how you
could prove the thing directly. If you switch your perspective to the
contrapositive.”
Codes Identified in the Excerpt
Toolbox of Proof Techniques: ‘So I guess I have some, like like, proof
strategy toolbox things. Yeah. So one is induction, right?’
Relationship between Small and Large Cases: ‘So, here, when I
could relate something to a smaller version of itself...
PMI Linked to Case Relationship: then I’m immediately thinking
induction that says that type of induction flavor argument.’
Contradiction Linked to Examples: ‘like the playing around to try
and prove something idea lends itself to thinking about contradiction.
Because what a proof by contradiction can do is often give you an example that you’re trying to find some problem with.’

Searching for themes

Links between Proof Techniques: ‘The main idea is contradiction
though, eventually I could use the contrapositive. Often sometimes what
happens with contradiction is you find why something doesn’t work and
then you can see how you could prove the thing directly. Or you could
switch your perspective to the contrapositive.’
In this step, I noticed that codes 1 and 5 each deal with the way the
participant’s knowledge about proof techniques is organized. Code 2
deals with identifying a relationship between 2 cases, while codes 3 and
4 both deal with the contexts in which the participant uses a particular
technique. I developed three initial themes:
Noticing Relationships in Examples: This theme included the subcase ‘relationship between small and large cases’
Proof Technique Organization: This theme included sub-themes of
‘distinguishing techniques’ (toolbox) and ‘linking techniques’ (code 4)
Contexts that Trigger Proof Techniques: From this excerpt, two
sub-themes were identified. ‘Contradiction’ and ‘Induction’
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Table 4.3: Worked Example of Six Phases of Thematic Analysis by Braun & Clarke, 2006

Phase
Reviewing themes

Defining and naming
themes

Producing the report

Worked Example
In this step, additional codes from different portions of the transcripts were incorporated into the theme and its sub-themes. Some,
but not all, examples of this are given below
Several other sub-themes were added to the theme Noticing Relationships between Examples including ‘identifying generalizable patterns in examples’ and ‘relationships between consecutive
examples’.
The initial sub-themes of ‘distinguishing techniques’ and ‘linking
techniques’ sufficiently captured the remaining codes for this theme,
so no additional sub-themes were created for the theme Proof
Technique Organization.
‘Direct Proof’ and ‘Proof by Contrapositive’ were added to the
theme Contexts that Trigger Proof Techniques as other participants spoke about these techniques and the contexts in which
they use them. Each proof technique sub-theme also includes excerpts when participants discussed when they would not use a certain proof technique.
Note: Many other themes were identified from the other passages
in the transcripts during this thematic analysis. These will be detailed in the following discussion and are not included in this worked
example.
Since this thematic analysis was deductive and based on the expert
knowledge framework, this phase consisted of determining whether
themes identified in Phases 1-3 could be appropriately matched
with any of the 9 items in the framework. If an identified theme did
not have significant overlap or was not fundamentally compatible
with any of the nine items, they were not included in this part of
data analysis and were considered instead as part of the inductive
thematic analysis discussed in Section 4.3.
From this excerpt, the theme Noticing Relationships in Examples was linked to Item 1: Pattern Recognition since it deals with
identifying patterns in a problem or proof. Proof Technique Organization was linked to Item 2: Knowledge Organization since
it deals with arranging knowledge in ways that reflect deep understanding. The theme Contexts that Trigger Proof Techniques
was linked to Item 3: Contextual Conditioning, since it deals with
contexts of applicability.
The report and interpretations for this worked example and the
remainder of this deductive analysis can be found in the sections
that follow. The report for this section of data analysis is organized
according to the nine items from the expert knowledge framework.
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Although a theme’s value should not be determined solely by its prevalence or frequency
in the data, frequency can be used as one measure that a theme is appropriate for the data
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Each of the nine items in the classification frequently appeared in
the data set, which, together with pre-existing literature, suggests that the framework likely
captures at least a subset of characteristics of expertise. As part of the data analysis, the
researcher noted the level of commonality for each of the eight items (recall that Flexible
Retrieval and External Exploration were combined). First, the number of interviews each
item appeared in was noted (out of a total of n = 10 interviews). Next, out of the n = 460
usable sections of dialogue (see Section 3.4), each was analyzed to see if any of the expert
classification items were related to that section. It is important to note that the nine items
are not necessarily independent of one another, so one section of dialogue may have been
linked to more than one item. The interaction between items in the classification is explored
further in Section 4.2.3.9. The information is summarized in the table below.
Table 4.4: Summary of Expert Classification Item Prevalence in Dialogue Sections

Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item

Name
1: Pattern Recognition
2: Knowledge Organization
3: Contextual Conditioning
4: Flexible Retrieval
5: Variable Communication
6: Novel Application
7: Mathematical Fluency
8: Comprehension Monitoring

Number of Interviews
8
10
9
6
9
5
7
8

Number of Associated Sections
30
29
20
13
16
11
23
33

The section is organized by the items in the classification framework, giving any relevant
examples of each item found during data analysis, when appropriate, and contextualizing the
item according to the guiding research questions. The definition of each item is reiterated in
each section. For a more in-depth discussion of the framework and its corresponding source
material, see Section 2.1.
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4.2.1

Pattern Recognition

Pattern Recognition refers to the idea that experts notice features and meaningful patterns
of information that are not noticed by novices. There were two primary sub-themes identified
for this item. These are listed below.
1. Noticing Relationships between Examples
2. Visually Identifying a Pattern
‘Noticing Relationships between Examples’ was a sub-theme used to describe moments when
participants gave verbal descriptions of either a concrete or abstract relationship between
two or more examples. Codes in this sub-theme often, though not always, dealt with either
abstract or formulaic relationships between examples. In contrast, the ‘Visually Identifying
a Pattern’ sub-theme encompassed instances when participants drew pictures of a pattern,
visualized some pattern in their minds, or described some visual pattern verbally or by using
gestures.
In previous research with expert participants, it has been noted that mathematics experts
are able to effectively recognize informational patterns including specific classes of mathematical solutions (Hinsley et al., 1977; Robinson & Hayes, 1978). The notion of pattern
recognition occurred frequently in the data. However, it was most closely associated with two
concepts in particular. First, it was closely associated with the inductive step of PMI and
was commonly seen when participants were working on the mathematical induction problems during the problem-solving section of the interviews. Second, it was highly prevalent
in sections of the interviews when the participants were discussing how to identify whether
or not mathematical induction is a useful technique for the problem, suggesting some interaction between Pattern Recognition and Contextual Conditioning (item 3). This interaction
will be discussed in Section 4.3.10. Some of the most pertinent and noteworthy examples of
each sub-theme of pattern recognition are included in this section.
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4.2.1.1

Relationships between Examples The act of identifying relationships be-

tween two, usually consecutive, cases was named as an important part of proving the inductive step by several of the participants. When discussing this type of identification, the
language of “patterns” and “generalizing patterns” was frequently used, suggesting that the
participants associate the act of pattern-finding with the inductive step of PMI. Participant
4 was asked to imagine that he was working on constructing a proof for which he had already identified mathematical induction as an appropriate technique. He was then asked to
describe how he would approach the proof construction. The excerpt below is a portion of
his response.
P4: ...induction works sometimes well when how you manipulate a small object is
the same way I manipulate a big object and so when I’m thinking about induction,
I often think about the small example and then ask myself, okay, how did I show
this result for a reasonably small not the smallest. . . but like a reasonably small
example and can that same kind of pattern or manipulation work for the more
abstract one?... Like, if I do the same algorithm here, it does it work again? If
so then, maybe it will work in abstract. And so that kind of toying with small
examples is really how I like to think about doing induction.
The strategy described here by Participant 4 is echoed in various instances by most of
the other participants in relation to the inductive step of PMI. It is clear that, in order to
employ this strategy, the participant must feel confident in his ability to identify or recognize
a pattern in the chosen small examples. There are two primary notes to consider regarding
this example. First, the pattern recognition described in this excerpt is not grounded in any
concrete mathematical induction example, but it is instead described as an abstract strategy
used in general in problems involving mathematical induction. This suggests that the notion
of pattern recognition is linked, in the participants’ minds, to the technique of mathematical
induction, rather than to the context in which it is being applied. Second, this strategy of
identifying a pattern through small examples and generalizing or abstracting served as the
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bulk of the participant’s description of how he writes the proof of the inductive step. This
suggests that his ability to successfully write the inductive step of a proof using PMI may
heavily depend on his ability to recognize the pattern for a given proof.
The hypothesis that effective pattern recognition may be linked to success in the inductive
step is supported by the data, since participants who were unable to identify a solution to the
tromino problem (Participants 4 and 5) were the only two participants who did not recognize
the pattern of growth between consecutive chessboards. On the other hand, participants who
were able to successfully identify the pattern in small examples were able to construct a sound
argument for the inductive step without needing to perform cumbersome tasks like tiling an
8 × 8 chessboard. For instance, Participant 1 said this during his work on the tromino
problem: “I never even drew the 8 × 8. I just understood what it should look like from a
4 × 4.” However, when Participant 1 worked on the stamp problem immediately afterward,
he was unable to recognize the relationship between package prices, and did not successfully
come up with a solution to that problem independently. However, given a slight prompt in
the post-problem-solving period, he was able to almost immediately craft a valid argument
for the inductive proof, which he had been unable to do in the allocated 20-minutes of
problem-solving. In the post-problem-solving section of the interview, the participant was
asked why he chose to use PMI for the first problem (trominos) but not the second. Part of
his response is included below.
P1: I guess the main, um, argument against induction is knowing that I can do,
like, suppose I knew how to, um write down 102 in terms of fours and fives, and
I knew the number of fours I needed and the number of fives I needed. . . I. . .
Huh. Hold up.. maybe I want an inductive proof. Okay. Well, I was about to
say, I don’t see a way to, uh to get to 103 using my knowledge of the number of
fours and the number of fives I used, but couldn’t I use one fewer 5. . . Or sorry,
one more 5 and one less 4 to increase by 1? I guess I could have. So, maybe. . .
Maybe induction could work so now this is giving me an entirely different proof
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idea.
Here, with minimal prompting, the participant was able to rapidly recognize the pattern in
the relationship between package prices. As soon as the pattern was identified, the participant expressed confidence that he could construct an inductive proof. This supports the
existence of a relationship between pattern recognition and the inductive step of PMI. This
phenomenon gives further evidence of a link between successful pattern recognition and the
ability to prove the inductive step. On the other hand, it also suggests that difficulties with
pattern recognition might inhibit success with the inductive step. While this section focused
on data associated with identifying general or abstract relationships and patterns, the following section highlights some of the more visually-based pattern recognition found in the
data.

4.2.1.2

Visually Identifying a Pattern Since the participants’ written work was also

collected for use during data analysis, it was included when the data was coded for the
deductive thematic analysis. From the written work, several instances of visually-based
pattern identification were noted. One interesting example of this phenomenon was identified
during Participant 3’s work on the tromino problem during the problem solving section. In
order to deal with the fact that the missing tile could be located anywhere on the 2m × 2m
chessboard, he identified a rotational pattern that would allow him to generate a tiling for
any missing tile from a tiling with a missing corner tile (his argument was explored in detail
in Section 4.1). Consider his explanation from the transcript below (irrelevant portions of
the dialogue are redacted for brevity and are indicated by “...”).
P3: ...And then rotate so that the empty square is like, um, inside. So it’s over. . .
let me draw it. So, it’s over there. Well, now there’s a new two by two square
that I can rotate... Um, I can move the empty square pretty much all all the way
around... And it becomes like this pattern, right? So you can just kind of rotate
it around, shifting it until it gets where you needed to be... and then the place
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where the tile is missing, I can rotate these square pieces to move that missing
tile anywhere that I need. Yeah, because then, so then that’s just giving you
a tiling no matter where the missing square is, like, just generating it from the
tiling you have for the original one, right?
Participant 3 drew two figures (Figures 7 and 8) to illustrate the patterns of rotation he
is discussing here. His identification of this rotational pattern was crucial to his inductive
argument for an arbitrary tiling. He first used PMI to show a tiling existed for all 2m × 2m
boards with a corner tile missing. Then he used a second argument using mathematical
induction to show that he could generate a tiling for any missing tile using the missing
corner tiling together with this rotational pattern.

Figure 4.7: Participant 3 Visual Pattern Identification Part 1

Figure 4.8: Participant 3 Visual Pattern Identification Part 2

One important note in this example of visual pattern recognition is that the participant
was able to coordinate two different instances of pattern recognition into one argument.
Namely, the participant first identified that the missing tile could be moved anywhere on
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the board using rotational patterns. Then, the participant linked this pattern to the pattern
of the chessboard’s growth (this pattern is discussed further in the following section). This
exhibits not only the ability to recognize patterns, but also the ability to coordinate patterns
in nuanced ways within mathematical arguments. In addition to Participant 3’s use of this
rotational pattern in the tromino problem, Participant 1 also exhibited the use of visual
pattern identification in his solution to the stamp problem.
When trying to identify the appropriate base case for the stamp problem, Participant 1
decided to create a table. The horizontal axis represents the number of 4 cent stamps used,
and the vertical axis represents the number of 5 cent stamps used. The numbers in the chart
represent the resulting paid package price. The illustration is shown in Figure 9 below.

Figure 4.9: Participant 1 Visual Pattern Identification

The participant used the table to identify the package prices which could be created, and
used the diagonal pattern to (correctly) conclude that 12 was the appropriate minimal value
for the question. While the participant was able to successfully recognize one pattern in his
table, he was unable to recognize the modular pattern across the rows of the table which
may have helped him successfully make an argument for creating any package price. As
previously mentioned, the participant was unable to do so in the second problem. Again,
this reinforces the connection between successful pattern recognition and the proof of the
inductive step. In addition to pattern recognition linked to images and tables, some notable
examples of pattern recognition found in the data were closely related to functions.
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4.2.1.3

Conclusions The data supports two primary findings associated with Pattern

Recognition as it relates to the current study.
1. Mathematical experts exhibit success at recognizing and using patterns in problemsolving and proof construction.
2. Pattern recognition is linked to the inductive step of PMI.
These two findings offer some insight to RQ3 and RQ4. If mathematical induction is not
specified as the appropriate technique for a proof construction problem, the participant must
determine it on their own. The data indicates that this determination may rely, at least in
part, on a proof-writer’s ability to recognize and generalize a pattern or relationship between
two cases (regardless of the mathematical context). It therefore follows that difficulty with
pattern recognition may also contribute to difficulty with using PMI in novel situations. This
relationship has some potential implications for teaching which will be discussed further
in Chapter 5. The next section deals with Item 2 in the expert knowledge framework,
Knowledge Organization.

4.2.2

Knowledge Organization

Experts have acquired a great deal of content knowledge. Knowledge Organization refers
to the idea that experts often organize or store their knowledge in ways that reflect a deep
understanding of their subject matter. Existing research studying Knowledge Organization
has often used the language of “chunking” which refers to a phenomenon in which experts
group related pieces of information into cohesive units referred to as chunks, which allow them
to more effectively identify relevant pieces of information in a problem-solving context (Chi
et al., 1981). It is important to note that novices may also use chunking strategies. However,
the important distinction between experts and novices lies in the way in which knowledge
is organized. Novices tend to make associations based on surface-level relationships, while
experts are more likely to associate knowledge based on big-picture, holistic linkages (Chi
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et al., 1981). In the case of this study, both surface-level and holistic chunking styles were
identified. The two primary sub-themes noted in relation to Knowledge Organization were
‘Organization of Proof Techniques’ and ‘Knowledge Organization by Field or Discipline’.
The first sub-theme, ‘Organization of Proof Techniques’ consists of instances when the
participants discussed or exhibited particular ways of organizing their knowledge relating to
proof techniques. This sub-theme included both relationships between the proof techniques
and distinguishing factors which make them distinct from one another in participants’ minds.
The second sub-theme, ‘Knowledge Organization by Field or Discipline’ pertains to participants’ tendency to chunk knowledge and create knowledge associations based on various
fields of mathematics. This included relationships between proof techniques, problem-solving
strategies, and various disciplines of mathematics (i.e. analysis, graph theory, etc.). Some
notable examples from the data along with the corresponding analyses are detailed in the
sections below.

4.2.2.1

Organization of Proof Techniques Two of the codes developed in the worked

example in Figure 2 deal with knowledge organization, and in particular, focus on the ways
in which Participant 1 organizes his knowledge of proof techniques. As discussed in the
worked example, there were two primary parts of this proof technique organization noted
during data analysis. First, some comments described ways of ‘distinguishing techniques’
from each other. Second, other comments dealt with ‘linking techniques’ to each other by
discussing the relationships between them. Recall one excerpt from the worked example
when Participant 1 said, “I guess I have some, like proof strategy toolbox things.” The
act of comparing proof techniques to tools was prevalent among many of the participants.
When discussing how his understanding of PMI developed over time, Participant 4 said he
struggled to use the technique at first, but now he is able to “recognize its usefulness and
it’s just another tool in my toolbox.”
This toolbox analogy lends itself to describing both the distinctions between each technique
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and the relationships between them. In a toolbox, each tool is naturally appropriate for
different scenarios. However, the toolbox itself is a mechanism which holds all the tools
in the same place, indicating that the tools may share some common purposes or often be
used in similar situations. Analogously, while proof techniques may be used in different
scenarios, it is also certainly true that they are interconnected and interdependent in many
ways. Participant 1 further used the tool/toolbox analogy when describing the development
of his understanding of proof technique. He said the techniques he uses are exactly the same,
but his understanding of them has grown and evolved. He described this evolution in the
following way.
P1: I already knew it a wrench was, but now I have like, 10 different sizes of
wrenches or something. I think of technique... It’s just more an extension of how
to formally explain things correctly that you know are true.
Here, he referred to a single, arbitrary proof technique (wrench), but said that he felt as
though he has learned new ways of applying that same technique, or tool, which he describes as “different sizes of wrenches.” This suggests that the participant does not view the
technique as having fundamentally changed as he has developed as a mathematician, but
instead he feels he has learned how to better use or apply the technique in a greater range
of scenarios.
This finding is noteworthy since it indicates that an individual’s perception of the mechanics underlying a technique may be fairly static, even as they develop new ways of applying
the technique. This can also be seen in Participant 5’s discussion of mathematical induction.
When asked if she feels like the technique of PMI changes based on the field she is working
in, she said the following.
P5: I think because it’s like a technique, like how people use it might differ, but
I think it’s like the same. . . Also it’s like a very, it’s not like a very flexible
technique. Right? You need some hypothesis. Um, to be true before you apply
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it, like, we need like, some a set, which is well-ordered. So I think it’s like a bit
rigid in that sense. Like, if you if your problem has that setting, then I think
then, using induction would be the same in, like, different fields.
This excerpt gives some important insight to Participant 5’s knowledge organization. In
particular, much of the existing literature with PMI and novices suggests that students may
strongly associate PMI with particular phrases like “for all n ∈ N” (Avital & Libeskind,
1978; Ernest, 1984; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993). This association is certainly related to Item
3: Contextual Conditioning, and will be discussed in the next section. However, the linkage
is also likely related to how novices are chunking information associated with mathematical
induction and proving techniques. Participant 5’s discussion above shows a different, more
nuanced way of chunking this same information. Rather than linking mathematical induction to surface-level characteristics (like phrases involving the natural numbers), she instead
focuses on broader characteristics like a “well-ordered” set. This type of chunking allows
her to conceptualize the technique of mathematical induction as being the same regardless
of the context, and it allows her to be able to recognize when mathematical induction may
be appropriate in a broader range of contexts. Participant 5’s discussion above does not
necessarily mean that experts have no associations between mathematical fields and PMI,
but instead suggests that the fundamental characteristics of the technique are not contextdependent. However, some of the data indicated that participants might associate certain
proof techniques more strongly with certain disciplines based on experience. This is discussed
in the section that follows.

4.2.2.2

Knowledge Organization By Field or Discipline The belief that a proof

technique’s fundamental characteristics are context-independent was discussed in the previous section. While this consensus was shared by most of the participants, it was also the
case that some of the experts’ knowledge is chunked or organized according to discipline.
Consider the excerpt from Participant 2 below.
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P2: That’s a good question. Because I remember when I got here [he’s referring
to graduate school], I was thinking, like, okay, I know a lot of about proofs and
techniques, but then I took that class in geometry and I started to see the proofs
that came from geometry and I was like, okay, this is something completely
different... So, yeah, I was thinking that I. . . that I had a good development
of proof techniques, but there is so much difference between the fields. At the
end, what you know is with respect to your field. . . kind of. It’s a little attached
to your field. I mean, of course, we can generalize and move techniques from 1
field to another 1, but still there is like a little relation between the field and the
technique of proving that we are using.
While this quote reinforces the finding that experts may not view proof techniques as contextdependent (he acknowledged that “of course we can generalize and move techniques from one
field to another”), there may still be some relationship between the technique and the field in
which it is being applied. An important detail to note is that, despite a perceived field-based
difference in application or appearance of the technique, he is still able to recognize that the
technique itself is the same. This suggests that the knowledge organization he is discussing
here may be more significantly related to problem characteristics or nuances of the proof
than to the proof technique itself.
This type of problem or situation-based organization was seen elsewhere in the data.
Consider the excerpt from Participant 4. Here, he was asked what his first step is when
working on a proof construction problem.
P4: Well, I categorize it. So, this problem is very clearly discrete math. And
so I think to myself, okay, it’s a discrete problem. So what are the typical
methods of proof that discrete mathematicians use and is it likely that one of
those methods is going to work here?... Since I started learning mathematics, I’ve
always categorized things, but your ability to know proof strategies is something
that just kind of develops the more techniques that you see and the more proofs
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that you see and have yourself discovered.
Within this excerpt, we are able to more closely analyze this field-based organization. It is
clear here that the participant referred to using an organizational system to classify problems. First, he categorizes it based on what field he thinks the problem is coming from.
Next, it appears that for each field or discipline, he has some number of techniques he thinks
are commonly used in that field, likely based on experience and exposure. He begins exploring the problem by first trying these associated strategies. This finding is consistent with
the pattern identified by Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson (2016), which was discussed in
Section 2.4.3. In particular, the first step in the expert proving exercise pattern noted that
experts often begin by attempting “ to identify a reasonable method or technique to prove
the statement. If one can be identified, they may use the technique without necessarily
thinking about why the statement is true” (Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson, 2016, p.23).
This approach is exemplified in the excerpt above, since the participant’s main focus seemed
to be identifying a technique that would work for the given problem, and there was little to
no discussion of why the given statement might be true. This may suggest that experts use
their knowledge organization in ways that help them more rapidly identify appropriate techniques for given classes of problems, validating other work done with mathematical experts
(Hinsley et al.,1977; Robinson & Hayes, 1978; Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson, 2016). The
primary findings of this and the previous section are concisely summarized in the following
section.
4.2.2.3

Conclusions The data supports three primary findings associated with knowl-

edge organization as it relates to the current study.
1. Mathematical experts recognize the similarities and differences between various proof
techniques and generally group their knowledge of techniques together, adding to this
knowledge as they gain mathematical maturity.
2. Mathematical Experts recognize that the fundamental components and characteristics
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of a given proof technique are context-independent.
3. Some mathematical experts may organize their knowledge according to mathematical discipline and may associate certain proof techniques more closely with particular
disciplines.
Item 1 offers some insight to RQ1. The experts in the study generally expressed that their
definition and fundamental understanding of proof techniques, including PMI, has remained
generally stable, but the number of contexts they can apply the technique in and the number of ways they know how to implement the techniques has grown in tandem with their
mathematical maturity. Item 2 offers insight to both RQ1 and RQ2. First, experts described
their recognition that proof techniques are context-independent as developing over time (“I
knew what a wrench was already, but now I have 10 different sizes of wrenches”), which is
indicative of conceptual growth after gaining experience. Second, the fact that experts view
techniques as context-independent gives some enlightenment to the relationships between
specific techniques, including mathematical induction, and the act of proving. Finally, Item
3 gives insight to RQ3. Evidence suggests that experts may organize their knowledge based
on mathematical disciplines, and they may associate certain techniques with specific fields.
The evidence also indicates that this organizational strategy may be used in order to help
the expert more rapidly identify an appropriate proof technique for a given problem. This
last finding is also closely linked to the idea that expert knowledge may be linked to context. Item 3 of the framework focuses on contextual conditioning, and it is explored in the
following section.
4.2.3

Contextual Conditioning

Contextual Conditioning refers to the idea that experts’ knowledge often cannot be reduced to sets of isolated facts or propositions but, instead, reflects contexts of applicability.
In other words, expert knowledge is frequently “conditionalized” on some set of circumstances. According to Bransford, Brown, and Cocking (1999), the concept of conditionalized
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knowledge offers important implications for pedagogical practice, but “many forms of curricula and instruction do not help students conditionalize their knowledge” (p. 31). As
exemplified in the worked example in Table 4.3, Contextual Conditioning was primarily seen
during discussions of when participants choose to use particular proof techniques. Although
all proof techniques (i.e. direct, contrapositive, contradiction, etc.) were referenced in various codes throughout the transcripts, this section will restrict attention specifically to codes
associated with this item which primarily dealt with PMI, since that is the primary focus of
the current study. With this restriction in mind, two primary sub-themes were identified in
relation to Contextual Conditioning. These sub-themes are listed below.
1. PMI Associated with Specific Mathematical Fields
2. PMI Associated with Problem Characteristics
Sub-theme 1, ‘PMI Associated with Specific Mathematical Fields’ encompasses instances
when participants contextually conditionalized mathematical induction by linking it to specific fields or disciplines (i.e. graph theory, discrete math, etc.). This also includes any
sections of the transcripts where participants mentioned fields that they do not associate
with mathematical induction. Sub-theme 2, ‘PMI Associated with Problem Characteristics’
focuses on moments when participants associated the method of mathematical induction
with certain characteristics of a problem or problem statement. These sub-themes are each
explored in more detail below, and they will be discussed using the language of “conditionaction” pairs, which is a phrase used to describe the link created by an individual between
some condition and a corresponding action that occurs when the condition is met (Bransford,
Brown, & Cocking, 1999, p. 31).
4.2.3.1

PMI Associated with Specific Mathematical Fields As mentioned in the

discussion of knowledge organization in the preceding section, experts may organize parts of
their knowledge according to mathematical field. There were strong links in the data between
knowledge organization and contextual conditioning, and those are discussed carefully in
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Section 4.3.10. However, this section will strictly discuss the contextualized conditioning
elements of the data. Specifically, the discussion will begin with noteworthy examples of
proof techniques being contextually situated in relation to specific mathematical disciplines.
Participants were asked to explain how they might choose an appropriate proof technique
for an arbitrary proving exercise. Participant 2’s response to the question is below.
P2: Now um, if I see that the problem looks like a real analysis problem, most
likely I will go for constructive. Because in my experience, in that field, most
of the problems are actually constructive. So, I will go with that. I know that
in complex analysis, a lot of the proofs are by contradiction, so if I’m studying
something like that, and I need to do a proof, most likely, I will try contradiction.
So, it’s more like um. . . an experience thing.
Here, the participant indicated that, based on his experience, certain fields of mathematics
automatically trigger him to attempt to use specific proving techniques. This study does not
seek to make a judgment on whether these associations are “good.” That is to say, evaluating
whether or not most real analysis proofs “are actually constructive” or whether or not “in
complex analysis, a lot of the proofs are by contradiction” are true statements is outside
the scope of this study. Instead, we will focus on the act of using experience to create a set
of conditions that, when they are met, prompt an individual to perform a certain action.
In this case, the condition is a problem in a specific discipline and the action is using a
particular proving technique. As previously mentioned, particular focus will be placed on
PMI. The following quote from Participant 4 highlights the same condition (a problem in a
specific field of math) which is associated with the action of using mathematical induction
as a proving technique.
P4: I was probably biased towards induction, because my first thought was that
this is a discrete problem and I. . . use induction a lot in discrete proofs. So I. . .
I categorized where it fit and then just using some of the intuition from what I’ve
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seen. Really. . . you know, you’re like, okay, there’s certain tactics that. . . tools
or methods of arguing that are often successful and so that’s at least a good first
place to start.
Here, the broad field of discrete math seems to be linked strongly to the technique of mathematical induction. Therefore, without necessarily even mentioning the problem statement,
the participant already seemed primed to try PMI in the proving activity. This excerpt provides further support for the claim that experts likely use mathematical fields as one context
through which their knowledge of proof techniques can be conditioned. In addition, this data
further corroborates the claim by Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson (2016) that experts may
begin a proving exercise by attempting to identify a proving technique without necessarily
thinking about why the statement is true. While several of the participants briefly mentioned
mathematical fields as being associated with PMI, an even stronger contextual conditioning
pattern was seen based on problem characteristics. This is explored in the following section.

4.2.3.2

PMI Associated with Problem Characteristics The transcripts contained

numerous examples the technique of mathematical induction being contextually triggered by
specific problem characteristics. Some of these examples were surface level characteristics,
like the phrase “all natural numbers,” that even novices have been shown to associate with
PMI (Avital & Libeskind, 1978; Ernest, 1984; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993). For instance,
Participant 4 said, “Whenever I see natural numbers, the first thing I always think of is: is
induction going to work on this?” Likewise, Participant 2 said, “So it will depend on the
problem. If I see like, for example, the natural numbers and something that is going step by
step, okay, it is induction, no questions asked.” Further corroborating this well-documented
association, Participant 3 stated, “I mean, like, in this one, in particular, the, the hint is
that you’re trying to show that there’s like, some numbers of stuff for everything, bigger
than it. Like this thing is true well, then that probably, like, suggests that there’s gonna
be some induction going on.” In all of these examples, the condition is a proving problem
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mentioning natural numbers and the resulting action is the participant identifying PMI as an
appropriate proving technique. As mentioned, this type of contextual conditioning has been
noted by several studies, so these examples simply corroborate a fairly well-known result.
However, a more interesting example of contextual conditioning associated with problem
characteristics also appeared in the data.
In addition to the natural, rudimentary association between PMI and the natural numbers,
other problem characteristics were also shown to trigger the use of PMI. The most commonly
expressed characteristic associated with mathematical induction an identifiable relationship
between a small case or example and a larger case or example. This type of relationship was
explored in Section 4.3.1, but this section will focus on the ways in which this relationship
is used as a contextual trigger that signals an individual to use mathematical induction.
Consider the excerpt from Participant 1.
“So one is induction, right? So, here, when I could relate something to a smaller
version of itself, then I’m immediately thinking induction that says that type of
induction flavor argument.”
A relationship between smaller and larger cases was the most common contextual trigger
for PMI described by participants. Participant 4 said, “whenever I think of induction now,
what I often think about is. . . induction works sometimes well when how you manipulate a
small object is the same way I manipulate a big object.” Another finding that is equally as
important is that participants also used the lack of this relationship in a problem as a signal
that mathematical induction may not be an appropriate choice. This can also be seen in an
excerpt from Participant 1.
P1: And it is quite often the case that I don’t see a way to relate sort of, the
smaller cases, and then induction’s off the table and go and do other stuff.
This notable trend represents a “lack of condition-inaction” pair. Namely, if the participant
does not identify a relationship between cases, then the action of using PMI as a proving

135
technique is not triggered and, more importantly, may be disregarded immediately. While
contextual conditioning has many benefits, this “lack of condition-inaction” phenomenon
gives one example of a pitfall of conditionalized knowledge. Consider the example below.
Three out of the five participants were able to effectively identify the relationship between
successive chessboards in the tromino problem, and in each case, they were able to almost
immediately identify PMI as an appropriate proof strategy. A fourth participant (Participant
5) first considered an adjacent number theoretic argument (counting tiles) and successfully
used PMI to prove that statement. She was also able to recognize the link between successive
chessboards, but ran out of time before finishing the proof. In the last case, Participant 4
was unable to successfully link the condition-action pair. Namely, he attempted to use mathematical induction, but was unable to identify the correct relationship between successive
chessboards. See an image from his written work below.

Figure 4.10: Participant 4 Issues with Condition-Action

This image was supposed to represent a 2m × 2m chessboard. However, the picture drawn
actually has dimension (2m−1 + 2) × (2m−1 + 2). Because of this mistake, the participant was
unable to effectively find a useful relationship between cases, meaning that the condition
in the aforementioned condition-action pair was not satisfied. Immediately, he decided that
mathematical induction would not work and was ultimately unable to answer the question.
This result was also seen in the second problem, albeit with a different subset of participants getting correct responses. However, the primary takeaway is that participants who
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immediately identified the relationship between cases, rapidly identified PMI as an effective
proof technique. Those who did not meet the condition overwhelmingly failed to perform the
action of proving. It is particularly important to note that in several cases, a single participant would successfully use the condition-action pair in one problem and fail to identify the
condition in the other. This supports the claim that if the condition is not recognized, it may
result in difficulties with adaptability. This relationship between expertise, conditionalized
knowledge, and adaptability is well-documented in the literature.
An important aspect of conditionalized knowledge is its automative nature. The conditionaction pairs occur, in many ways, without conscious thought. This has been studied in the
literature, and there are several problems related to this phenomenon. The term automaticity refers to the mostly effortless execution of cognitive procedures that have been
developed through the repeated association of condition-action pairs (Schneider & Shiffrin,
1977). Because this automated behavior often occurs without conscious thought, it has
sometimes been found to inhibit experts when confronted with environments not well-suited
to their pre-developed condition-action pairs (Ericsson, 2004). Hatano and Inagaki (1986,
2004) describe two disctinct kinds of expertise, routine expertise and adaptive expertise.
Adaptive experts are able to successfully perform even in changing conditions, while routine
experts are successful in established, predictable situations. The current study validates
work done on the relationship between automaticity and adaptibility, and suggests that the
participants in the study may be primarily demonstrating routine expertise in relation to
their PMI condition-action pairs. The following section summarizes the findings relating to
conditionalized knowledge.

4.2.3.3

Conclusions The data supports three primary findings associated with contex-

tual conditioning as it relates to the current study.
1. Some experts may conditionalize their use of specific proving techniques based on the
field of mathematics the problem is in, and certain proving techniques may be perceived
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to be more closely related to specific disciplines as a result of this conditionalization.
2. Most mathematical experts still strongly link language involving the natural numbers
with the technique of mathematical induction.
3. Experts likely conditionalize their use of PMI on the identification of a relationship
between small and large cases in a given problem, and the lack of this identification
can result in the expert actively dismissing PMI as an appropriate technique.
All three of these items offer insight to RQ3. The data suggests that these mathematical
experts have created condition-action pairs that link PMI to particular problem characteristics, and that these pairs are likely utilized in the determination of whether or not PMI is
an appropriate method of proving in a novel scenario. In addition, these items also provide
some enlightenment regarding RQ1. Namely, previous studies have identified links between
the natural numbers and mathematical induction, but these findings suggest that conditionalized knowledge associated with mathematical induction may become more nuanced
over time. Clearly, the original associations with N still exist, but there is evidence of more
mature associations with the expert participants, as seen in findings 1 and 3 above. The
relationship between adaptability and conditionalized knowledge discussed in the previous
section also provides insight to RQ4, since limited adaptability of their condition-action pairs
likely inhibits their ability to identify PMI as an appropriate technique in some scenarios. In
addition to contextualizing their copious amounts of knowledge, experts also need to be able
to quickly and effectively retrieve this knowledge. This is explored in the following section.

4.2.4

Flexible Retrieval

Experts are able to flexibly retrieve important aspects of their knowledge with little attentional effort. This is referred to as Flexible Retrieval. As mentioned at the beginning
of Section 4.3, there was significant overlap in this item and Item 9: External Exploration.
Experts often search known relevant texts along with other outside resources in order to
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gain a better understanding of the concept in question. External Exploration is the term ascribed to this practice, and it was strongly linked to Flexible Retrieval during the deductive
thematic analysis. In particular, Flexible Retrieval was primarily linked to two sub-themes
in the data. First, the sub-theme ‘Recalling Relevant Facts’ was used to describe moments
when participants recalled specific facts or theorems which they perceived to be associated
with a given problem. Second, ‘Linking Novel Problems to Known Proofs’ referred to a
common occurrence in the data when participants discussed how they use known proofs and
proving strategies when approaching novel problems. While related, the two sub-themes are
distinct. The first sub-theme strictly encompasses moments when general facts or pieces of
knowledge were retrieved, and the second sub-theme focuses on when knowledge associated
with the act of proving or proving strategies was accessed and used. Both sub-themes had
strong ties to the idea of external exploration, and almost all codes assigned to the external
exploration item were also linked to flexible retrieval. Because of this significant overlap,
these two items were collapsed into the single item named Flexible Retrieval in order to
avoid redundancy. Both sub-themes are explored in more detail in the following sections.

4.2.4.1

Recalling Relevant Facts Data associated with the sub-theme of ‘Recalling

Relevant Facts’ most often appeared in the problem-solving sections of the interviews, when
participants were working on novel problems and thinking about potential solutions. Consider the excerpt below from Participant 1.
P1: Yep. All right. Okay, um. So, my first thought is, this is a little similar
to the last question in that. I kind of recognize it, meaning I’ve thought about
problems like this before so that that helps with the framework. So I’m trying
to figure out. Okay, I’ve, in fact, even remembered the answer which. My my
cheap, um, by the answer, I mean, the smallest number for which you can’t
express it as a linear combination... With two numbers, I think should be those
two numbers minus the sum of the two numbers or something. So I guess, like,

139
I’ve remembered a claim that the smallest number you can’t write should be 11.
In this piece of dialogue, Participant 1 was beginning to work on the stamp problem. Although the participant had not seen this specific problem before, he recognized some elements
of the problem and was quickly able to recall some relevant information with no apparent
difficulty. These are the first few lines spoken by the participant after being given the problem. This demonstrates the ease with which he is able to identify relevant information. It
is important to note that, while it is expected that experts usually retrieve information that
is generally relevant to a given task, not all retrieved information will necessarily be useful.
For example, when working on the stamp problem, Participant 4 quickly recalled a relevant
fact which did not necessarily help her find a solution. After noting that the problem dealt
with linear equations of the form 4x + 5y = m, she immediately recalled a number theory
fact stating, “so like the gcd of 4 and 5 is 1, so, like a linear solution. . . like a solution
to a linear equation 4x+5y=1 exists.” However, she quickly judged that this fact was not
useful and proceeded to try other strategies. Likewise, other participants often accessed and
retrieved relevant knowledge quickly, regardless of it’s usefulness to the problem. Participant 1 fluidly recalled the Chinese Remainder Theorem and some of its implications when
working with modular arithmetic in the stamp problem, even though it was not necessary
to prove the statement. These examples of retrieval, whether the retrieved information was
“useful” or“not useful,” give insight to its importance in conversations involving the study
of expertise.
In the context of Flexible Retrieval, is not necessarily the use-value of a retrieved piece
of knowledge that is most important. Instead, there are two primary characteristics of
retrieval that make it valuable to experts- speed and effort. Speed and cognitive effort tend
to be strongly correlated. Schneider and Schiffrin (1977) characterized three primary levels
of retrieval: effortful, relatively effortless, and automatic. Effortful retrieval is primarily
seen in novices. It requires significant attentional effort and nontrivial amounts of time.
Experts most often fluctuate between relatively effortless retrieval and automatic retrieval.
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It therefore takes significantly less time to retrieve the information, and because it also
requires little to no conscious thought, experts are able to retrieve relevant knowledge while
still actively working on the task at hand. It is important to note that the speed of retrieval
does not necessarily mean that experts will always perform the overall task faster (Bransford,
Brown, and Cocking, 1999). Experts often attempt to gain a deep understanding of a
problem, which may take more time than simply identifying a solution. The data of this study
supports this finding, since participants often retrieved and explored relevant knowledge that
was not necessarily linked to the solution and used a nontrivial amount of their problemsolving time to explore this retrieved knowledge. The participants still demonstrated retrieval
that was fast and visibly effortless, even if the solution to the problem itself did not necessarily
develop quickly. In work discussed in Section 2.2, Selden & Selden (2017) identified some
obstacles associated with proof construction. Item 5 on this list involves “knowing, but
not bringing, appropriate information to mind,” and Item 6 deals with “knowing which
(previous) theorems are important” (p. 3). The experts in this study demonstrated that
their flexible retrieval can help preclude them from these types of obstacles. In addition to
relevant facts and isolated pieces of knowledge, experts in the study also demonstrated the
ability to flexibly retrieve larger pieces of information like entire proofs or overarching proof
strategies. This is explored further in the following section

4.2.4.2

Linking Novel Problems to Known Proofs Participants frequently referred

to the retrieval of previously known proofs or proving strategies. The participants may have
either previously read the proof or constructed the proof, or both. The data suggests that the
participants were able to quickly retrieve both entire proofs and overarching proof strategies
from their memory. When asked what his first step is when working on a proving task,
Participant 2 immediately replied, “It will depend on two things. Do I know the problem?
If I know the problem, then I will already answer with the proof that I know.” This is
indicative that, in some contexts, he is able to recall entire proofs for statements with little
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to no need to “re-work” the proof. Participant 3 discussed a similar ability in the excerpt
below. When asked how quickly he identifies an appropriate proving technique for a given
problem he responded as follows.
P3: Typically really early on. Um, I mean, at least for like, elements like more
elementary proofs, I guess usually pretty early on, but that’s just because, like,
I usually know how it’s going to go instantly. Like, I, at least now when I look
back at, like, you know some of the old problems that I used to do an undergrad
that got assigned to me for homework. Like, I don’t really have to think that
hard about them anymore. And so it was like, oh, this is an inductive argument.
I know what they’re looking for, because I’m just familiar with this.
There are two phrases of note in this excerpt. First, he said, “I usually know how it’s going to
go instantly” indicating that the retrieval of his knowledge of a given proof is instantaneous.
Second, he indicated that he doesn’t “really have to think that hard about them anymore”
indicating that the retrieval of this knowledge does not require much of his attention. These
phrases exemplify the two primary characteristics of Flexible Retrieval, speed and effort,
detailed in the previous section. Although the retrieval of proofs could arguably be linked to
memorization, it is important to note that experts are exposed to innumerable proofs over
their years of study.
While flexible retrieval is certainly linked to memorization in some ways, this level of
retrieval is also more nuanced and extensive than the rote memorization of algorithms we
often see with novices in mathematics. This nuance can be more easily seen in examples
where participants retrieve proof strategies, rather than entire proofs themselves. Participant
5 was asked about her strategies when dealing with a novel proving task. Her response can
be seen in the excerpt below.
P5: Thinking of a similar example. Like the problems that I dealt with in my
research is like. . . You already know how to get the estimate on this sort of set.
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And like, the set that I’m looking at, it’s sort of similar, but not really exactly
the same. So go through that proof and then, um, see if this proof is like, maybe
2 different cases of that one, something like that.
Here, she did not refer to the recollection of a proof in its entirety, but instead referred to a
known proving strategy in her field. Participant 2 gave a similar example.
So, sometimes it’s actually doing proof, but a proof I’ve seen from someone that
already did it, only to get the feeling that I understand that. And then I would
start to do the proof of my own conjecture. Uh, based on things that I read on
that paper, it can be as easy as trying to generalize one thing, I don’t know, like,
what I did with rectangular cases from the argument about square matrices.
Again, the participant referred to the recollection of a known proof in terms of the strategy
involved in that proof. Both of these excerpts exemplify some of the distinctions between
rote memorization and flexible retrieval. The retrieved knowledge in these cases is more than
just a line-by-line memory, but instead reflects an understanding of the structural aspects of
an argument as well an ability to adapt the recalled argument to a current task. This finding
is linked to existing work discussed in Section 2.3. In particular, studies with mathematicians
show that when reading (taking in) a proof, a mathematician may file that proof away for
use in future, relevant work (Giaquinto, 2005; Meija-Ramos & Inglis, 2009). The data in this
study that was linked to Flexible Retrieval corroborates this claim. The findings associated
with this item are detailed and summarized in the following section.

4.2.4.3

Conclusions The data supports three primary findings associated with Flexible

Retrieval as it relates to the current study.
1. Mathematical experts exhibit the ability to flexibly retrieve relevant facts and theorems
when working on proving problems.
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2. Mathematical Experts exhibit the ability to flexibly retrieve and recall both entire
proofs and overarching proof strategies.
3. The flexible retrieval exhibited by mathematics experts in this study has characteristics
which distinguish it from rote memorization.
These findings, in totality, offer insight to RQ2 and RQ3. First, knowledge of specific
proving techniques, including PMI, may be stored and retrieved quickly and with little
attentional effort by experts. Experts in the study demonstrated fluency with identifying
relevant proof techniques for given types of problems and retrieving associated knowledge
quickly. It is likely that this type of fluent retrieval is related to how proof and specific proof
techniques are linked and organized in experts’ minds. Second, the determination of PMI as
an appropriate proof technique for a given problem may be related to fluency and flexible
retrieval. In order to appropriately identify PMI as an appropriate technique, for example,
an expert will likely need to retrieve known examples related to a current task where PMI
has been an appropriate technique. Additionally, Item 3 offers some enlightenment to RQ1.
Namely, studies have identified that novices often exhibit rote memorization and restrictive
algorithmic approaches to proving problems, particularly problems involving PMI (Avital
& Libeskind, 1978; Ernest, 1984). In contrast, the flexible retrieval documented in the
preceding sections is significantly more nuanced in nature. This offers evidence that experts’
fluency surrounding both proof and proof techniques deepens over time. While experts
may be able to easily and fluently retrieve known information, it is not necessarily the case
that they can effectively communicate this knowledge. This phenomenon is explored in the
following section.
4.2.5

Variable Communication

The term Variable Communication is used to describe a phenomenon associated with
expertise. In particular, experts may or may not be able to teach others effectively, and
expertise is not necessarily a good indicator of an individual’s ability to communicate their
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own knowledge. This item is an important part of the framework, since it highlights the
difference in expertise in a field and expertise in the pedagogy or communication within
the same field. There were two primary ways that variable communication appeared in the
data. First, participants were asked how they might describe PMI to a student who had no
mathematical background. Almost all the participants chose to answer this question with a
mathematical induction analogy, and a few of these are described in more detail in Section
4.3.5.1. Second, there were several instances when participants discussed how they might
teach mathematical induction to students learning the technique for the first time. Some
illustrative examples of this are discussed further in Section 4.3.5.2.

4.2.5.1

Induction Analogies As previously mentioned, during the interview, partic-

ipants were asked how they would describe the technique of mathematical induction and
why it works to a student with no mathematical background. Three participants chose to
use analogies in their answers. Each of these three distinct analogies explicitly describes the
purpose and role of the two primary parts of mathematical induction, the base step and the
inductive step. Implicitly, two other aspects of PMI are also addressed by the analogies.
First, the analogies address the necessity of each part of mathematical induction. Second,
each analogy includes an understood ability to continue in perpetuity. That is, the notion
of “infinity” is understood to be involved in the process of using mathematical induction.
Each of the analogies, along with relevant excerpts from the transcripts, is included in the
table below.
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Table 4.5: Participant PMI Analogies

Participant
Participant 1

Summary of Analogy
“Traveling along a Path”
Base Step: Ability to make
it to some step on the path

Participant 2

Inductive Step: Ability to
make it from one step to
the next
“Stairway to Heaven”
Base Step: Some beginning
step in the stairway

Inductive Step: Ability to
move from one step to the
following step

Participant 4

“Dominoes”
Base Step: The first
domino falls

Inductive Step: Every
domino knocks over the
following domino.

Relevant Excerpt(s)
“Induction is like, uh, traveling along
a path and claiming that you could go
to infinity if you wanted to. So, the
idea is that if you can make it to the
kth step on the path, and from every
kth step, you have a way to get to the
next step. Well, in principle you could
go as long as you wanted.”
“An example with the stairs is that in
induction, we are showing that if I am
on one step, I’m able to construct the
next step and go onto that step. So
then, because I’m in the next step, I
can construct one next step again and
one next step and one next step... so
that is the idea. But the only thing
that we. . . we need to be sure is that
we have that first step from where we
begin. And that’s where we need. . .
that’s why we need that particular
cases where this actually happens.”
“If the first domino fell over, and if
you assume that every previous
domino is going to knock over the
next one, Then as long as the first
one falls over, you know that the rest
of them are going to fall over. And so,
as long as you know that one of them
implies the next one, if the first thing
is true, then that implies the second
one, implies the third one, implies the
fourth one, and so on.”

Some research with expert participants indicates that expertise can cause difficulties with
teaching, as experts can have a difficult time determining what parts of the content may
be difficult for students (Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 1999). The analogies in the table
above indicate that some of the experts in this study are able, on some level, to effectively
identify important characteristics of PMI and to cohere them into a form that would be
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understandable to someone with little to no mathematical background. They communicate
complex mathematical ideas, like the concept of infinite iteration, in ways that could be
understood by a layperson, like stairs or dominos. In contrast, Participant 5 struggled with
this question. Her response is included below.
P5: Induction definitely, uh, relies on the well ordered property of natural numbers. And then you want to check that it’s true in the base case like the prob,
like, even in the simplest case, it’s. . . the problem is true. So you do that. And
then, uh. What you do is you pick like, a random number, and you assume it’s
true for that and then you try to show that it’s true for, like, the immediate next
1. And if that works out good, and the thing is. . . because the number that you
chose was random, like, you can apply that for anything. Like, you can take the
base case, and then the next 1, and then. This 1, and the next 1, and you can
keep doing it forever, but you don’t have to because the number you chose was
random. So, in a way are, like, proving it for, like, all the natural numbers.
Although her response is generally correct, it lacks coherence, and it would certainly not be
comprehensible to someone with no mathematical background. Terms like “natural numbers” and “base case” would likely be confusing for someone who had not been exposed to
that language, and they are introduced without a recognizable example to ground them.
Taken together with the analogies described above, this example provides insight to the
varying levels of success experts may have when attempting to communicate a mathematical
concept to someone else. It is important to note, that the ability to communicate concepts
can vary depending on the concept. For instance, Participant 5 may have been able to
explain a different concept more successfully than Participant 2. The ability to communicate one concept is not necessarily indicative of the ability to communicate mathematical
ideas as a whole. Importantly, these responses were associated with learners who had no
mathematical background. Participants also spoke about how they would communicate the
technique of mathematical induction to learners in an introductory proofs course who have
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a general understanding of mathematical terms and logic. These findings are discussed in
the following section.
4.2.5.2

Communicating PMI to Math Students Graduate students represent a spe-

cific subset of the set of mathematical experts. They are both students and teachers. They
have years of mathematical experience, but most of them are still able to clearly remember
their experiences learning mathematical concepts for the first time. As a result, graduate
students offer a unique perspective when asked how to teach mathematical concepts to novice
mathematics students. Participants were asked how they would teach PMI to students in
an introductory proofs course. Consider two different responses which are representative of
two different types of answers given by the participant. The excerpt below is Participant 2’s
response.
P2: I will introduce this like hey, what we are doing on the abstract level is that,
hey, if I can show that if I have one step, then I can get another one and another
one. So, basically, I’m saying, hey, starting from this level, I’m proving that I
can actually reach the next one now. Um, then after I show that, I will explain
that I will say, okay. Now that we have in mind these concepts that takes once
I have this level, I can go to the next one, we have to say, hey, what is the first
level? What. . . where do we start? Like do we start with one, do we start with
two? Or where? Because there should be one case where our thing is true.
The following excerpt is Participant 3’s response to the same question.
P3: I mean, my hot take is that you really shouldn’t actually tell students the
real definition of principle of mathematical induction because it’s too general.
Like, to me, I feel like, would actually make most sense is show a bunch of proofs
in different fields that are mathematical induction proofs but like, aren’t you
know.. we wouldn’t say it explicitly and then say, like, oh, these are all kind
of doing the same thing and then, like, introduce the principle mathematical
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induction. I think part of the problem is that most students I feel like, have a
hard time grasping abstract definitions, or abstract like theorems or whatever...
those general statements of things um. And so the hardest part for them, I
imagine, would just be that they don’t actually understand what the statement
means fundamentally. And so then it makes it kind of impossible to apply it on
a like deeper than surface level.
Participant 2’s response essentially consists of restating the definition of PMI with little
elaboration. It does not seem to reflect any intentional thought about delivery or offer any
reason or justification for the approach. In contrast, Participant 3’s response is a deeper,
more nuanced exploration of a communication strategy. Instead of leading with a definition,
the participant believes in showing various examples from multiple fields that use PMI and
introducing the definition afterward. He said that this approach is based on his belief that,
“part of the problem is that most students I feel like, have a hard time grasping abstract
definitions, or abstract like theorems.” He also mentioned that he believes the approach of
exposing students to a variety of mathematical induction examples will help reduce the strong
association between mathematical induction and standard PMI problems. This is indicative
that his communication strategy reflects some level of understanding of the epistemological
obstacles associated with mathematical induction.
These two different responses illustrate an important point related to expertise. It is
crucial to note that expertise in a field is not equivalent to expertise in effectively teaching
content in that field. Research indicates that expertise in a content area together with
generic teaching strategies is not sufficient, but that there are content-specific pedagogical
strategies that expert teachers should know (Shulman, 1986, 1987). Many mathematics
education researchers emphasize the importance of this difference (Selden & Selden, 2003,
2017). The two excerpts discussed above can provide insight into these concepts. While
Participant 2’s response may be indicative that he understands PMI and is able to use it and
describe the process of using it, it solely reflects content knowledge, rather than knowledge
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of effective pedagogy. However, Participant 3 demonstrated content-specific decisions about
his communication strategies. He noted student difficulties with abstract definitions and also
referred to the value of exposing students to multiple examples of proofs using PMI. While
the two participants have similar backgrounds and levels of experience in their content area,
their responses indicate different levels in teaching expertise. This exemplifies the concept
of variable communication in relation to expertise. The findings of this and the preceding
section are detailed and discussed in the following section.

4.2.5.3

Conclusions The data supports two primary findings associated with Variable

Communication as it relates to the current study.
1. Some experts are able to simplify and explain the two primary parts of mathematical
induction and to describe the overall principle in the context of these two parts.
2. Experts, even experts with similar backgrounds, exhibit varying levels of success when
communicating concepts associated with PMI to students.
Both these findings provide insight to RQ5. The three mathematical induction analogies
detailed in Section 4.3.5.1 each detail both the base case and the inductive step of PMI. The
analogies illustrate that the participants understand the necessity of both parts of mathematical induction, indicating that they do not experience the same difficulties identified by
studies on PMI with novice participants. In particular, the work done by Ernest (1984)
suggests that novice students may underestimate the importance of one or both parts of
mathematical induction. In addition to providing answers to the research question, the data
presented in this section also exemplifies some potential limitations of expertise. Namely,
expertise in mathematics does not necessarily guarantee the ability to effectively communicate mathematical concepts. This fact supports the need for mathematical experts who
have also developed expertise in teaching mathematics or studying mathematical pedagogy.
In addition to having varying levels of success communicating mathematical concepts, the

150
participants in the study also demonstrated differing abilities in applying known concepts to
novel situations. This is explored further in the following section.

4.2.6

Novel Application

Similarly to Variable Communication, discussed in the preceding section, Novel Application
can refer to a potential limitation of expertise. Namely, experts may have varying levels of
flexibility in their approach to new situations, and expertise is not necessarily a guarantee
that an individual will always be able to apply their knowledge in a new situation or environment. Since the current study deals primarily with mathematical induction, the discussion
of novel application will be restricted to instances in the data dealing with PMI. There were
several examples during problem-solving sections of the interview where participants exhibited different degrees of success in applying PMI to novel proving exercises. Some notable
examples are discussed in detail in the following section.

4.2.6.1

Applying PMI in Novel Problems As detailed in Chapter 3, one significant

part of the study was a CTA on the participants as they worked on two questions that could
be solved using PMI. In all cases, the participants had never seen either problem in the
form given. The table below shows which of the two given problems each participant solved
during the problem solving section. A participant was said to have solved the problem if
they crafted a valid and complete proof that completely answered the question given. There
are two important notes about the table below. First, this reflects only the proofs created
during the initial problem-solving period. Some participants were able to finish or revise
their arguments during the post-solving interview, but did not solve the problem initially
during the allocated problem-solving time. This table only reflects a successful outcome
for those who were able to construct a complete proof without help or prompting. Second,
the participants were not required to write the formal proof down in order to have been
considered as creating a valid proof, though many of them did. The primary point of this
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CTA was not for the participants to successfully complete a proof for the given problems, and
they were told before their allocated problem-solving period that they should not feel pressure
to do so. The table is included merely to help frame the discussion of Novel Application.
Note that a ✓ represents a successful solution to the problem, while a ✗ means that the
participant was unsuccessful in proving the problem.
Table 4.6: Participant Success on Induction Problems

Participant
Participant 1
Participant 2
Participant 3
Participant 4
Participant 5

Problem 1
✓
✓
✓
✗
✗

Problem 2
✗
✗
✓
✓
✓

Note that one participant (Participant 3) successfully answered both questions, while
the remaining four participants either answered the first or second problem correctly, but
not both. For example, Participant 2 identified an algorithmic approach to proving the
tromino problem and indicated that if writing a formal proof down, he would reformulate
the algorithm into an argument using PMI. However, he struggled to come up with a valid
proof for the second problem. When asked why he was able to quickly identify an inductive
argument for the first problem, but not the second, he replied, “Because the first one had this
natural way of going back to a previous step. With this one, I don’t see anything like that.”
In contrast, Participant 3, who answered both problems successfully, almost immediately
identified mathematical induction as a strategy for both.
Aside from just the ability to identify a pattern leading them to an inductive argument,
which was discussed in Section 4.3.1, participants also described other strategies for approaching unfamiliar problems. Consider the following excerpt from Participant 5.
P5: When I first learned how to do questions, like, in the beginning, I would. . .
once I’d written down, like, the basic things, I would just stare at the problem
because I wouldn’t even know where to begin. But now, I’ve learned to like, at
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least figure out what the easiest thing is to do. I mean, sometimes it’s also like
doing examples, but like, in this case, I could have started with the 2 cross 2 grid,
for instance... I at least like, write down the problem. Or like use real numbers
and try to figure that piece. Usually I try to do that, but sometimes I still forget.
Here, she spoke about how her approach to novel problems has evolved over time. She
described the feeling of being frozen when confronted with an unfamiliar problem. In order
to prevent that feeling, she developed a strategy of identifying a single, simple task within
the problem and starting the problem by working on that task. In the case of the tromino
problem, she began by considering the more simple problem of counting the tiles on the
chessboard and calculating the number of trominos she would need to cover a chessboard
with a missing tile. The strategy of identifying part of a problem to work on, even if an
entire solution is not immediately apparent, was used by many of the participants, regardless
of whether or not they explicitly mentioned it. For instance, even though he was unable to
completely solve Problem 2, Participant 1 began by enumerating small package prices and
was able to at least identify his candidate for the minimal n. This suggests that experts
may chunk novel problems into known or manageable pieces in order to solve the problem
in its entirety. In research discussed in Section 2.4, Styliandies, Sandefur, and Watson
(2016) suggest that when experts cannot immediately identify a technique to prove a given
statement, they may begin to experiment with examples to gain insight into an appropriate
proving technique. The data in the current study corroborates this. Many participants who
were successful in quickly identifying a solution to one or both of the problems did so after
first identifying a proving technique. Those who were unable to do this immediately began
working on smaller examples in order to better understand the mechanics of the problem, as
exhibited in the excerpt above. Based on the data, is is hypothesized that this progression
of proof construction develops as experts gain experience.
As discussed, most of the experts followed the same pattern of proof construction identified
by Styliandies, Sandefur, and Watson (2016). However, the data indicates that this model
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may be unique to experts and may not be the same model that novices use when confronted
with a novel proof construction activity using PMI. As indicated in Participant 5’s description
above, novel problems were more difficult for her when she initially learned how to construct
proofs. Other participants also shared anecdotes of their experience when first learning how
to write proofs. Consider the excerpt from Participant 2 below.
It was in my first year of undergraduate, actually. And it was like really easy
proofs, now that I’m thinking about it, but I didn’t have that kind of like the
logical thinking yet. So, my first attempt to prove something was following what
the teacher was telling me. It was following the path of someone else, it was not
me trying to understand what is going on or trying to play with the problem like
now. It was actually me. . . Me remembering. . . okay the professor started like
this, so I need to start like it like this. And then what are the next step? And
I was like, I know the professor did a problem similar in class. I was like, okay,
then he did this. Okay. What do I need to do here? Then here what is, like. . .
close enough? Or what is similar that I can like, use here and I was doing that.
Of course, when the problem was really different, I was screwed. It was like, okay,
I cannot do this. But it was always trying to follow something that I knew.
Participant 2’s recollection is consistent with studies that suggest students may view proving, especially proofs by mathematical induction, in terms of algorithms they apply with little
to no conceptual understanding of the proof technique they are using (Avital & Libeskind,
1978; Weber, 2005). This description of the proving process is both incompatible with the
proving behavior exhibited by participants in this study as well as previous research with
mathematical experts that suggests experts have a more nuanced approach to proof production (Weber 2005, 2008). This implies that experts’ proof construction approaches develop
and evolve over time. In particular, participants’ descriptions of their proof construction
strategies when they were novices are compatible with Weber’s (2005) definition of procedural proof production, where a student uses previously seen theorems as a template for a
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“linear set of steps not directly attached to conceptual knowledge” (p.353). In contrast, the
proving behavior of the participants during the CTA more closely mirrored Weber’s (2005)
description of semantic proof production, where a student uses some informal or intuitive
examples of a relevant concept to understand the given statement. The significant results
linked to novel application are discussed in the following section.

4.2.6.2

Conclusions The data supports three primary findings associated with Novel

Application as it relates to the current study.
1. Experts, even experts with similar backgrounds and levels of experience, may exhibit
varying levels of success on cognitive tasks involving proof construction for novel problem statements.
2. Over time, experts have developed strategies for approaching novel proof construction
problems, including those involving the use of PMI.
3. The proof production behaviors of mathematical experts differs from the proof production behaviors of novices.
Item 1 provides insight to RQ4. Even if experts exhibit a solid conceptual understanding
of PMI, they may not always be able to correctly identify it as an appropriate proving
technique. Expertise does not guarantee the ability to effectively apply knowledge in all scenarios, as exhibited by participants who were able to successfully use PMI in one cognitive
task, but not the other. Items 2 and 3 also have implications for RQ1. The data offers
many anecdotes associated with participants’ experience with proof production when they
were novices. These anecdotes corroborate previous work done with novices that suggest
surface-level, algorithmic approaches to proof construction (Avital & Libeskind 1978). In
contrast, experts in the current study discussed and exhibited strategies for solving novel
proof construction problems and demonstrated more nuanced, advanced approaches to constructing proofs during cognitive tasks. This type of mathematical development over time
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is further explored in the following section, which focuses on Mathematical Fluency.

4.2.7

Mathematical Fluency

Mathematical Fluency may refer to a broad range of characteristics of mathematical experts. For the purposes of this study, Mathematical Fluency most often refers to an expert’s
ability to decode mathematical language and symbols, skim over known mathematical concepts, and refine or condense mathematical arguments. As would be expected, experts in
the study demonstrated well-developed mathematical fluency in numerous ways, including
a deep understanding of logical reasoning and a solid grasp on mathematical language and
notation. This section will restrict focus to two primary sub-themes associated with mathematical fluency that are linked to proof construction, proof techniques, and PMI. First, there
were multiple instances where participants exhibited mathematical fluency during proof validation. These instances include several of the proof validation activities discussed by Selden
and Selden (2003). Second, participants also exhibited mathematical fluency through their
demonstrated ability to translate problems. This sub-theme includes examples when participants translated a problem from one discipline to another as well as examples when
the participant altered the problem to gain more insight to the structure and underlying
argument. Both of these sub-themes are explored in the sections that follow.

4.2.7.1

Proof Validation Proof Validation was explored in detail in Section 2.2.3. Sel-

don and Seldon (2003) identified five primary activities associated with proof validation.
They are included again in the table below along with examples of each activity from the
data.
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Table 4.7: Examples of Proof Validation

1. Asking and answering questions
and assenting to claims.

2. Constructing subproofs.

3. Remembering or finding and interpreting related theorems and definitions.

4. Feelings of rightness or wrongness.

5. Production of a new text- modification, expansion, or contraction of the
original argu- ment (Selden & Selden,
2003, p.5).

P3:“Yeah, because then, so then that’s just giving you a tiling no matter where the missing
square is, like, just generating it from the tiling
you have for the original one, right? Um, and
now that I’m looking at this more. I need to be
careful probably. But it looks like. Oh, okay. I
think I know how to make the other. . . my claim
is that n is two. Um. How I can make tilings for
all the higher, um order grids? ”
P1: “what I’ve actually done is sort of 2 inductions. I proved a Lemma for building the L’s,
starting at a small L, and then I did a lemma for
starting at a big step, and then going downwards
when I was dealing with the with the grids.”
P1: “I mean, the smallest number for which you
can’t express it as a linear combination... With
two numbers, I think should be those two numbers minus the sum of the two numbers or something. So I guess, like, I’ve remembered a claim
that the smallest number you can’t write should
be 11.”
P2: “So basically they are saying that there is
a minimum value n such that for any m bigger
than that n, that number will be the divisible
by 4 and 5, if I’m understanding is correct. But
I don’t think that is true because just take any
minimal n if it exists. A quantity that is divisible by 9 or whatever it would make the quantity
something such that. . . that m will be divisible
by 9. and then we. . . Do we have that? 4 plus 5
is. . . Oh, no... it’s not divisible. Okay. I assume
this is true actually.”
P1: “Yeah, so I think the way I proved it, it’s
sort of well, now now, I feel like I’m seeing
there’s a better way to do it with a single induction, but what I’ve actually done is sort of
2 inductions... But now I think I could see, I
could have built up with a missing tile grid from
a small group to the grid.

While most proof validation studies ask participants to validate the proofs of others, the
data from the current study indicates that participants are capable of self-validation and
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that they participate in the same kinds of validation activities associated with validating
the work of others. More importantly, the experts in this study performed these validation
checks without prompting, suggesting that self-validation may be an automatic part of their
proving process. While the table above offers one example of each validation activity, these
occurrences were prevalent throughout the data. A summary of each activity’s appearance
in data analysis is included below.
1. Asking and answering questions and assenting to claims: This item is related to the
self-checking behavior discussed in the section on Comprehension Monitoring. In summary, participants frequently make a claim, ask themselves about the validity of the
claim, provide some sort of justification for the claim (this may be external or internal), and assent or dissent to the claim. This happened frequently throughout the
problem-solving section.
2. Constructing subproofs: It was common for participants to construct small subproofs
to provide justification for claims or to break a larger argument down into smaller,
more manageable pieces. For example, Participant 1 constructed a Lemma to help
him understand part of the tromino question. It is pictured below.
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Figure 4.11: Participant 1 Lemma

3. Remembering or finding and interpreting related theorems: In general, this occured in
two places in the data. First, as exemplified in Table 4.7, participants often recalled
a theorem that was useful to them during the cognitive task and interpreted it in
the context of the problem. Second, participants spoke about proofs of theorems and
interpreted those proofs in the context of a different proof. This phenomenon was
explored further in the section on Flexible Retrieval.
4. Feelings of rightness or wrongness: Participants often read a claim or made an assertion and immediately exhibited or verbalized feelings of rightness or wrongness, then
followed with justification for the feeling. This activity seemed closely linked to intuition in the data. In places when participants discussed intuition, they also indicated
feelings of rightness and wrongness.
5. Production of a new text- modification, expansion, or contraction of the original argument: This process occurred almost continuously throughout problem-solving and
during the post-solving interview. Participants consistently checked their argument
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and made arguments more concise. This ranged in extremity from condensing notation in a proof (Participant 3) to merging two completely separate inductive proofs
into a single, cohesive proof by PMI (Participant 1).
The findings discussed in this section corroborate work already done on proof validation
and mathematical fluency. First, the experts in the study participated in all of the proof
validation activities identified in work by Selden and Selden (2003). Second, experts exhibited the same characteristics of mathematical fluency named by Shepherd and Sande (2014).
Experts were able to skim and summarize over complicated mathematical concepts and notation while working on their cognitive tasks. However, this study also indicates that, in
addition to validating the work of others, experts also participate in proof validation activities when working on and reviewing their own proofs. Additionally, while Shepherd and
Sande’s (2014) work primarily looked at mathematical fluency in terms of reading proof, this
study identified similar characteristics of mathematical fluency during proof construction. In
addition to the findings mentioned in this section, participants also displayed mathematical
fluency through translating and altering given proving exercises. This is discussed in the
following section.

4.2.7.2

Problem Translation and Alteration In addition to the proof validation ac-

tivities discussed in the previous section, participants also participated in or discussed two
other activities linked to mathematical fluency. First, participants exhibited the ability to
translate mathematical problems and known proofs from one field or situation to another.
Second, participants exhibited the ability to alter problems in order to better understand
them. Each of these two activities is discussed in this section. Consider the excerpt from
Participant 5 below.
P5: Okay. Okay, I guess so if it’s covering, then this number of tiles, I guess,
um has to be divisible by 3, is what I’m thinking. So, I guess the new question
is. . . we want a minimal n such that for all m greater than equal to n, 22m − 1
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is divisible by 3. Like, I think that’s like the first necessary condition.
Here, Participant 5 began her solution for the tromino problem by translating the question
to number theory (her primary field of study). She noted that the reformulation is not
logically equivalent, but that it is certainly a necessary condition for the assigned cognitive
task. She indicated that she uses this strategy often. When asked how she approaches a
novel question, she answered in the following way.
Turning the question into something familiar... Thinking of a similar example.
Like the problems that I dealt with in my research is like. . . You already know
how to get the estimate on this sort of set. And like, the set that I’m looking at,
it’s sort of similar, but not really. So go through that proof and then, um, see if
this proof is like, maybe 2 different cases of that one, something like that.
While at first glance this strategy may seem simple, the act of translating either a problem or
proof into a new context is a difficult and nuanced skill. It requires the individual to first have
a solid conceptual grasp on the initial question or proof and the knowledge required from
both the initiating field and terminal field in order to correctly complete the translation. For
instance, in order to translate the tromino problem to the tile counting problem, Participant 5
had to have an understanding of the initial problem statement, translate that into a counting
argument, and compare and evaluate the logical relationship between the two formulations
to determine that the reformulation was necessary, but not sufficient. The participant then
proceeded to construct a proof for her counting argument, demonstrating mathematical
fluency in her use of number theoretic argumentation and notation. Following this, she
again translated back to the original context in order to proceed with the more geometric
approach to the tiling. This type of translation occurred often in the data. The stamp
problem was translated into the language of modular arithmetic and linear combinations,
and participants frequently discussed taking argumentation from a proof and translating it
into a different context. In addition to translating problems and proofs across mathematical
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disciplines, participants also demonstrated the ability to alter different aspects of a problem
in order to gain better understanding of the underlying structure of the given exercise.
When asked how he approaches proving exercises, Participant 2 responded as follows.
I might start to change their assumptions of problem. Like, okay, like, for example, here they were saying that there was one tile missing. In that part, I will
maybe say, like, hey, what, if there is no tile missing? What if it is the complete
chessboard? How will that tile affect my approach to the previous cases that already played with?...So if I’m in a point in where my first approach didn’t work,
I will try to change the assumptions to see what is going on.
This action of altering assumptions, similarly to the previously discussed translation process,
appears to be simple on the surface, but is actually reflective of deep mathematical fluency.
The interrogation of assumptions in a problem indicates a solid conceptual understanding
of the underlying logic and reflects a deep level of mathematical knowledge. Participant 2
indicated that understanding the necessity of assumptions in a given problem is something
that he did not have as a novice mathematician. He described the following memory.
I have noticed that when you are, like, actually writing the proof. Uh, you can
actually see if all the assumptions are important or not. I remember one time
that I was doing a proof, and I was like, hey, I’m not using this. Apparently,
I was not using that, and then I went to a professor, this was when I was an
undergraduate, and I was like, professor, why is that? We are assuming this, and
we are not actually using it. And then the professor said, like, hey, you are using
it, but you just don’t know, because it’s not like visible. But, if you take out this
assumption, this will happen to this and this to this, and eventually you end up
with a contradiction to what we were like, trying to prove.
This excerpt indicates that the participant has developed these skills over time. In particular,
the notion of understanding assumptions is important when considering PMI, since many
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of the epistemological obstacles identified by previous studies deal with misunderstandings
of the fundamental assumptions and underlying logic of mathematical induction (Avital &
Libeskind, 1978; Ernest, 1984; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993). The examples of mathematical
fluency identified and discussed in this section provide some insight to the study’s research
questions. These insights are discussed in the following section.

4.2.7.3

Conclusions The data supports three primary findings associated with Mathe-

matical Fluency as it relates to the current study.
1. Mathematical experts demonstrate numerous behaviors associated with mathematical
fluency during proof construction and proof validation of problems involving PMI.
2. Experts demonstrate mathematical fluency through the actions of translation and alteration of proving exercises.
3. Evidence suggests that the mathematical fluency demonstrated by experts is developed
over a long period of time.
Items 1 and 2 offer information relevant to RQ3. During problem-solving, the five participants employed many of the mathematical strategies discussed in this section, including
problem translation, proof validation activities, and assumption alteration. When approaching novel problems using PMI, the participants often questioned how small alterations to
the problem would change the question. Some of them translated the problem into another
mathematical induction problem that was more comprehensible to them, and throughout
their work, they asked questions, and verified assertions, demonstrating many characteristics of mathematical fluency identified by previous work. Finally, Item 3 gives further
enlightenment to RQ1. Namely, the data indicates that the actions associated with mathematical fluency detailed in this section have developed over time. The next section explores
the final item in the Expert Knowledge Framework and discusses instances when participants
monitored their own comprehension during cognitive tasks.
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4.2.8

Comprehension Monitoring

Experts were found to self-check performance, and persist through difficulty when working
on tasks much more often than novice counterparts (Shepherd & Sande, 2014). This tendency
is referred to as Comprehension Monitoring. The participants in this study performed the
action of comprehension monitoring consistently throughout the problem-solving section.
Two sub-themes, based on the two actions associated with comprehension monitoring, were
created to classify data linked to this item. First, examples of participants self-checking
their performance were classified into one sub-theme, named ‘Self-Checking and Performance
Monitoring’. Second, instances where participants continued to work on the cognitive task
even when they struggled were included in the second sub-theme, called ‘Persisting through
Difficulty’. Both sub-themes associated with Comprehension Monitoring occurred frequently
throughout the data, but a sub-collection of notable examples are detailed and analyzed in
the following sections.

4.2.8.1

Self-Checking and Performance Monitoring The notion of self-monitoring

is strongly linked to some of the proof validation activities discussed in the previous section.
One of the proof validation activites identified by Selden & Selden’s (2003), and discussed in
the previous section, involves asking and answering questions and assenting to claims. This
was a large part of the self-checking and performance monitoring processes, and it happened
frequently throughout the interviews. These performance checks were unprompted, and
appeared natural and almost automatic for all participants. Participants asked themselves
questions and paused between claims to either think or justify the claim out loud. The
research by Shepherd and Sande (2014) suggests that these types of reflections are more
common among experts than novices. Five sub-actions were identified frequently in sections
of the interview linked to self-checking and performance-monitoring. Note that some of these
(Checking for Understanding, Asking and Answering Questions, and Justifying an Assertion)
were also identified by previous studies (Selden& Selden, 2003; Shepherd & Sande, 2014)
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while the other two were developed by the current study (Identifying Mistakes or Irrelevant
Steps and Self-Correcting Errors). These sub-actions are are listed below.
1. Checking for Understanding
2. Identifying Mistakes or Irrelevant Steps.
3. Self-Correcting Errors
4. Justifying an Assertion
5. Asking and Answering Questions
These same performance monitoring actions were identified throughout the data. Consider
some excerpts below with these sub-actions identified within the text, color-coded using the
key above. Consider the excerpt below from Participant 1.
P1: Yeah, so I’m, I’m happy with how I started working. How I started was
remembering what I think the answer should be, which I guess I guess I can’t be
sad about but, uh. As far as actually trying to work on the problem writing on
the table did seem to be a good idea to get me an idea for how the numbers fit
together. And it gave me some confidence that the right answer here for n was
12 the smallest number for which any number of bigger than equal to it can be
written as a combination of fours and fives. And I made a table to verify.
Um, so that that table looks like this. It just sort of like addition table
for the number of fours I was using and the number of fives I was
using. Um, then I wanted to do some. . . I had a sense that I needed to
understand what was happening in in the additive structure of fours
and fives, which maybe you want to consider things mod 4 and mod
5, and I think what I’ve done is spent about 15 minutes dithering on
something that wasn’t super useful, though, maybe messing around
with it to help me think about what I really need to think about. And
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then about the last 3 minutes or whatever, doing something kind of
useful.
In this excerpt, he was asked to reflect on his performance on the second cognitive task
(stamp problem), for which he did not identify a complete solution. Even though he did
not fully construct a proof for the given cognitive task, he still performed several of the
sub-actions associated with self-checking behavior. An excerpt from Participant 5 is also
included below, again color-coded to reflect the sub-actions listed above.
P5: Okay. I guess I’m writing it down, and I’m a little confused, uh,
because, uh, this question seems similar to the first question and the
first questions uh, like the language used was that for any. . . for all
m and n with m ≥ n. So I’m trying to figure out if the language over
here is the same. Like, is the quantifier “for all” as well here? So my
first thing I thought was like, is the quantifier for all? Yeah, and it is.
Okay, so basically we want a solution to like a linear equation, right?
Like n = 4x + 5y where x and y are integers. So, I’m like trying to rewrite
the question now.
These five sub-activities effectively describe and account for the self-checking and performance monitoring behavior found in the data. As discussed, self-checking behavior was
prevalent in the data, corroborating Shepherd and Sande’s (2014) claim that experts commonly demonstrate these behaviors during proving activities. Importantly, these behaviors
indicate a willingness to acknowledge mistakes, to adjust an argument, and to interrogate
and justify their own claims. Additionally, these self-checking behaviors corroborate the
findings by Inglis and Alcock (2012) discussed in Section 2.1.2. Namely, the data of the
current study indicates that experts are willing to participate in “zooming in” strategies
when validating their own proofs during proof construction (p.340). Zooming in behaviors
consist of considering problematic parts of a given proof by performing line-by-line checks.
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This behavioral description is consistent with some of the sub-activities identified above. In
addition to these self-checking and performance-monitoring behaviors, the participants in
the study also demonstrated other Comprehension Monitoring behaviors. A discussion of
the participants’ willingness to persist through difficulty is discussed in the following section.

4.2.8.2

Persisting through Difficulty Mathematics often involves long, intricate and

detailed problems. It is rarely the case that difficult problems are solved immediately or with
little thought. Therefore, it makes sense that persistence would be a valuable characteristic
for a mathematical expert. As previously mentioned, Shepherd and Sande’s (2014) study
concluded that mathematical experts were far more likely than novices to persist through
difficulties when working on a proving exercise. This study’s findings are consistent with
their claim. A few relevant examples from the data are included below. After working on
the first cognitive task (trominoes), Participant 3 was asked what the hardest part of the
problem was. He responded in the excerpt below.
P3: Well finding the tiling for the 4 × 4. Because I was ready to give up, um, the,
the, the tricky part for me was thinking exactly how to set it up. So what I can
make copies and rotate around cause, you know, the original drawing I had um,
for the 8 × 8 with something like. . . This where the missing cell is in the top, it
should be in the top left corner not wherever it is right now but, um and at least
in that drawing um, or with that set up the, the other, um, 4 × 4 is weren’t exact
copies they were, like, slightly different cause they all each had a different, um,
piece of that L, shape in the center. Um, so, for me, a tricky part was trying to
figure out how to, like, actually piece the 4 × 4 grids together um, in a true, like,
oh, this is a copy being rotated around as opposed to, like, well, this is like, kind
of a copy being rotated around, then you have this extra piece somewhere.
During the problem-solving period for the first cognitive task, Participant 3 initially struggled
to tile the 4×4 board. He spent a large portion of the time dwelling on that part of the proof,
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which he reflected on in the excerpt above. However, rather than giving up on the problem he
persisted. Importantly, his reflection above is indicative that he not only continued working
on the problem, but also used the difficulty to give him a deeper insight to the problem after
he successfully identified the tiling. Later in his interview, he referred to the importance
of this perseverance and exploration. When asked what skills he felt novice students were
lacking in relation to proving, he responded as follows.
P3: Oh, they just unwilling to just try something. Um. I guess, like, okay,
I’ve actually thought about this. So, um, I think that students often conflate
something that is correct with something that is useful, like, when I talk to my
students and they’re trying to solve for x or whatever, um, and they’ll, like, do
something and they’ll ask me is that correct? Well, so let’s say they’re trying
to solve some like, quadratic thing and they square root both sides or whatever.
Like that is correct, it just isn’t necessarily useful, but they, they want me to
say, no, it’s not correct. And so they are just like always looking for the correct
thing to do. Like. . . the thing that moves them in the correct direction and not
just like something that will move them in some direction and see what happens.
Um. I think actually, that’s the biggest thing.
Here, he identified the unwillingness to persist through difficulty as a stumbling block that
negatively impacts novice students, and claimed that the willingness to “just try something”
can be of benefit when working on difficult proving problems. Altogether, the participants
in the study exhibited consistent willingness to persist through struggle. Participant 1 spent
the majority of his allocated problem solving time for Problem 2 struggling with the details
of modular arithmetic, and Participant 4 did the same on the first problem. However, when
faced with difficulties, they exhibited the willingness to explore multiple avenues of thought,
as mentioned in the excerpt by Participant 3 above. The findings of this and the previous
section are summarized in the following section.
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4.2.8.3

Conclusions The data supports two primary findings associated with compre-

hension monitoring as it relates to the current study.
1. Experts demonstrate the ability and willingness to perform consistent self-checking and
performance-monitoring behaviors when working on proving problems.
2. Experts demonstrate the ability and desire to persist through difficulties when working
on cognitive tasks
While these two items are not necessarily directly related to any of the guiding research
questions, they still provide valuable insight to the ways in which experts work on proving
problems, including those involving PMI. In particular, the Comprehension Monitoring Behaviors discussed in the preceding sections illustrate experts’ self-monitoring behavior and
provide concrete examples of the ways in which experts check their own performance. These
behaviors have implications for teaching that will be discussed in Chapter 5. In addition,
these results corroborate other studies involving mathematical experts, including the work
by Shepherd and Sande (2014). The following section discusses the interactions between
various items in this framework to further elucidate the some of the findings discussed in
Section 4.3.

4.2.9

Notable Item Interactions

While the items in the Expert Knowledge Framework represent unique aspects of expert
knowledge, it is certainly true that they are not independent of one another. Depending on
the research context, it is expected that various subsets of these eight items will interact
with one another in different ways. This was certainly the case for the current study. While
not every instance of item interaction will be discussed, some commonly noted interactions
are detailed in this section. Specific attention was given to the interactions which relate to
the study’s research questions. It is important to note that some of these interactions are
nuanced, and a more careful analysis of these interactions may be pertinent to future study
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using the framework. This is discussed further in Section 5.4.

4.2.9.1

Pattern Recognition, Knowledge Organization and Contextual Condi-

tioning in PMI There was significant interaction between the items of Pattern Recognition, Knowledge Organization, and Contextual Conditioning in the contexts of this study.
In the case of proof techniques, including PMI, experts in the study demonstrated several
methods of organization. These included discipline-based organization strategies as well as
organization based on problem characteristics. In particular, the recognition of patterns
between small and large cases and examples was the primary problem characteristic associated with PMI. The experts demonstrated the formation of condition-action pairs based on
this Knowledge Organization system. In particular, the action of using PMI as a proving
technique was associated with the two conditions of associated discipline and pattern-based
problem characteristics. In summary, Pattern Recognition was found to inform the Knowledge Organization of knowledge associated with PMI and to as one of the conditions in a
condition-action pair.

4.2.9.2

Mathematical Fluency and Comprehension Monitoring Since both items

involved activities associated with proof validation, there was nontrivial overlap in the items
of Mathematical Fluency and Comprehension Monitoring. The most notable interaction between these two items occurred in relation to two of the proof validation activities identified
by Selden and Selden (2003): ‘Asking and Answering Questions and Assenting to Claims”
and ‘Production of a New Text: Modification, Expansion, or Contraction of the Original
Argument.’ First, In order to perform the actions of asking, answering, and assenting, participants needed mathematical fluency. In particular, it was often the case that these three
actions required rigorous or nuanced mathematical justification. Additionally, these actions
are closely tied to the self-checking and performance-monitoring behaviors associated with
Comprehension Monitoring. Second, in order to produce a new text from an original argument, a participant needs to have a solid handle on the associated logical processes, theorems,
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and definitions. These are all linked to demonstrated Mathematical fluency. Additionally,
the modification of an existing argument requires the ability to meaningfully reflect on the
argument as well as the ability to persist through difficult details. Both of these abilities are
linked to Comprehension Monitoring. In summary, these two items are inextricably linked
to one another in the contexts of this study and provide a second example of how different
characteristics of expertise interact with one another.

4.2.10

Section Summary

Section 4.2 provided a summary of the deductive thematic analysis conducted based on the
Expert Knowledge theoretical framework. Each of the eight items appeared frequently in the
data, and provided a guide for exploring mathematical expertise in the context of the current
study on PMI. The section detailed findings for each of the eight items in the framework, and
situated these findings within the existing literature discussed in Chapter 2. These findings
were linked to the study’s five guiding research questions, and the section concluded with
an analysis of notable item interactions. Section 4.3 will explore the findings of the second
thematic analysis conducted for this study.

4.3

Inductive Thematic Analysis

In addition to the analysis using the two primary theoretical frameworks, APOS Theory and
Expert Knowledge Classification, several recurring themes were identified in the data each of
these themes helps address the study’s research questions in various ways. It is important to
note, that while inductive and deductive thematic analyses share many characteristics, the
primary difference is related to how themes are developed. In a deductive thematic analysis,
the themes are pre-determined by an existing framework, and the data is classified by these
pre-existing themes. In contrast, there are no pre-developed themes in an inductive analysis,
rather, overarching themes are developed from the data. These overarching themes were
identified and analyzed through the six-phase thematic analysis process detailed in Section
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3.4.1. Section 4.3.1 deals with how participants think about formality and rigor in proofs
as well as the role of convincing in proof. Section 4.3.2 discusses the role of examples in
participants’ work on novel problems. Next, Section 4.3.3 details participants’ views on the
standard mathematical induction problems that are often presented in introductory proofs
courses. Finally, Section 4.3.4 summarizes the thematic analysis and further contextualizes
these themes in relation to the study’s research questions.

4.3.1

Informal and Formal Proof: Convincing Oneself and Convincing Others

The first recurring theme identified during the thematic inductive analysis involves two types
of proofs participants mentioned during the interview. First, participants used the term
informal proof to describe the act of creating a proof or sequence of justifications intended
to convince oneself that something is true. These informal proofs can be written down, be
spoken aloud, or be mentally constructed. Second, participants used the term formal proof
to describe the more rigorous construction of a proof, and this type of proof was strongly
linked with the act of convincing others of the validity of either the statement or proof.
Recall that this study takes Stylianides (2007) definition that a proof is “a mathematical
argument, a connected sequence of assertions for or against a mathematical claim” (p. 291).
It is important to note that both the informal and formal types of proofs described by the
participants may satisfy this definition. Consider the excerpt from Participant 1’s interview
below. He was asked what skills are necessary in order for someone to be able to construct
a good proof. His response follows.
P1: Yeah, so I think somehow there, at least 2 distinct phases of good proof construction at least for me, not that I’ve also. . . I’ve haven’t like super formalized
it in my head or anything, but first, the initial stage is really convincing yourself that something’s true um, which can be a lot looser than writing a formal
proof... and then and then there’s actually writing it down, which is somehow. . .
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it’s supposed to be like the. . . the full justification to the reader that something’s
true. So really dealing with every possible issue a reader might have. Yeah, so,
um, and that second stage is really where you’re trying to communicate a proof,
which is what most people would think of as, as the proof.
The concepts of convincing oneself and convincing others were also referenced by other
participants. Participant 3, in particular, linked these ideas to PMI. Consider the excerpt
below.
P3: I think. . . I mean, this is true for induction and it’s just true in general.
I think too many people are trying to go from here’s the problem statement to
I’m going to write on the formal proof immediately. And that’s it. And, like, I
just think that is unproductive, I mean, for me, the way I understand things that
there’s a proof for myself, and there’s a proof for everyone else, and I’m going
to understand the proof that convinces me first, before I ever try to convince
someone else or something is true. And, like, when I see students struggling with
mathematical induction argument it’s, because they, like, show their base case
and then they like, you know, assume it’s true for the k thing, but they don’t
actually have a feel of what’s going on in the problem or why it should be true.
There are commonalities in the two excerpts above. First, the informal proof seems to be a
precursor to the formal proof in the participants’ minds. That is to say, both participants
refer to convincing themselves first. Participant 3 indicated that he thinks this ordering
is crucially important, and he mentioned that students may struggle when they attempt to
construct a formal proof before they have convinced themselves of a statement’s validity. The
data indicates that the action of convincing oneself that a statement is true or that a proof is
valid may encompass many different approaches. During CTA, it was noted that none of the
five participants immediately began constructing a formal, rigorous proof in either cognitive
task (tromino problem or stamp problem). Instead, the participants began by working small
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examples. This behavior corroborates the work done by Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson
(2016), and the act of working with examples is explored further in the Section 4.3.2. It was
during this self-justification that participants participated in many of the proof validation
activities identified by previous studies, including asking and answering questions, assenting
to claims, and constructing subproofs (Harel & Sowder, 1998; Selden & Selden, 2003).
Not all of the participants wrote down formal proofs. In the case of participants who
chose to write the formal proof down, they did so at the end of the problem-solving section
after they had successfully reasoned through all aspects of the assigned problem. While
other proof validation activities took place primarily during the informal phase of proof
construction, it was often during the process of writing down a formal version of their
constructed proof that participants modified, refined, or condensed the structure of their
argument. Selden & Selden (2003) identify these behaviors as activities associated with
proof validation. The participants’ demonstrated tendency to perform these modifications
during the formal proof stage may be related to the perceived role of the reader in proof
construction. As previously mentioned, when a participant is constructing an informal proof,
the justification and argumentation may take place internally, externally, or both. As such,
the thread of the argument needs only be coherent to the individual constructing the proof
during this informal stage of proof construction. However, when a formal proof needs to be
created, the participant must translate this informal line of reasoning into a form that can
be easily understood and evaluated by others. When referring to the formal proof in the
excerpt above, Participant 2 said that a formal proof should deal with “every possible issue
a reader might have.” Altogether, the findings of this section seem to suggest that, while
both informal and formal proofs may satisfy the study’s definition of proof, informal proof
may be primarily concerned with self-justification only, and formal proof is likely concerned
with both rigorous justification and clear communication. Further, the data suggests that
participants feel that both informal and formal proofs are integral parts of the overall proof
construction process. The results presented and interpreted in this section are summarized
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below.

4.3.1.1

Conclusions The data supports three primary findings associated with Formal

and Informal Proof as they relate to the current study.
1. Mathematical experts view both informal proofs (self-justification) and formal proofs
(justification for others) as important components of proof construction.
2. The data indicates that experts likely view informal proof as a precursor to formal
proof.
3. Proof validation activities identified by existing studies likely take place during both
the informal and formal phases of proof construction.
These three results give insight to both RQ3 and RQ4. The data indicates that the determination of an appropriate proving technique likely occurs during the informal phase of proof
construction. The excerpt from Participant 3 in the previous section highlights the obstacles
that may occur if an individual immediately tries to use a technique to write a formal proof
without first going through some self-justification that provides them with some underlying
structure to inform the proof. While previous studies indicate that novices are unlikely to
participate in self-justification behaviors, the current study found that experts use these
behaviors frequently during cognitive tasks. This suggests that informal proving may be
a skill that develops along with mathematical maturity and the development of expertise.
Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson (2016) found that novice students primiraly demonstrate
behaviors associated with absolutist perspective of proof, which focuses on the product of
the proof. In contrast, this study found that experts may operate primarily from the subjective perspective, which focuses on the proving process. In particular, during the informal
phase of the proving process discussed in this section, participants relied heavily on the use
of examples. This phenomenon is explored further in the following section.
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4.3.2

“Playing Around” and “Getting your Hands Dirty”: The Role of Examples in Proof Construction and Problem-Solving

Recall the study by Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson (2016) discussed in Section 2.4 in
which the researchers studied the proving behavior of experts working on proving exercises
with PMI. The authors note a pattern in how expert mathematicians often approach a
proving exercise. This pattern is summarized below.
1. Attempt to identify a reasonable method or technique to prove the statement. If one
can be identified, they may use the technique without necessarily thinking about why
the statement is true.
2. If no method can be immediately or easily identified, then the expert may try to
experiment with some examples to gain insight to possible proving strategies.
3. Use discoveries made in the previous step to inform the formalization of an argument.
The proving behaviors observed during the CTA in this study strongly adhere to this pattern. This section primarily focuses on Items 2 and 3 in this set of steps, in which experts
used examples to provide insight to a problem. This behavior was common to all participants during problem-solving, and the act of using examples was discussed frequently by
participants in other parts of the interview. When discussing the use of examples in proof
construction, participants frequently used the language of “playing around” or “getting your
hands dirty.” When asked what he does when he gets stuck on a problem, Participant 2
responded as follows.
If I don’t know the problem, the thing that I will do is start to, like, play with
the problem. And by play with the problem, I mean do examples and small cases
for motiviation and see how it works or see what I can see from that problem.
It’s like. . . I like this part because it’s having fun with the problem. It’s just not
being worried about proving, just see what is going on with the problem. And
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then after I play a little bit comes. . . well, the part that I don’t like too much,
because I want to actually find a pattern. I want to find what is going on.
This excerpt illustrates two important aspects of the role of examples in proof construction
and problem solving. First, the participant describes the act of “playing around” and exploring examples as a strategy to familiarize himself with the problem and give him insight to
the problem, as discussed in Step 2 of the pattern described above. Second, he mentions that
during this time he is not “worried about proving.” This reflects the subjective perspective
on proof identified by Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson (2016), in which an individual is
focused on the process of proving, rather than the proof itself. The participant says that he
enjoys working with examples because “it’s having fun with the problem.” In terms of APOS
theory, this could be indicative that he enjoys working on a problem at the action stage, but
he finds it more difficult to reflect on those actions and interiorize them into processes, since
this requires a higher level of cognitive activity.
The three step process identified above also requires a high level of cognitive activity.
These example-based behaviors were demonstrated by all five participants during the CTA.
This approach seems so integral to experts’ proving strategies that it can cause difficulty if
the pattern is disrupted. When asked what the hardest part of proving a statement using
mathematical induction, Participant 3 responded as follows.
Um, actually the, the hardest thing is if I can’t. . . if. . . there are some of these
problems where I can’t come up with an example, right? If there’s really no way
to do a worked example um, that illuminates like a broader picture, like you’re
kind of forced to work in full generality, and I really uncomfortable doing that.
Um, because I like getting my hands dirty on with examples and, like. That
happens more often than not that, like, you know, I could in theory, simplify it,
but if I could prove the simplified version of this, it would be a direct translation.
There’s no, like, content difference between, um, the proofs. . . like the proof of
the specific example and the general proof.
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In this excerpt, Participant 3 indicated that if he cannot come up with an example, his
proof construction strategy is disrupted, and this disruption causes him to have difficulties
when solving the problem. In particular, this description exemplifies Step 3 in the three-step
pattern above. The participant stated that there is often “no content difference between
the proof of the specific example and the general proof.” This corroborates the findings
by Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson (2016), who found that experts in their study used
examples to inform the general argument. In terms of APOS Theory, Participant 3’s response
above is similar to the previous quote from Participant 2. Namely, Participant 3 also enjoys
starting with an action stage by working examples and while performing them, he reflects on
these actions, which he can then interiorize into processes that eventually gives him insight to
the “general proof.” Other participants describe a similar process. Consider the excerpt from
Participant below, who also mentioned the phrase “playing around” when referencing the act
of exploring examples. When asked about the role this strategy plays in his problem-solving
processes, he responded as follows.
P1: For me, it’s it’s basically the entirety of my problem-solving process I need
to have some sort of hands on feel for what’s going on. If there’s if it’s like an
algebraic question about an arbitrary group, what I’m going to do to start with
is play with a toy group first and check whatever property works there and see if
they can understand what pieces are fitting together to make it work there. Um,
that sort of thing, and then once you, once you understand the like, small hands
on things, you can think about how it could work in more general cases.
Again, this description mirrors Steps 2 and 3 of the model above almost exactly, providing
further evidence that the model effectively captures the problem-solving behaviors of experts.
In terms of APOS theory, his response highlights the action of working on a small example
and reflecting on that action (“play with a toy group first and check whatever property works
there and see if they can understand what pieces are fitting together to make it work”) and
continuing to reflect on the action until it becomes interiorized into a process (“you can think
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about how it could work in more general cases”).
In addition to discussing this behavioral pattern, the experts also exhibited this behavior
during the CTA. All five of the participants began both questions by exploring examples,
albeit with varying levels of success. For Problem 1 (tromino problem), participants experimented with tiling small boards. Participants who successfully constructed a valid and
complete proof were able to generalize the identified pattern from their examples to a general case, while those who failed to identify the pattern were unable to generate the proof,
further supporting the claim that a disruption in the three-step process may inhibit proof
construction. Similarly, for the second problem, participants began by testing small package
prices to see if they could be exactly covered using the available stamp problem. Again,
those who were able to generalize the example-based patterns were the same participants
who successfully completed the second proof. These behaviors during CTA, together with
the discussion above give solid evidence that suggests the three-step model captures most
of the problem-solving strategies employed by experts during tasks involving mathematical
induction. The findings of this section are summarized below.
4.3.2.1

Conclusions The data supports two primary findings associated with the Role

of Examples in the contexts of the current study.
1. When working on problems involving PMI, experts use small examples to identify a
generalizable pattern in order to construct a proof.
2. Experts may struggle to construct proofs using PMI in scenarios where relevant examples cannot be identified or when no pattern can be identified from small examples.
Both of these items relate to RQ2 and RQ4. First, it is likely that the example-based proof
construction strategies discussed by participants in relation to problems involving PMI are
also used in broader proof construction contexts, so this may illustrate one way proof by
PMI is linked to other techniques and the action of proving. Second, the data provided
strong evidence that difficulties associated with identifying relevant examples or generalizing
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example-based patterns contributed to difficulties constructing proofs using mathematical
induction. In terms of APOS Theory, this is indicative that the participants may experience
difficulties with interiorization (i.e. transitioning from the action stage to the process stage).
This suggests that the worked examples of small cases may be integral to proof construction
involving PMI. This discussion is tangentially related to the pattern recognition discussion
in section 4.2 as well as some of the revisions to the preliminary genetic decompositions
discussed in Section 4.1. The following section continues the discussion of examples by
exploring the use of standard or routine examples of PMI used in introductory proofs courses.

4.3.3

Standard Induction Examples

This research uses nonstandard examples involving mathematical induction (see Section
3.2.3). Recall that this study considers algebraic verifications and statements involving
finite sums to be “standard” mathematical induction problems. A common theme identified
by the inductive thematic analysis involved the use of standard mathematical induction
problems in introductory proofs courses. During data analysis, three trends emerged as subthemes in relation to standard PMI examples. First, individual participants offered some
differing opinions of the use-value of these standard problems, and this trend formed the ‘UseValue of Standard PMI Problems’ sub-theme. Second, although perceptions of usefulness
differed, participants agreed that these standard problems were not representative of the
types of mathematical induction problems they encounter now as graduate students. This
phenomenon was encoded as the ‘Relevance of Standard PMI Problems.’ Third, the data
indicates a consensus that intro to proofs courses should include at least some examples of
non-standard proofs using PMI, and this common occurrence was coded as the ‘Need for
Nonstandard Examples of PMI’. Some illuminating discussions and interpretations of these
three sub-themes are included in this section.
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4.3.3.1

Use-Value of Standard Problems As mentioned, there were differing opinions

regarding the value of standard mathematical induction problems in introductory proofs
courses. Participant 3 indicated that he did not feel these problems effectively convey the
power of mathematical induction. When asked why he felt these types of problems were not
very useful for understanding mathematical induction, he responded as follows.
P3: I mean, I think they’re good once or twice. So you’re seeing a specific application of the principle of mathematical induction to like, a number whatever. . .
number theory problem. But like, mathematical induction as a principle goes
beyond just like, oh, let me look at this algebraic expression and expand. You
know, you have some polynomial thing that you expand collect some terms on
the side. We’ll look at the previous case. Like, it’s much deeper than that. Like
using mathematical induction for, um. The problem with the L shaped tiles that
we did. . . from last week. Um, like, I think that. . . that’s like, so far removed
from the algebraic number theory, like the x3 − x is divisible by 6 problem. Like.
I. . . it wouldn’t shock me actually if you went to an intro to proofs student and
told them, like, assuming they had mostly been learning mathematical induction through those, like, number of theoretical problems, if you told them that
you could prove that problem from the first interview by mathematical induction,
they would not understand why or how. Because it just becomes too intrinsically
tied to these like silly problems about divisibility and whatever else.
This response validates work discussed in Chapter 2 which suggests that the sole use of
standard examples of PMI can create harmful associations between rote algebraic manipulations and mathematical induction which may not easily generalize to broader applications of
the principle (Avital & Libeskind, 1978; Ernest, 1984; Smith, 2006). In particular, the fifth
epistemological obstacle Ernest (1984) identified in his work with PMI was students inability
“to generalize the method of PMI to examples that differ from the routine algebraic verification they see associated with PMI in introductory proofs courses” (p. 182). The excerpt
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from Participant 3’s Interview above not only substantiates this claim, but also adds to it.
In particular, Participant 3 not only feels that the student will be unable to generalize the
method, but also feels that they would not even be able to recognize the method in a nonstandard context. In fact, several of the participants in the study experienced this difficulty
with generalizing the method to nonstandard contexts, as Participants 4 and 5 were unable
to successfully use PMI in Problem 1 (tromino) and and Participants 1 and 2 were unable
to successfully use PMI in Problem 2 (stamp problem). This has implications not only for
proof-construction activities in the classroom, but also for activities involving proof-reading
and proof-comprehension. While Participant 3 expressed concerns with these negative associations and questioned the overall usefulness of these standard problems, Participant 2
offered some differing opinions on the role and value of these problems.
When asked about the types of problems he primarily saw associated with mathematical
induction in his intro to proofs courses, Participant 2 gave the following response.
P2: It was sums. So it was like the sum of the first n numbers is. . . what was
it? Something like

n(n+1)
?
2

So it was like those kinds of examples. I think they’re

good examples, because it’s easy to see where to apply the induction hypothesis,
you just need to like try to cut the sum into the previous number, and then
try to make this from algebra. And doing algebra at this point where you learn
induction is something that I think everyone already know. So yeah. I remember
sums and I’m pretty sure there are more exercises that were not sums, but every
time I think of induction, I think of sums.
This quote illustrates two primary points. First, although he does not view it negatively like
Participant 3, Participant 2 exhibits the same strong association between PMI and these
standard problems when he says “every time I think of induction, I think of sums.” Second,
the primary benefit and value he identifies in these standard problems is their accessibility
to younger students with less mathematical training. This is important to note, since the
problems are not perceived to have value because they necessarily teach the technique of
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mathematical induction effectively, but rather because they offer an accessible way of using
mathematical induction. In addition to the usefulness of these standard problems, their
relevance to more advanced work using mathematical induction was also discussed.

4.3.3.2

Relevance of Standard PMI Problems When participants were asked to

describe how the standard examples of mathematical induction compare to the types of
mathematical induction they have seen in their graduate studies or their research, most of
the participants responded by saying that standard problems were trivial by comparison.
Participant 1 said, “Those types of problems are absolutely not what I do now.” Similarly,
when asked if he thought standard mathematical induction problems were representative of
the types of mathematical induction problems he sees in his work now, he replied, “ No, no,
they’re toy problems. They’re silly. Yeah. No, not even close.” This sentiment was echoed
by Participants 2 and 3. However, Participant 5 had a slightly different perspective. When
asked the same question, she responded as follows.
P5: I would say they were just different. . . . Like, how, um. So I’m thinking like
in precalc, maybe we first teach our students how to solve quadratic equations.
But, like, the really difficult problems are, like, the word problems where they
have to do the whole set up of the quadratic equation, and the quadratic equation
has a meaning to it. And then you. . . . and, like, sometimes the solution makes
sense sometimes like, both solutions don’t make sense. So I think that I would
say, like, proof by induction grew as well. In grad school, like, the problem comes
with some context.
Participant 5 expressed the view that these standard problems are important, relevant,
and related to the more advanced examples of PMI she has seen. In particular, she felt that
standard problems serve the purpose of introducing students to the technique of PMI in the
same way that we might introduce the most basic level of a concept in an undergraduate
mathematics course. This perspective should be closely considered in light of existing re-
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search involving PMI. Ernest’s theoretical research on PMI (1984) claims that students may
struggle to understand the usefulness and necessity of PMI. PMI is, in many ways, unlike
other the other principles and proving techniques they may have been previously exposed to.
In particular, he claims that “mathematical induction is neither self evident nor a generalisation of previous more elementary experience” (Ernest, 1984, p. 181-183). The act of using
standard PMI problems as introductory examples, as suggested by Participant 5 above, may
therefore have merit.
Standard examples of mathematical induction represent straightforward applications of
the principle with few complications from the contexts. These characteristics make them
well-suited to help students during as they adjust to the novel technique. However, several
authors have also identified strong associations between PMI and these standard problems as
harmful (Avital & Libeskind, 1978; Ernest, 1984; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993). In her analogy
above, Participant 5 discusses the process of gradually increasing the level of conceptual
difficulty as a teaching strategy, giving context to a mathematical concept like the quadratic
formula. This same approach could be used when teaching PMI to students for the first time.
Namely, initially using standard examples to ease them into using the technique could serve
to alleviate the difficulties associated with the foreign nature of PMI. However, in order to
prevent such strong, rigid associations with these types of problems, nonstandard examples
of mathematical induction should also be incorporated into instruction and curriculum. This
type of incorporation, along with associated difficulties, is discussed in the following section.

4.3.3.3

Need for Nonstandard Examples of PMI As discussed in the previous sec-

tion, the sole use of standard mathematical induction problem can lead to epistemological
difficulties with PMI. Smith (2006) found that some students did not view mathematical
induction as explanatory, but “as an algorithm they can apply almost blindly” (pp. 80–81).
Ernest (1984) also claims that students are often unable to generalize the method of PMI
to examples that differ from the routine algebraic verifications they see associated with PMI
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in introductory proofs courses. Not only do these issues cause students difficulty when approaching novel scenarios requiring mathematical induction, they can also inhibit them from
developing a robust understanding of the underlying technique itself. This phenomenon can
be seen in the excerpt below.
P2: So, yeah, that would be nice to actually get a little taste of how you use
mathematical induction in other things that are not so attached to algebra. Because you do not want the students to um link those things in their minds or else,
they maybe will not be able to do mathematical induction in other scenarios. I
remember that happened to me. When I saw an mathematical induction problem
that was not with algebra, it was hard for me to understand because it was not
in the so-called “right format.” (air quotes)
Here, Participant 2 indicated that he developed such a strong association between PMI and
standard mathematical induction that he was completely unable to apply or think about the
principle in other scenarios. Participant 3 also discussed the harm with only using standard
mathematical induction problems.
P3: If it’s one of those number, like the divisibility problems or number theoretical
ones, I immediately just write down what the k+1 case, and then just start trying
to, like, simplify like, there’s actually no thoughts going on in my head because
I just assume it’s I’m algebra trick, and if that fails, then I’ll go and think about
it more but, like, that’s usually my first bet for those type of problems.
According to Woodall (1981), students may become accustomed to the algorithmic versions
of the base step “plugging in n = 1” and inductive step of “an equation involving n and add
something to both sides so as to produce a similar equation with n + 1” (p. 100). This is
illustrated above in Participant 3’s excerpt. The lack of thought that occurs when working
on the standard problems indicates an algorithmic approach to PMI that, while it may not
be harmful for an expert who otherwise has a solid grasp on the technique of mathematical
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induction, can have harmful consequences for a novice. Styliandes, Sandefur, and Watson
(2016) believe that PMI can be introduced to students in a way that highlights what they call
its explanatory proving power. Namely, they advocate for using nonstandard mathematical
induction problems that (1) do not explicitly tell students to use PMI and (2) Are worded
in nonstandard ways (i.e. do not uses phrases like “show for all n ∈ N.”
One common argument against the use of nonstandard problems in introductory proofs
courses is difficulty finding problems which do require significant prerequisite content knowledge. This difficulty is captured in the excerpt from Participant 1 below.
I was trying to think of of. I don’t know, quote, unquote, low level, examples of
mathematical induction, and I was coming up blank, except that picture problem
with you.
Here, he referred to the tromino problem. It is true that many nonstandard examples of PMI
would require content knowledge beyond what is known by most students in an introductory
proofs course. However, there are still plenty of viable options. The two problems in this
study require only minimal content knowledge, as well as the nonstandard problems used in
the work on PMI done by Garcia-Martinez and Parraguez (2017). Later in his interview,
Participant 1 recalled another example of one such nonstandard problem.
P1: You know, actually, I think another early problem that’s like, actually kind
of quite like the tiling problem. Well, okay. It’s also a tiling problem, but maybe
it works quite differently. Um, is there’s, there’s a question about, um. Where
you have n boxes in a line, better phrased a 1 × n grid, um and you’re trying to
cover that with tiles of either size 2 or size 1 I don’t know if it’s quite familiar. If
this is a problem that’s familiar to you. I mean, the question is how many how
many ways can you tile and n × 1 object with tiles of size 2 × 1 and 1 × 1. So,
for example, if you’ve got length 3 tile, there are 3 ways to do it. Yeah, you can
either have all 1 length tiles, or you can have a 1 then a 2 or then a 2 then a
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1. All. Okay, and the way to go about it, um, actually figuring it out in general
is an inductive argument, you get the Fibonacci numbers and the idea is that,
like... But the idea is, like, you can, um cut... you can think about how to build
up, um, the nth case from the previous case, and the case before that.
Again, this demonstrates that there are nonstandard examples of mathematical induction
that could be appropriate to use in an introductory proofs course. The addition of these
nonstandard problems has the potential to help students develop both their understanding of
the underlying structure of an argument by PMI as well as the ability to apply the technique
in novel, nonstandard problems. The implementation of these nonstandard problems into
instruction and curriculum is explored in more detail in Chapter 5. The following section
provides a summary of the findings associated with standard PMI problems.
4.3.3.4

Conclusions The data supports three primary findings associated with Stan-

dard Mathematical Induction Problems as they relate to the current study.
1. While experts have varying opinions on the use-value and relevance of standard examples of PMI, there is a consensus that nonstandard examples of PMI should also be
incorporated into introductory proofs curriculum and instruction.
2. Some experts do not believe standard mathematical induction problems effectively
illuminate the underlying technique of PMI and can cause students to have difficulty
generalizing the technique.
3. Experts have experienced difficulties resulting from strong associations between PMI
and standard mathematical induction problems.
Together, the findings in this section provide insight to RQ1 and RQ4. First, the data
corroborates existing literature which says novices strongly associate PMI with standard
mathematical induction problems and are unable to generalize. However, the expert participants discussed how exposure to nonstandard PMI problems, coupled with years of study,
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have allowed them to develop their ability to apply PMI in novel scenarios. This illustrates
one way in which expert knowledge associated with PMI may develop over time. Second, the
section’s findings suggest that some experts believe that the incorporation of nonstandard
PMI problems into introductory proofs curriculum may help students develop the ability
to (1) identify situations where PMI is appropriate and (2) effectively apply PMI in novel
situations. These findings are consistent with the work done by Styliandes, Sandefur, and
Watson (2016). The following section concludes the chapter with a summary of the results
and findings detailed in Chapter 4.

4.4

Chapter Summary

This chapter presented the results of the study, summarizing the findings of the data analysis. Section 4.1 presented findings associated with the APOS Theory framework, including
a suggested revised version of the preliminary genetic decomposition. Section 4.2 provided
a revised eight-item version of the Expert Knowledge Framework. The section discussed the
results of the deductive thematic analysis conducted based on this revised framework, and
gave relevant examples from the data for each item. Finally, section 4.3 explored the findings
of the inductive thematic analysis and presented three recurring themes identified in the data,
giving relevant examples associated with each theme. Holistically, this chapter presented the
data, linked the findings to both the guiding research questions introduced in Chapter 1 and
the existing literature discussed in Chapter 2. The chapter also offered interpretations of the
data based on the study’s guiding theoretical frameworks and epistemological perspectives.
The following chapter will conclude the paper.

5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter offers a summary of the results discussed in detail in Chapter 4 as well as

closing remarks and implications of the study. Section 5.1 offers a summary of the study’s
findings as they relate to the research questions presented in Section 1.2 and the primary
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theoretical framework, APOS Theory. Since the primary focus of this study involves learning
and cognition in mathematics, Section 5.2 discusses potential implications of the research
for the teaching of PMI. Section 5.3 identifies potential limitations of the current research,
and Section 5.4 discusses potential future work that might expand on the work of this study.
Section 5.4 concludes the paper with closing remarks and final points for consideration.

5.1

Summary of Results

The following sections discuss how the results of the study address the research questions
outlined in Chapter 1. Note that some of the findings of the study relate to more than one of
the research questions, so they may be listed and discussed more than once in this section.

5.1.1

Research Question 1

RQ1 How do experts describe the development of their conceptual understanding of PMI
over time?
This research question was primarily addressed by the study in two ways. First, the
instruments and study design were created in a way to elicit responses associated with
participants memories of learning PMI for the first time. This allowed for direct comparison
of those memories with the participants current demonstrated conceptual understanding of
the technique of mathematical induction. Second, this study used expert participant, which
allows the data collected in this study to be compared with existing literature studying
PMI with novice participants. During data analysis, several of the findings offer information
related to RQ1. These findings are listed below, along with a brief description of how each
finding relates to RQ1.
1. Mathematical experts recognize the similarities and differences between various proof
techniques and generally group their knowledge of techniques together, adding to this
knowledge as they gain mathematical maturity. Participants in the study demonstrated
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a nuanced understanding of proof techniques that includes the ways in which they are
related to one another in the broader context of proof. This contrasts with participants
descriptions of their initial exposure to proof techniques, when they viewed them as
isolated from one another and had a limited understanding when a proof technique
was appropriate for a given context.
2. Mathematical Experts recognize that the fundamental components and characteristics of
a given proof technique are context-independent. While experts demonstrate the ability
to apply mathematical induction in a broad array of contexts, they still recognize that
the fundamental nature of the technique is the same despite the context in which it is
applied. In contrast, novices have difficulties extracting the technique from the context
of standard problems and may not recognize the similarities between a standard and
nonstandard use of PMI (Ernest, 1984).
3. Most mathematical experts still strongly link language involving the natural numbers
with the technique of mathematical induction. Various studies support the claim that
students strongly associate PMI with statements involving the natural numbers (Avital
& Libeskind, 1978; Ernest, 1984; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993). This study corroborates
this well-known link and notes that experts still maintain this strong association after
years of study.
4. Experts likely conditionalize their use of PMI on the identification of a relationship
between small and large cases in a given problem, and the lack of this identification
can result in the expert actively dismissing PMI as an appropriate technique. While
it is well-known that experts and novices alike associate PMI with the natural numbers, this study found that experts have developed other associations, including the
association between PMI and patterned relationships between successive cases. This
is indicative that as individuals gain mathematical maturity, they may develop more
nuanced associations between problem characteristics and PMI.
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5. The flexible retrieval exhibited by mathematics experts in this study has characteristics which distinguish it from rote memorization. While much of the research on
PMI conducted with novices suggest that they use algorithmic approaches along with
rote memorization to construct PMI proofs (Avital & Libeskind, 1978; Ernest, 1984;
Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993), this study found that experts demonstrated retrieval that
was more advanced and reflected a deep knowledge of the technique of mathematical
induction.
6. Over time, experts have developed strategies for approaching novel proof construction
problems, including those involving the use of PMI. While novices have been shown to
struggle to generalize the technique of mathematical induction to nonstandard PMI
problems (Avital & Libeskind 1978, Ernest 1984), experts demonstrated the ability to
apply the technique of PMI broadly in various mathematical fields and to discuss the
technique’s use in multiple contexts.
7. The proof production behaviors of mathematical experts differs from the proof production behaviors of novices. Previous studies note that novice students often participate
in what Weber (2005) calls procedural proof production, in which the student mimics
previously seen arguments with no real understanding of the statement they are proving. In contrast, the participants in this study were more likely to use what Weber
(2005) refers to as semantic proof production in which a student uses some informal or
intuitive examples of a relevant concept to understand the given statement. Based on
the memories of the participant this proof production behavior developed over time as
they gained mathematical maturity.
8. Evidence suggests that the mathematical fluency demonstrated by experts is developed
over a long period of time. By nature, the ability to gain a solid grasp on mathematical
language and concepts develops over a long period of time. The mathematical fluency
displayed by the participants in this study was developed over several years of study.
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5.1.2

Research Question 2

RQ2 How do experts situate their conceptual understanding of PMI in relation to the notions
of proof and proof technique?
The Principle of Mathematical Induction is used as a method of proof. Therefore, the
concept of PMI is inextricably linked to the general notion of proof and to other proving
techniques. This study sought to elucidate these linkages and to situate the technique of
mathematical induction within the broader literature involving proof. During data analysis,
several of the findings offer information associated with RQ2. These findings are listed below,
along with a brief description of how each finding relates to RQ2.
1. Mathematical Experts recognize that the fundamental components and characteristics of
a given proof technique are context-independent. While experts demonstrate the ability
to apply mathematical induction in a broad array of contexts, they still recognize that
the fundamental nature of mathematical induction remains unchanged, regardless of
context. They are also able to compare the fundamental characteristics of the technique
of mathematical induction with other proof techniques. In particular, they exhibit the
ability to understand how PMI is similar to and distinct from other proof techniques
and to use these comparisons to classify when PMI may be appropriate for a given
problem.
2. Mathematical experts exhibit the ability to flexibly retrieve relevant facts, theorems,
entire proofs, and overarching proof strategies of known-proofs when working on proving
problems. The participants in the study demonstrated the ability to rapidly recall
relevant details related to a given novel problem with little to no attentional effort.
This is indicative that experts may organize their knowledge of proof and specific
proof techniques, like PMI in ways that allow them to easily access relevant information
quickly when working on novel problems.
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3. The flexible retrieval exhibited by mathematics experts in this study has characteristics which distinguish it from rote memorization. The flexible retrieval demonstrated
by experts in the study reflects a deep understanding of how the concepts of proof
technique and PMI are related, rather than just a set of memorized facts.
5.1.3

Research Question 3

RQ3 When viewing a novel problem, how do experts determine whether or not mathematical
induction is an appropriate method for proving a statement?
This study sought to better understand how experts determine whether or not mathematical induction is an appropriate technique for a given problem statement. This research
question was most closely associated with the items of Pattern Recognition and Contextual
Condition in the Expert Knowledge Framework. During data analysis, several of the findings
offer information associated with RQ3. These findings are listed below, along with a brief
description of how each finding relates to RQ3.
1. Pattern recognition is linked to the inductive step of PMI. Experts most often identified PMI as an appropriate technique when they identified a pattern between small
and large cases of the given statement. This is likely an important way that experts
determine when to use PMI in novel problems.
2. Some mathematical experts may organize their knowledge according to mathematical
discipline and may conditionalize their use of certain proof techniques according to
which discipline a given problem is associated with. Some experts strongly associate
PMI with particular mathematical disciplines (e.g. graph theory, combinatorics) and
indicate that the mathematical field of a given problem may serve as part of their
determination of whether or not PMI is an appropriate technique.
3. Most mathematical experts still strongly link language involving the natural numbers
with the technique of mathematical induction. While this finding was also associated
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with RQ1, it also provides insight to RQ3. Namely, this finding indicates that experts
may still use phrases involving the natural numbers as an indicator that PMI may be
an appropriate proof technique for a given problem.
4. Experts likely conditionalize their use of PMI on the identification of a relationship
between small and large cases in a given problem, and the lack of this identification can
result in the expert actively dismissing PMI as an appropriate technique. While this
item was also linked to RQ1, since it highlights a difference between how experts think
about PMI when compared to novices, it also gives insight to RQ3. As mentioned
in Item 1, the recognition of an inductive pattern may be integral to an expert’s
determination that PMI is an appropriate technique for a given problem. This finding
also indicates that the experts in the study use the lack of such a pattern as an
indicator that PMI may not be appropriate. In terms of APOS Theory, this may mean
that an experts ability to appropriately identify PMI as a proving technique for a given
problem depends, in part, on their ability to interiorize actions associated with small
examples into processes they can use to generalize patterns between small cases.
5. Mathematical Experts exhibit the ability to flexibly retrieve and recall both entire proofs
and overarching proof strategies. Because experts demonstrate the ability to easily
recall known proofs and proof strategies, the decision to use PMI in a given scenario
may be based on a related proof or problem that is known to the expert.

5.1.4

Research Question 4

RQ4 What obstacles, if any, do experts face when solving mathematical induction problems
in which mathematical induction is not explicitly specified as the technique to use?
The literature identifies several epistemological associated with PMI (Avital& Libeskind,
1978; Ernest, 1984; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993). This study sought to determine if some, all,
or none of these difficulties were also common to expert participants. During data analysis,
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several of the findings offer information associated with RQ4. These findings are listed below,
along with a brief description of how each finding relates to RQ4.
1. Experts demonstrate behaviors indicative of varying levels of development within the
APOS Theory framework for both the base step and inductive step of PMI. As discussed in Section 4.1, not all participants in the study demonstrated a high-level of
conceptual development for both parts of PMI. While the observed behavior may not
be wholly indicative of the cognitive constructions in an individual’s mind, it was certainly the case that students exhibiting higher levels of development in the context of
the APOS Theory framework were, in general, more successful on the cognitive tasks.
This suggests that students with lower levels of understanding of one or both parts of
mathematical induction or of the relationship between the two parts may struggle to
some extent applying the technique in novel scenarios.
2. Mathematical experts exhibit success at recognizing and using patterns in problem- solving and proof construction, and Pattern Recognition is linked to success proving the inductive step of PMI. As previously mentioned, successfully identifying a pattern linking
small cases to larger cases was a primary indicator for participants that PMI may be
an appropriate proving technique. In the mathematical induction problems used for
this study, PMI was not specified as the proving technique to use. Participants who
struggled to identify a pattern relating small cases to large cases during the cognitive
tasks were significantly less likely to solve the problems. This is indicative that lack of
pattern recognition skills may be one obstacle for experts working on novel problems
where PMI is not specified for them. In terms of APOS Theory, these difficulties with
pattern recognition are likely indicative of difficulties with the mechanism of interiorization. That is to say, this may reflect participant difficulties with reflecting on the
actions they perform when working on small examples, which then prohibits them from
interiorizing these actions into processes. As a result, they may be unable to generalize
patterns identified in small examples into broader arguments for the given problem.
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3. Experts, even experts with similar backgrounds and levels of experience, may exhibit
varying levels of success on cognitive tasks involving proof construction for novel problem statements. As discussed in Section 4.2, expertise is not a guarantee that an
individual will be able to effectively apply their knowledge in all scenarios. This was
demonstrated in the study. Only one of the participants (Participant 3) was able to
successfully solve both mathematical induction problems. The remaining four participants were only able to solve one of the two. This is indicative that, even when they
demonstrate a solid conceptual understanding of a concept, there is no guarantee they
will be able to apply it in all scenarios.
5.1.5

Research Question 5

RQ5 How do experts explain and define the two primary parts of PMI (the base step and
the inductive step) and the perceived relationship, if any, between these two primary
parts?
Since the primary focus of the study was understanding how experts think about and use
mathematical induction, it was natural to try to understand how these experts conceptualize each component of PMI. The insight to this research question primarily came from the
analysis with the APOS Theory Framework, since APOS Theory is useful in deconstructing complex mental structures and concepts. During data analysis, several of the findings
offer information associated with RQ5. These findings are listed below, along with a brief
description of how each finding relates to RQ5.
1. Some experts are able to simplify and explain the two primary parts of mathematical
induction and to describe the overall principle in the context of these two parts. Many of
the participants demonstrated the ability to explain mathematical induction well, even
to individuals with no mathematical background. These participants used analogies
(explored in Detail in Section 4.2) that grounded both steps of mathematical induction,
the base case and the inductive step, in simple terms. As discussed in Section 4.1, the
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ability to form successful analogies is indicative that an individual is operating at an
object stage of understanding, since the ability to compare two separate ideas (like a
chain of dominos and PMI) requires the individual to have encapsulated the process
into an object they can think about in totality.
2. Experts, even experts with similar backgrounds, exhibit varying levels of success when
communicating concepts associated with PMI to students. Not all participants were
able to effectively communicate the two primary parts of mathematical induction in
ways that would be comprehensible or illuminating for students. Some participants
merely re-worded the formal definition without actually explaining the technique. In
contrast, some participants were able to explain the principle in ways that reflected deep
knowledge of both mathematics and pedagogy. In particular, participants who gave the
most informed communication strategies indicated that they would use several different
examples of PMI in various contexts in order to motivate students’ understanding of
the concept before giving them a rigorous definition. This approach allows students to
first perform the actions associated with PMI (via working on examples using PMI)
and then to reflect on those actions before ever trying to understand a more abstract
definition of PMI.
3. Experts demonstrate behaviors indicative of varying levels of development within the
APOS Theory framework for both the base step and inductive step of PMI, but the data
indicates that the experts in the study have at least a process-stage of understanding
of both of the primary parts of PMI. The participants all exhibited the ability to
imagine the process of proving a statement using mathematical induction in their
minds, indicating that they have at least a process stage conception of both parts of the
technique. Many of the participants exhibited behavior suggesting they had progressed
past the process stage of mathematical induction. In general, the participants were all
able to provide both a description of each step and to explicate each step’s purpose in
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the broader technique.
4. While some participants view the base case as being easy, all of the participants demonstrated recognition of the necessity of the base case as part of the technique of mathematical induction.

Existing research indicates that novices tend to underestimate

the importance and neccesity of the base case of mathematical induction (Avital &
Libeskind, 1978; Ernest, 1984; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993). While the participants in
this study indicated various levels of depth in their conceptual understanding of the
base case (some viewed it as trivial, while others viewed it as informing the overall
proof), all participants demonstrated a full recognition of the necessity of the base
case within PMI. In terms of APOS Theory, this is indicative that the participants
have successfully coordinated the base case process and the inductive step process to
form the process of PMI, so that they recognize both the role that each process plays as
well as the necessity of each within the broader technique of mathematical induction.
5. Some participants are more successful at describing the relationship between the two
steps of mathematical induction, but all of the participant behavior during CTA indicates that all participants have, to some extent, coordinated the base case process
and the inductive step process. Some participants were unable to communicate the
relationship between the base step and inductive step, while others gave nuanced descriptions of this relationship and how it operates as part of their proving strategies.
However, regardless of their ability to verbally communicate their understanding of the
relationship, all the participants demonstrated that they had coordinated the process
of the base case and the process of the inductive step in their minds, as demonstrated
in their work on the cognitive tasks when they were able to describe or construct an
argument using the technique of mathematical induction. The varying degrees of success in describing the relationship may be correlated with the different levels of schema
development demonstrated by the participant during the CTA and interviews. Those
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who demonstrated a more advanced level of PMI-schema development were able to
more effectively describe the relationships between the base case and the inductive
step of mathematical induction.

5.1.6

Revised Genetic Decomposition

Recall that genetic decompositions operate as rubric-like models for explaining cognitive
constructions associated with a particular concept. In APOS Theory, they are used to identify mental constructions students should be able to make in order to develop sufficient
understanding of mathematical concepts (Arnon et al. 2014). It is important to note that
genetic decompositions offer a potential model of how a concept may be constructed in
students’ minds. The researcher initially uses a preliminary genetic decomposition, which
may be a novel decomposition or may have been tested in previous research studies. The
preliminary genetic decomposition used for this study informed the creation and implementation of the research instruments including the CTA activities and the interviews. During
data analysis, the preliminary genetic decomposition for this study was evaluated. The
data indicated that a few constructions demonstrated by participants in the study were not
completely captured by the preliminary genetic decomposition. The revised version of the
genetic decomposition is below (with revisions in bold).
1. Reversal through the existential quantifier to form a process of identifying and testing
an appropriate base case P (a).
2. Interiorizing the action of a logical statement P (N ) for a given statement P
and an arbitrary N ∈ N.
3. Coordinate the process of P (N ) from Step 2 with the process of identifying
and testing an appropriate base case from Step 1 to form a process of testing
a statement P (N ).
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4. Encapsulate the coordinated processes from Step 2 into the statement object P (N ) for any N ∈ N.
5. Expand the Function Schema to include a function mapping each natural number to
a propostion-valued output (f : N → P (N )).
6. Encapsulate logic into the implication p ⇒ k. The implication cognitively becomes an
object which is the value of the function f .
7. Encapsulate P (N ) and P (N + 1) into the logical implication p ⇒ k to form
the implication P (N ) ⇒ P (N + 1)
8. Create the schema of the implication-valued function g where g(N) = (P (N ) ⇒ P (N +
1))
9. Interiorize the action of logical necessity into a process so that inputs P0 and PA ⇒ PB
allow one to conclude PB .
10. Coordinate the function g from Step 7 with Modus Ponens beginning with P (a) from
Step 1 for an appropriate case a.
11. Coordinate this implication valued function along with the base case process through
the use of modus ponens to explain the PMI.
12. Encapsulate this inductive process into an object be connected to the Method of Proof
schema so induction can be applied as a proof method.
13. Generalize actions on the induction object within various problem types coordinated
with the Method-of-Proof schema until students can apply induction as a proof technique.
14. Generalize actions to the base case object until students can identify an appropriate
base case in novel problems where it is not specified.
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The testing and revision of genetic decompositions is a crucial part of research using APOS
Theory. Recall that the APOS Theory research cycle starts with some preliminary genetic
decomposition (like the one described in Chapter 3), followed by the development of teaching
material or research instruments and finally, instruction or research using these materials.
Afterward, data is collected and analyzed, the genetic decomposition is revised, and the
teaching material or research instrument is modified for a repetition of the cycle to start anew.
The revised genetic decompostion presented by this paper should be tested by future studies
to evaluate the validity of the added steps and to determine if any further modifications are
required to fully capture the constructions involved in the technique of PMI.

5.2

Implications for Instruction

At the heart of mathematics education research is the desire to improve pedagogical practices in mathematics classrooms. This research identifies several potential implications for
instruction at the undergraduate level. Each of these implications are discussed in detail in
this section, along with some concrete suggestions for pedagogical and curricular adjustments
that may help address the issues identified in this research.

5.2.1

The Use of Nonstandard PMI Problems

Potentially the most prevailing connection to instruction identified within the data relates
to the use of standard mathematical induction problems discussed in detail in Section 4.3.1.
This study validates existing literature discussed in Chapter 2 that indicates the isolated use
of standard mathematical induction examples, including algebraic verifications and equalities
involving finite sums, can create and reinforce harmful associations. These associations can
create issues with generalizing the technique of mathematical induction to broader contexts
as a student progresses through a major (Ernest, 1984). One common argument against rectifying this issue is that other inductive proofs require high-level knowledge that students in
an introductory proofs course may not have. However, this study offers two problems using
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mathematical induction that do not require highly-specific knowledge and demonstrate the
use of PMI in a nonstandard problem. Other such examples have been used in research,
as discussed in Section 2.5.2. One such example was discussed by Participant 1 (see Section 4.4.1), and it is likely that numerous other examples could be easily constructed and
implemented into activities for the classroom. The pre-existing literature, in addition to
the current study’s results, suggest that the use of these nonstandard problems in tandem
with the standard problems typically seen in an intro to proofs course may lessen the negative associations with PMI and allow students to more easily generalize the technique of
mathematical induction to other contexts. The use of nonstandard mathematical induction
problems also has the potential to alleviate another issue identified by the study, which is
discussed in the following section.
5.2.2

Teaching Expertise

Expertise can often be perceived as elusive or unattainable. Each of the eight items in the
revised Expert Knowledge Framework are concrete characteristics, and the abstract concept
of expertise can become more tangible and grounded when linking it to the framework. These
tangible, more manageable characteristics are often measurable skills, allowing educators to
use them to inform instructional and curricular design. Some suggestions for incorporating
each of the eight items in the framework into into instruction of PMI, based on the findings
of the study, are included below.
1. Pattern Recognition: When introducing PMI, proof construction and proof reading
activities can be scaffolded in ways that emphasize patterns between large and small
cases. This has the potential to help students to develop their ability to recognize these
kinds of patterns.
2. Contextual Conditioning: The pattern recognition discussed in Item 1 should be linked
to the technique of mathematical induction. This link can be reinforced through lecture
and activities, by providing several nonstandard examples of PMI and emphasizing
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the relationship between problem characteristics and the technique of mathematical
induction.
3. Knowledge Organization: When homework is assigned section-by-section, students are
not forced to practice identifying the appropriate strategy on their own. As students are
exposed to various proof techniques, exercises which ask them to compare and contrast
the techniques and to identify appropriate techniques for given problems may help them
develop a well-organized system associated with proof techniques and strategies.
4. Flexible Retrieval: Active learning activities, when carefully and intentionally constructed, can help students develop their retrieval skills. When topics are introduced
in class, they should be followed first with scaffolded activities to help students develop links from problem contexts to learned knowledge. Then, the scaffolding should
be removed so that the student can practice accessing the appropriate knowledge independently. Continually providing new situations requiring the same piece of knowledge
can help further develop this skill.
5. Variable Communication: The ability to communicate both concepts and mathematical arguments is a crucial skill for mathematicians. This skill can be developed by
incorporating presentational elements into the classroom. This can be in the form of
group discussion, where individuals must present and defend their arguments in small
groups or on a wider scale where participants present a proof to the entire class.
6. Novel Application: The ability to apply the technique of mathematical induction in
a novel scenario is best developed by giving students where they (1) must determine
when PMI is appropriate on their own (2) are asked to apply PMI in a variety of
nonstandard contexts.
7. Mathematical Fluency: This item should develop naturally as long as students are given
intentionally developed instruction, like the examples in the previous items. The data
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indicates that Mathematical Fluency develops over time with exposure and experience.
8. Comprehension Monitoring: Assigning proof validation activities will likely help students develop their ability to monitor comprehension. Modeling this behavior during
lecture and providing opportunities for them to question themselves, each other, and
you during the learning process will allow students to improve their Comprehension
Monitoring Skills.
These are only a few, general suggestions of how the findings in this study may be used
to inform teaching practices, and these strategies should be implemented and tested during
future studies. In general, however, expertise should not be seen as unattainable for the
average student. Expertise is not innate or inborn. Instead, most experts have carefully
and intentionally cultivated their expertise over years of study, and the characteristics that
define expertise can certainly be included into instructional design. Further work should be
done to explore other implications for teaching PMI since, by nature, all research studies are
limited in scope. The limitations of the current study are explored in the following section.

5.3

Limitations of the Study

Every research study has limitations. Acknowledging and describing these limitations
is a crucial component of the research process. This section will explore the limitations
of the current study. First, although generalizability is not the primary purpose of this
research, it is important to note that findings from a case-study or multi-case study with
a smaller number of participants will not always provide results which are easily applicable
to a broader set of individuals. But, collectively, this study along with previous qualitative
research studies, provide us with valuable insights about students understanding of PMI.
Therefore, the results from this study offer a deeper and richer account of several expert
participants’ views and experiences. Secondly, for data consistency, the participants in this
study were selected from the same regional area of the United States with several other
selection criteria (detailed in Section 3.1), and there is potential bias in the sample as a
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result. Although these criteria were used intentionally, more research should be conducted
with a variety of participants in order to further triangulate the data with a broader pool of
participants. This is explored further in the following section.
As with all research, whether quantitative or qualitative, the researcher’s own bias is an
integral part of the research process and should always be acknowledged. I conducted the
interviews, verified the transcriptions, coded the results, and interpreted the data presented
in this study. In order to account for this bias and to ensure that it did not unduly or
negatively impact the findings and results of the study, several methods of triangulation
were used. A second researcher checked, validated, and critiqued all initial codings as well
as the interpretations of the data. The written work of the participants is included as
part of the data analysis to corroborate and enhance the interpretation and dialogue data.
The interpretations are informed heavily by existing peer-reviewed research and theoretical
frameworks to ensure rigorous analysis in the work. These actions help to lessen any negative
impacts the primary researcher’s bias may have contributed to the research and data analysis.
Lastly, this study intentionally used questions which did not require any highly specific
mathematical knowledge associated with any branches of mathematics. While this was an
important part of the current work, it is likely that exploring mathematical induction in
even more specific cases with experts in various fields of mathematics may offer even more
insight to PMI and the cognitive processes associated with it. Potential future studies with
such specificity are discussed in the following section.

5.4

Future Research

This study offers three natural avenues for future study. First, the revised genetic decomposition outlined in Section 4.2 can be used to develop teaching materials for PMI, and
the outcomes of these materials could be tested to check if the genetic decomposition may
need further refinement. Second, the expert knowledge framework, used in tandem with
CTA or comparable methods, has the potential to serve as an effective method for analyzing
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mathematical expertise in various contexts. Future work could further investigate each item
in the framework to identify any redundancies or gaps in the framework. Additionally, the
more work could be done on item interaction for the framework similar to the discussion
in Section 4.3.10 to further our understanding about how various characteristics of expert
knowledge inform and influence each other. Finally, good mathematics education research
should have concrete applications to the teaching and learning of mathematics. The implications for teaching discussed in Section 5.2 offer various strategies for adjusting teaching
practices associated with mathematical induction. Each of these suggestions offers the potential for implementation and evaluation research studies. I will conclude the paper with a
quote from Henkin (1961) which motivated this work.
“Of what real good is this principle anyhow?” you may ask. Of course one answer is that it can be used to establish many general statements about positive
integers, but perhaps you are not really interested in general statements about
positive integers. You have heard that mathematics can be used to build bridges
or guide rockets, and you may wonder if mathematical induction can be applied
to problems in such domains. As a matter of fact there are very few direct
applications of mathematical induction to what we might call “engineering problems”; most of these arise in connection with computations in the elementary
theory of probability. But in spite of this, mathematical induction is really of
great importance to engineering, for it enters into the proofs of a great many of
the fundamental theorems in the branch of mathematics we call analysis - and
these theorems are used over and over by engineers. And yet, to me, the true
significance of mathematical induction does not lie in its importance for practical
applications. Rather I see it as a creation of man’s intellect which symbolizes his
ability to transcend the confines of his environment. After all, wherever we go,
wherever we look in our universe, we see only finite sets: The eggs in a market,
the people in a room, the leaves in a forest, the stars in a galaxy - all of these are
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finite. But somehow man has been able to send his imagination soaring beyond
anything he has ever seen, to create the concept of an infinite set. And mathematical induction is his most basic tool of discovery in this abstract and distant
realm. To me, this conception gives to mathematical study a sense of excitement,
and I hope that some of you will carry your study of mathematics to the point
where you too can experience the unique excitement which mathematics affords
to its devoted student. (p.10)
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A Induction Problem Solutions
1. Show that there exists a minimal n such that for all m with m ≥ n, a 2m × 2m
chessboard with one missing tile can be exactly covered with “trominos” that is, three
tiles in an L-shape as pictured below (the trominos in the cover may be oriented in
any direction):

Proof: First, note that for n = 1, a 2×2 chessboard with one tile removed is a tromino,
so the property holds trivially when n = 1. Now, assume the property holds
for some n ≥ 1. Consider a chessboard C of size 2n+1 × 2n+1 . Note that we can
think of this chessboard as four copies of a 2n × 2n chessboard, with one in each
quadrant as illustrated below.

If we remove one tile from C, what remains is 3 complete copies of 2n × 2n
chessboards and one copy with a single tile missing. Now, the inductive hypothesis ensures that the 2n × 2n board with a missing tile can be covered by
trominos. For the remaining three complete boards, we can place a tromino
covering the three squares where these boards meet at the center of C. This
will cover exactly one tile in each of the three boards, leaving boards which can
be covered by trominos by the inductive hypothesis.
■
2. Assume that if you want to send a package, you must pay a certain amount of postage.
Show that there exists some minimal n ∈ N such that any package with a postage price
of m cents for m ≥ n can be paid for exactly using only 4 and 5 cent stamps.
Proof: First, note that 11 cannot be written as a linear combination of 4 and 5. Thus,
n ≥ 12. Next, we can see that the property holds for 12, 13, 14, and 15. Namely,
we have that 12 = 4(3), 13 = 4(2) + 5(1), 14 = 4(1) + 5(2), and 15 = 5(3).
Now, let m ≥ 15, we have that m is congruent to one of these four base cases
modulo 4. Therefore, m = y + 4k for y ∈ {12, 13, 14, 15} and k ∈ Z. Since we
know y can be written as a linear combination of 4 and 5, we can see that m
can also be written in this way, as desired.
■
OR
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Proof: For the basis step, we will prove not only P (12), but also P (13), P (14), and
P (15). Namely, we have that 12 = 4(3), 13 = 4(2) + 5(1), 14 = 4(1) + 5(2), and
15 = 5(3).
For the inductive step, assume for all j with 12 ≤ j ≤ n, the statement holds.
Now consider a package whose postage costs n + 1 cents. Consider a package
which costs n+1−4 = n−3 cents. Then as long as 12 ≤ n−3, we can cover this
cost with 4 and 5 cent stamps by the inductive hypothesis. Therefore, adding
one 4 cent stamp will cover the cost of the n + 1 cent package. Therefore, as
long as n ≥ 15, the property holds. Together with the four base cases, this
completes the induction.
■
B Interview 1 Questions and Protocol
B.1 Interview Guide
Initial Prompt:
This initial interview will include a problem solving section. I will provide you with two
problems, one at a time. For each problem, you will have around 20 minutes to read the
question and think about, talk about, and write out a potential solution to each of them. If
you are able to come up with a complete proof by the end of the allotted time, that is great.
However, it is not necessary, and you don’t have to feel pressured to do so. The primary
point of these exercises is to get a feel for your thought process as you work on the problem.
You may use any method you wish to solve the problems. It is helpful if you talk out loud
as you work on a solution.
After the problem solving period, I will ask you some questions about your thought process,
work, and ideas. You are not required to do so, but if you choose to write things down, it
would be helpful for me to have a copy of your written work after the interview. It is
helpful if you have two differently colored writing utensils, so that your original work can be
distinguished from any edits you make afterward. We will repeat this process for each of the
two problems. Do you have any questions before we get started?
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Question 1 (Trominos)
Prompt: I would like you to read the prompt, and take about 20 minutes to work on the
problem. You can take notes, think out loud, think to yourself, or any combination of these
three things. Then, I will ask you some questions.
“Stuck” Prompts (Optional): Use if participant is struggling at a particular step.
1. Base Case:
(a) If you are having difficulties identifying the initial m, what are some strategies
you could use to find a candidate?
(b) Are there any natural numbers you know won’t work? Why?
2. Inductive Step:
(a) So what is the inductive hypothesis you are using?
(b) Can you see any way that your inductive hypothesis links to the “n+1” statement?
(c) It seems like you may be having difficulties linking the nth step to the n + 1 step.
Could you reduce it to the case where we move from n = 1 to n = 2. Does this
generalize somehow?
(d) I see you have shown this works in the case of a particular tile being removed.
Does your exact argument still work no matter which tile we remove from the
chessboard?
Post-Solution Questions:
1. This is a problem is asking for a proof. What is the first step in your process when
you work on a problem asking for a proof?
Further prompts (as needed):
(a) Why do you think it’s important to start with this step?
(b) How does this step affect or inform how you approach the rest of a problem?
(c) Have you always started your proof construction process this way?
(d) What did this initial step look like for you in the context of this particular problem?
2. How do you identify what proof strategy you use for a given problem?
Further prompts (as needed):
(a) Can you give me some examples of words or phrases that you associate with
particular proof strategies?
(b) For this question, how did you decide on a proof strategy?
3. You indicated that you used
as your strategy for this question. If you were explaining this proof strategy to someone in an introductory proofs
course, how would you explain the process of using this strategy?
Further prompts (as needed):
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(a) Using your explanation of that proof strategy, can you walk me through each part
of your solution and how it fits into your description of the process?
(b) And in the context of this strategy, what was the purpose of
in your solution?
(c) Thinking about this proof strategy, are there any parts of your proof which are
extraneous or unnecessary? Are there any crucial components which are missing?
4. (Induction Questions)
(a) How would you describe the way the base case fits in with the overall induction
proof for this question?
(b) In general, how related do you think the proof of the base case and the proof of
the inductive step are?
(c) For this question, can you talk about which part of the induction you found most
difficult? Why was that difficult?
5. (Optional) Since you did not finish, can you walk me through what your plan was for
the rest of the problem?
Question 2 (Postage)
Prompt: Now, we are going to follow the same process for one more problem. Again, I would
like you to read the prompt, and take about 20 minutes to work on the problem. You can
take notes, think out loud, think to yourself, or any combination of these three things. Then,
I’ll ask you some questions.
“Stuck” Prompts (Optional): Use if participant is struggling at a particular step.
1. Base Case:
(a) If you are having difficulties identifying the initial m, what are some strategies
you could use to find a candidate?
(b) Are there any natural numbers you know will not work? Why?
2. Inductive Step:
(a) So what is the inductive hypothesis you are using?
(b) Can you see any way that your inductive hypothesis links to the “n+1” statement?
(c) It seems like you may be having difficulties linking the nth step to the n + 1 step.
Could you reduce it to the case where we move from n = 1 to n = 2. Does this
generalize somehow?
(d) I see you have shown this works in the case of a particular tile being removed.
Does your exact argument still work no matter which tile we remove from the
chessboard?
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Post-Solution Questions:
1. How did you identify what proof strategy you wanted to use for this problem?
as your strategy for this ques2. You indicated that you used
tion. (If not same strategy as before): If you were explaining this proof strategy to
someone in an introductory proofs course, how would you explain the process of using
this strategy?
Further prompts (as needed):
(a) Using your explanation of that proof strategy, can you walk me through each part
of your solution and how it fits into your description of the process?
(b) And in the context of this strategy, what was the purpose of
in your solution?
(c) Thinking about this proof strategy, are there any parts of your proof which are
extraneous or unnecessary? Are there any crucial components which are missing?
3. Are there any notable similarities or differences between this problem and the previous
problem? Further prompts (as needed):
(a) When you use the same proof technique for different problems, what are some of
the ways the structure is similar and/or different?
4. (Induction Questions)
(a) How would you describe the way the base case fits in with the overall induction
proof for this question?
(b) For this question, can you talk about which part of the induction you found most
difficult? Why was that difficult.
5. (Optional) Since you did not finish, can you walk me through what your plan was for
the rest of the problem?
C Interview 2 Questions and Protocol
Initial Prompt:
The initial interview consisted of a problem-solving section followed by questions and discussion about your solutions. During this interview, I will be asking you several questions.
We will start by talking about your mathematical background, current position, and general
questions about your teaching and research. Next, I will ask several questions about about
proof writing and construction as well as the Principle of Mathematical Induction. There
are no right or wrong answers. The purpose of this interview is to better understand your
mathematical background, how you approach certain types of problems, and how you think
about certain concepts. Before we get started, do you have any questions for me?
Interview Questions (Graduate Student Version):
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1. Before we get started, can you tell me what your current position is and what your
main areas of current research are?
2. How long have you been in your program?
3. To what extent and in what capacity would you say mathematical proof shows up in
your day-to-day life?
Further Prompts (if necessary):
(a) How often do you write proofs? Read them?
(b) How comfortable do you feel constructing proofs for problems you haven’t seen
before?
4. This interview will primarily deal with proof writing, construction, and comprehension.
You were chosen for this study in part due to the length and scope of your mathematical
and proof-writing experience. What are the primary skills you think are necessary for
good proof-construction?
Further Prompts (if necessary):
(a) How and when did you start developing these skills?
(b) Do you feel that you are still developing these skills? If so, how and when do you
work on these abilities?
5. There are a lot of different proof techniques we use as mathematicians. Over the
years you have studied mathematics, how has your understanding of these different
techniques changed or grown?
Further Prompts (if necessary):
(a) Are there any proof techniques which were difficult for you to learn at first?
(b) Are there any proof techniques that you still sometimes struggle with in the
context of your current work?
(c) What was your experience of proof-writing/proof-comprehension like during the
transition from undergraduate to graduate coursework?
Now, I would like to ask you some questions about the technique of induction, in
particular.
6. If you were trying to explain how and why induction works as a proving technique to
someone with no mathematical background at all, how would you do that?
7. If you had to give me a formal definition of the Principle of Mathematical Induction,
what would it be? Feel free to say it out loud, or write it down, or both.
8. When you first learned induction, what kinds of examples do you most often remember
being exposed to? What kinds of examples do you see now in your own studies or
research?
Further Prompts (if necessary):
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(a) Do you think the kinds of induction problems you saw in your intro to proofs
course were representative of the kinds of induction problems you see now?
9. Can you think of an example of a difficult or challenging induction problem you’ve
seen, solved, or read recently? Tell me about how that problem compares to the more
simple or “classic” induction problems we see in intro courses. Further Prompts (if
necessary):
(a) What is it about the problem you thought of that makes it trickier or more difficult
to understand?
(b) What was the most difficult part of the proof (e.g. base case, inductive step,
technical components, etc.)?
10. If you are tackling an induction problem you have not seen before, walk me through
an outline of the process you would go through.
11. Could you give me a list of concepts/facts/definitions/skills/etc. that you feel you
need/need to know in order to be able to successfully write an induction proof from
start to finish?
12. The base step of PMI usually involves proving (and sometimes identifying) a statement
for some particular value. What concepts/facts/definitions/skills/etc. do you think are
involved with understanding and proving this base step?
13. The inductive step is usually written in the form P (n) ⇒ P (n + 1). What concepts/facts/definitions/skills/etc. do you think are involved with understanding and
proving this inductive step?
14. How do you feel that other proof techniques relate to induction?
Further Prompts (if necessary):
(a) Do you need to understand other techniques to be able to perform induction?
(b) Do you use other techniques within induction?
15. Are there any interesting anecdotes/thoughts you have from your experience either
learning or using induction that you feel offer insight to the process or potential issues?

